The Security, Conflict and International Development (SCID) Symposium 2015
Researching and Working in Conflict-Affected Environments
Researching and Working in Conflict-Affected Environments: A Reader

Edited by
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Katharina von Schroeder is a film director and current SCID Student. She completed her film studies at the Konrad Wolf School for Film and TV in Potsdam Babelsberg with the feature length documentary My globe is broken in Rwanda, which was shown at several
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**Chris Sharwood-Smith** spent 31 years in the Police Service and has been deployed overseas on stabilisation activities and seconded to the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to work at the UK Mission to the UN on peacekeeping training. Subsequently, Chris became involved in developing Police Peacekeeping training for the UN and represented the UK Government on the Doctrine Development Group as Chair of the Training sub-committee. Since retiring in 2010 Chris has worked with the US State Department and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on police peacekeeping training and development.

**Anna Shevchenko** is the CEO of 3CN, a UK-based consultancy, specialising in cross-cultural risk management and conflict resolution. Anna speaks seven languages and has lived and worked extensively in 32 countries, including as Deputy Head of the Kiev office of the OSCE Special Monitoring mission to Ukraine (2014). She has worked on a number of international crisis projects during the last 15 years. She is also a visiting lecturer at a number of institutions and has published widely, including on the culture, business attitudes and mentality within Ukraine and Russia.

**Matthew Waterfield** is a Senior Conflict and Security Expert with over twenty years of experience in conflict-affected countries. He is founding Director of niche consultancy firm Aktis Strategy, which provides strategic analysis and programmes in some of the most challenging conflict affected countries. Previous experience includes serving as a senior DPKO official and work as an independent consultant. He has specialist expertise in conflict analysis, stabilisation, security and justice sector reform, conflict transitions and governance. He has also played a lead role in the definition and development of UK government approach to cross-departmental conflict and stabilisation analysis and planning.

**Dr Anthony Cleland Welch OBE** has over twenty years’ field and academic experience in international development and the security sector. A former military officer and with a doctorate, he has worked around the world with the UN, EU, UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). He taught Security Sector Management and Reform at Cranfield University, both in the UK and abroad, and is currently engaged in security and development matters on behalf the UK and Swedish Governments, including acting as an advisor on international development and security in Parliament.
Introduction: Researching and Working in Conflict-Affected Environments

Dr Eleanor Gordon

The Department of Criminology at the University of Leicester offers an innovative and dynamic distance-learning MSc Course in Security, Conflict and International Development (SCID), which focuses on how to meet the strategic security and justice challenges of countries emerging from conflict. Designed specifically for those working - or hoping to work - in international development, the Course seeks to develop skills, knowledge and understanding of conflict prevention and recovery with a particular emphasis upon building security and justice after conflict.

In the autumn of 2013, the Department established the SCID Panel of Experts, comprised of 70 leading international experts in the field of conflict prevention, mitigation and recovery. The Panel was established in order to further enhance the learning experience of students, exposing them to the knowledge and views of a broad range of international experts working in the field of international development and peacebuilding.

On 12 March 2015, the Department of Criminology at the University of Leicester hosted the second annual SCID Symposium in which eleven members of the SCID Panel of Experts presented papers. They gave presentations on the theme of the Symposium – researching and working in conflict-affected environments – together with the SCID course developer and tutor, Dr Eleanor Gordon, and SCID student and film director, Katharina von Schroeder, who introduced her award-winning feature-length documentary film We Were Soldiers, which follows the life of a former child soldier in South Sudan.

The theme of the Symposium ties into one of the core aims of the SCID Course and one of the main reasons for establishing the SCID Panel of Experts: to help bridge the divide between the worlds of academia and practice in the field of peacebuilding and broader international development. This is particularly important given the Course aims to equip its students with the knowledge and skills to pursue or advance their careers in this field. Ultimately, it is hoped that by bridging this gap, efforts to understand and, thus, better respond to the challenges posed by conflict can be more successful. As stated by one of the member of the Panel of Experts:
The nexus of Security, Conflict and International Development is a new, and comparatively under-studied, area of work. Although its influence on international relations is clearly growing, it has been subject to very little academic scrutiny and remains surrounded by many myths and misconceptions. By providing a space for academics and practitioners to discuss and debate issues the SCID Panel is fulfilling an invaluable role. (Member of the SCID Panel of Experts, 2013)

Another member of the Panel of Experts commented that the establishment of the Panel of Experts is:

… an innovative and ground breaking approach to bridging the often divergent worlds of academia and the worlds of practitioners and policy-makers: a divergence that does not serve the interests of those people most adversely affected by conflict and insecurity. An endeavour I am delighted to be a part of. (Member of the SCID Panel of Experts, 2013)

Papers from this year’s Symposium consider some of the skills, dynamics and challenges associated with researching in conflict-affected environments, as well as those (often similar) skills, dynamics and challenges associated with working as a practitioner in these environments. Part of the aim of this Symposium was to identify some of the common challenges and skills required for researching and working in the field, in an effort to identify lessons and enhance both research and practice.

The broad range of papers addressed issues concerning the challenges of conducting research and working in conflict-affected environments, and ways in which to improve practice; monitoring and evaluation of programmes; recruitment and deployment of staff; preparing police peacekeepers; managing multi-cultural teams and the importance of intercultural effectiveness; and ways in which to gather and utilise data. Specific subjects included the practical challenges of conducting police research in Kano (Nigeria); Security Sector Reform and development of the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) in Somalia; the relationship between food security and conflict in Mozambique, Burundi and elsewhere; election monitoring in Ukraine; the use of evidence in the monitoring and evaluation of programmes in Helmand (Afghanistan), Lebanon, Syria and Pakistan; and the use of biometrics and population registration in the Balkans. Presenters included professors, film directors, retired senior police chiefs and military officers, government advisers, international human rights and humanitarian law barristers, senior officials in the UN system and other leading international experts in the field of conflict resolution and recovery.

Most of the papers presented are included as chapters in this Reader. There is a chapter included in this Reader that was not presented at the Symposium: Emmicki Roos
(Chapter 6) was unable to attend due to her work for UN Women in Afghanistan, but generously contributed a chapter on the value of being a changemaker in the field of international development. Dr Alex Finnen MBE FRGS also generously contributed two chapters: one on research design for those who are both academic researchers and practitioners in the field they are researching; and the other on the use of biometrics and population registration (Chapters 2 and 9, respectively). Dr Eleanor Gordon also presented on the shared challenges and requisite skills of researchers and practitioners, and the need to bridge the gap between the worlds of academia and practice, rather than the focus of her Chapter in this Reader, which is on the challenges faced in conducting research in conflict-affected environments.

The Symposium presentations that are not included as chapters in this book include those by Professor Alice Hills on ‘Personal Reflections on Police Research in a Conflict-Affected Environment’; Matthew Waterfield on ‘Challenges of Monitoring and Evaluation of Programmes in Conflict Affected Countries’; Dr Richard Byrne on ‘Food Security and Conflict – Stabilisation Forces and Agricultural Awareness’; Anna Shevchenko on ‘Managing Multi-Cultural Teams in Conflict Environments (Experience from Ukraine)’; and Maureen Poole on ‘Working in Conflict-Affected Environments: Lessons from Ukraine’. These can all be found in video format on the SCID Blog (www.uolscid.wordpress.com) and in the SCID Course materials (along with this Reader).

The first three chapters of this Reader consider some of the approaches to and challenges of conducting research in conflict-affected environments. In the first chapter, Dr Anthony Welch OBE examines some of the key considerations when conducting research in such environments. Focussing particularly on research into security sector management and security sector reform (SSR), Tony explores the value of the case study and grounded theory. He then details some of the qualitative methods that can be used in a case study and other forms of research in this field (including structured and semi-structured interviews and focus groups). Ethical and security issues are discussed, especially the principle of doing no harm and the need to conduct risk assessments and manage risk throughout the research process. Using interpreters, recording interviews, and corroborating and analysing data retrieved are also discussed in this Chapter.

In the second chapter, Dr Alex Finnen MBE describes how the research design for his PhD was developed. Alex considers whether established research methods are adequate to capture the complexity of post-conflict operations and he raises key issues about how such research should be conducted. The Chapter also addresses the role of the researcher as an active participant in the post-conflict operations under scrutiny and what, if any, impact this might have on the research. Critically, Alex proposes that the nature of participant observation should be re-examined, so as to recognise that ‘decision makers’
in the process are also ‘participants’ and that those engaged in research can also be ‘active participants’ and ‘authoritative observers’.

In Chapter 3, Dr Eleanor Gordon considers some of the most significant challenges of conducting research in conflict-affected environments, particularly ethical and security challenges. Eleanor provides a number of recommendations to address these challenges. These recommendations include: dedicating a substantial amount of time to planning research as well as building trust with research participants; to undertake, regularly review and utilise security analyses; to be flexible in terms of research plans, while adhering to ethical principles; to develop an in-depth awareness of the context and also recognise the value of local knowledge; to be careful in the decisions made throughout the research process, from choosing gatekeepers and interpreters to choosing what subjects to discuss and what language to use; to have respect for research participants, and be aware of the risks they face and the trauma they may be suffering from; to attend to perceived imbalances in power between researcher and research participant; to be self-reflexive and regularly consider the impact of the researcher on the field as well as the impact of the field on the researcher; and, fundamentally, to adhere to the principle of doing no harm, while recognising the value that research can have in understanding and, thus, better responding to the challenges of conflict – and ultimately giving something back to research participants.

The next three chapters, in particular, address how practitioners, and the organisations they work for, can address some of the weaknesses, skills gaps and competency limitations that have led to underperformance in the field of peacebuilding and broader international development. In Chapter 4, Alex Batesmith discusses how international lawyers in overseas rule of law and transitional justice projects can become more interculturally effective when working with their national counterparts. The Chapter describes the environmental, organisational and individual barriers to international lawyers working effectively. It then identifies how improving and further refining specific knowledge, skills and attitudes can help any lawyer become better able to meet the considerable challenges of working in conflict-affected and other difficult environments, and help ensure that the projects they work on are successful. This Chapter also details some of the skills required of international lawyers including adaptability, self-awareness, humility, respect for others, communication and interpersonal skills, knowledge of the context, and language skills. In conclusion, Alex offers practical suggestions for organisations and employers as they seek to make structural changes to enable their projects and those who work on them to be more effective.

In the following chapter (Chapter 5), Douglas Brand OBE considers the adverse effects that not recruiting the right people can have upon the delivery of aid and development. In particular, Douglas looks at the harm that results from conflict between those delivering aid or implementing development programmes, and those recruited to facilitate such
work (such as those engaged in logistics, procurement, transportation and security). Part of the reason for this conflict and for underperformance in delivering aid and development programmes, Douglas argues, is that those who are recruited and deployed can lack all but the technical skills for the job. What is required is pre-deployment and in-theatre training, as well as assessment of non-technical competences – including attitudes and cultural sensitivities – during the recruitment process for development professionals.

In Chapter 6, Emmicki Roos also explores some of the behaviours and practices influencing the world of international development that are counterproductive to the objective of achieving positive social change. Emmicki also considers the role of the individual in challenging these behaviours, and the need to be introspective in order to be an effective changemaker. Emmicki argues that the reason why progress in the field of international development is so slow is because unhealthy organisational cultures, toxic and authoritative leadership, and an inability to translate our values into meaningful action are widely prevalent in value-based organisations. Emmicki concludes by arguing that as long as we are unable to implement the values that we profess outwardly in to our own organisations, we will never be able to truly transform the world we live in for the better.

Peter Reed also proposes ways in which engagement in conflict-affected environments can be more effective by reflecting upon and improving the strategies and approaches employed. In Chapter 7, Peter addresses the challenges of working in conflict-affected environments, specifically in the field of post-conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR), and ways in which these challenges can be best addressed. In particular, Peter draws attention to the importance and, thus, urgency of many post-conflict SSR programmes, which can be at odds with the complexity of the challenge and often constrained resources. Peter underscores the importance of developing strategic approaches and investing in leadership, and provides tangible recommendations on which these can be built. The Chapter draws on current examples of the challenges presented by highly complex operating environments in fragile and conflict affected States, with case studies from Libya and Somalia.

In Chapter 8, Chris Sharwood-Smith examines the history and rationale behind the introduction of the standardised pre-deployment training modules for both individual police officers and Formed Police Units, outlining the deficiencies that were identified in the system and how they were addressed. The Chapter also looks to current and prospective work in respect of the development of pre-deployment training. The Chapter concludes by underscoring the need for further development and review, although stresses that, in an organisation encompassing 193 Member States which is reliant on consensus for the majority of its decisions, optimum pre-deployment training for all police peacekeepers is unlikely in the short-term.
In Chapter 9, Dr Alex Finnen MBE discusses the challenges of working and researching in the field of electoral administration and censal data. The Chapter considers the use of biometrics and population registration as a control mechanism used by the international community through its political, social and welfare development programmes. The Chapter endeavours to identify why the EU is investing in Information and Computer Systems (ICS) technology in the areas of population control and management, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa; what their objectives are; and why, for many of their purposes, the current technology being deployed can be described as ‘good enough’. The Chapter also describes the technological advances currently being made in this area, and demonstrates how some of these advances have come about much faster than either the practitioners or the legislators could have imagined – and, hence, why legislation must keep pace or, indeed, keep ahead of these changing technologies.

In the penultimate chapter, Katharina von Schroeder describes the challenges faced as a documentary filmmaker, while researching, preparing for and filming her award-winning feature-length documentary, *We Were Rebels*. The film was filmed over two years and follows the trajectory of a young nation, South Sudan, in overwhelming euphoria from their recent independence until the outbreak of war in December 2013. The central character is Agel, a former child soldier turned basketball captain, who returns to his home country to help rebuild it after decades of war.

The concluding chapter draws from all presentations given at the Symposium in an effort to identify skills and challenges shared by those engaged in research and practice in conflict-affected environments. It is hoped that in so doing, lessons can also be shared and, as a result, efforts to better understand and, thus, respond to the challenges of conflict and peacebuilding may be more effective.
The Pitfalls and Academic Requirements of Research in Conflict Zones

Dr Anthony Cleland Welch OBE

Abstract: Researching in conflict, post-conflict and transitional states brings unique challenges to the academic researcher. This Chapter briefly examines the key considerations when researching in unstable and insecure areas. It outlines the key considerations for such work, compares them with researching in more benign environments, and acts as a reminder of the complexity of such an endeavour and the various techniques necessary to explain and uncover the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of research into the security sector.

Introduction

Security sector management and security sector reform (SSR) programmes grew out of the need for development agencies to take note of the effect of the security situation when dealing with conflict and the aftermath of conflict or transition. External actors, therefore, most likely drive security programmes. These actors can be national governments in their capacity as development donors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). Indeed IGOs have assumed, in recent years, significant responsibilities in shaping the SSR agenda. They have played a central role in designing and delivering security-related programmes and a number of them have developed policy frameworks to guide their various SSR activities (Law, 2007).
When researching SSR and other security-based stabilisation activities it is necessary to engage at multiple levels; IGOs, NGOs, host nation governments, security actors and militias. In addition, it is of paramount importance to ensure that the voices of ordinary men and women and those that, at grass roots level, represent them are heard. This will include local government officials and activists, women’s and minority groups and those working for and in the community. All these organisations have a role to play when researching the security sector. Too often these voices are not heard and the researchers in conflict and post-conflict situations find themselves only engaging with the elites, civil servants and politicians. Indeed, fostering and supporting local actors with an active interest in building peace are seen as key principles of post-conflict development management despite the ongoing confusion over who such local actors really are (Ropers, 2000).

The theoretical study of security sector management is complex. Fitz-Gerald (2009) contends that the security sector does not conform to a single set of theories and has yet to form its own. However, institutionalist understanding of cognitive paradigms and normative frameworks might be applicable to the work of IGOs in the field of SSR but it may be that, as Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond (2004: 14) observe, ‘the social world, including the activities of institutions, is complex and beyond the comprehension of a single body of theory’

Underlying the complexity of social interaction in the security field is the reaction of states and institutions to the issue of inter-state and IGO co-operation over matters of security. Lipson (1984: 1-23) believes that when economic relations are at stake, ‘cooperation can be sustained among several self-interested states’, whereas such collaboration is ‘more impoverished ...in security affairs.’ He suggests that, ‘significantly different institutional arrangements are associated with international economic and security issues’ and the likelihood of co-operation is markedly different within these two areas (Lipson, 1984: 18).

Conscious of the political, human and economic cost of failure in the security sector, there is an ever increasing need to study and understand the dynamics of security management and reform and this investigation can often only usefully take place in either a conflict, post-conflict or transitional setting. Such research, therefore, brings its own challenges and is often testing for the researcher, who must ensure that in-depth investigation and exploration takes place to get beneath the surface view commonly held by IGOs and NGOs working in the field. In short, the challenge is to understand the situation from the local rather than the international point of view and to describe and explore the context and process of security management and reform.

This Chapter will briefly examine the key considerations when researching in a conflict, post-conflict or transitional state. It is not meant to be exhaustive examination but can
serve as a reminder of the complexity of such an endeavour and the various techniques necessary to explain and uncover the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of research into the security sector.

**The Challenge of the Conflict and Post-Conflict Working Environment**

Conducting research in conflict and post-conflict environments presents particular challenges for academic researchers in terms of methodology, access, and ethics. Researchers may be at risk of violence when working in a social and political environment that can be unusually unstable and prone to conflict. They may have trouble accessing some regions or groups, or discover that their research and methodology has ethical implications and ramifications that they had not considered in advance.

In addition, there can be a psychological impact for researchers resulting from living and working in conflict and post-conflict environments. This is illustrated by the experience of Giorgia Doná (2014), who worked and lived in post-genocide Rwanda. Doná explains how the primary, secondary and vicarious traumatisation processes were closely interrelated. She notes the importance of understanding the connections that exist across different forms of traumatisation and how multiple forms of trauma intersect through the act of listening, imagining, empathising and experiencing in the stress loaded conflict environment. Thus, on a professional and personal level, academics considering researching in conflict, post-conflict and transitional areas need to be aware of the difficulties and risks. They will need to plan their work with care and with due regard to how their activities can impact on those with whom they interact and upon themselves.

Before embarking on academic research in a conflict or post-conflict zone, a researcher’s academic establishment will wish to be reassured that the researcher will not be putting him/herself into harm’s way. A series of written Risk Assessments will be called for and caveats may be placed on movement, areas to be visited and timescales. Travel advice from the researcher’s government and possibly the host nation government will be taken into account. In many cases, an in-country support network may need to be established and an introduction to hostile environment awareness training undertaken. At all times the duty of care for the researcher will be applied even if it is to the detriment to the proposed research.

**Ethics and Risk Evaluation**

Ethical and accountability considerations are also paramount to successful research; moral decisions will undoubtedly be called for from the researcher, as the danger that harm may be done by the proposed research has to be considered. An ethical framework for decision-making needs to be established. In the same way that humanitarian agencies
need an ethical framework to ensure that their work is not open to manipulation, so researchers must examine their ethical principles. Much can be learned from current developments in the humanitarian field where advances in the development of codes of conduct, ethical frameworks and the rights based approach have focused attention on the need to do no harm. Goodhand (2000: 12-13) suggests that researchers ‘… have a moral responsibility for their interventions and may inadvertently do harm by infringing the security, privacy and well-being of the subjects of their research.’ Ethically informed decisions should cover the motives and responsibilities of the researcher as well as the direct and indirect impact of the research.

The consent of participants in any research process is an obligatory, and a moral, requirement. However, obtaining informed consent can be made challenging by differences in the researcher’s and the interviewees’ languages, cultures, educational backgrounds, social norms (Leaning, 2001). This imbalance can be partly addressed through careful attention to the quality of the participant-researcher relationship. For Sieber (1993: 18) this ‘means communicating respectfully and openly with participants and community members throughout the project, respecting autonomy and life-style, and providing useful debriefing about the nature, findings, and value of the research and its likely dissemination.’ In addition, the participants’ consent can be ensured by giving them the authority to decline to answer specific questions, withdraw their participation at any point during the process, and dictate whether information can be attributed, published without attribution, or used only for informational purposes (Wood, 2006). In cases where interviewees have agreed to the final text, Sriram (2009) suggests that is essential that they be given the chance to validate the attributed text before it is published.

Risk assessment, both for the researcher and for the participant, consists of an objective evaluation of risk by which assumptions and uncertainties are considered and presented. Much of the difficulty in managing risk is that measurement of the potential loss and the probability of occurrence can be hard to measure. Risk with a large potential loss and a low probability of occurrence is often treated differently from one with a low potential loss and a high likelihood of occurrence. In essence, both are of proximate equal priority, but in practice these can be difficult to assess when faced with the scarcity of resources, especially time, in which to conduct the risk management process. Researchers must make a genuine effort to get their risk assessment right as the potential hazards may not only drastically affect the quality and veracity of their research but could seriously endanger their lives or those with whom they engage.

It is, therefore, clear that the challenges of research in conflict and post-conflict contexts are significant. While many of these challenges and dilemmas are likely also to be applicable in peaceful countries, they take on particular significance in conflict and post-conflict environments. These issues are made more difficult by the mistrust that pervades interpersonal interactions in conflict and post-conflict environments, and by the
asymmetric power relationship between the researcher and subject. The maintenance of focused research becomes more difficult and more significant because of the unpredictability of the conflict dynamics and the impact of the research on those dynamics. The challenge of judging acceptable risk intensifies when research subjects are traumatised, and the risk of the research to them is difficult to determine. Thus the moral and ethical obligation of researchers to the subjects of their research takes on greater significance when the participants are suffering the effect of violent conflict and this actuality must always be borne in mind.

Having laid the foundations for the research project, attention will now turn to the research methodology that can be followed in the field.

**Case Studies and Grounded Theory**

In order to explore the practice of security sector management and reform in conflict and post-conflict situations, research by case study may be used as the methodological approach. Several authors have provided guidance on interpretative research (Alvermann and Mallozzi, 2010; Miles and Huberman, 2000; Klein and Myers, 1999; McKay and Marshall, 1994) and, in particular, case studies (Yin, 1994; Walsh, 1995; Darke et al., 1998). Stake (1995) suggests that cases studies concern people and programmes and seek to come to an understanding of their activities. He asserts that each case studied is similar to others but, at the same time, unique. Research focuses both on their uniqueness and their commonality and observes the subjects with a desire to learn how they function.

Erickson (1986) proposes that the most distinctive characteristic of case studies is the emphasis on interpretation. He argues that case studies are situations where the key analysis is not based on the researcher’s views but those of the people being studied and, therefore, interpretation is a major part of the research. The aim of a case study is to understand what is going on. The facts will then emerge from the research process in what Parlett and Hamilton (1976) describe as progressive focussing. Marshall and Rossman (2006) suggest that unless a study is narrowly construed, researchers cannot examine all the relevant circumstances and personalities in any depth. Some research is location specific, as in this case where an actual security process in a conflict or post-conflict territory has been selected for study.

Critics of case studies suggest that the decision to focus on a specific setting can be constraining, as the study is defined by, and linked to, a particular event and population. In debates over the merits and disadvantages of case studies the problem of generalisation is raised. However, it is argued that such study is less constrained by place or population as many detractors might suggest, as the results of the work can be extrapolated to other situations of similar enquiry and then tested by further research. A case study is an experiment to test a theory; ‘case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to
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theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes’ (Yin, 1994: 10). Niederkofler (1991: 239) suggests, ‘the case study investigator's goal is not to demonstrate the validity of an argument for statistical populations or universes. Rather he aims to create and expand rich theoretical frameworks that should be useful in analyzing similar cases’.

The selection of a case study methodology when examining security management and reform therefore could be based on the premise that security, as a complex undertaking, does not lend itself to being neatly fitted into existing theories. It can be argued that the strength of case studies is their internal validity, but their weakness is the external generalisability. However, it is submitted that there is a trade-off between the two types of validity that can be helpful. If is considered that a case study is complementary to more extensive research, then follow up research may provide answers about frequency distributions and statistical answers (Swanborn, 2010).

There are also differing opinions as to how many case studies should be undertaken to ensure that the evidence revealed could be generalised. A frequent criticism of case study methodology is that, if it is dependent on a single case, then it is not possible to reach a comprehensive conclusion. Giddens (1993) suggests that case studies are suspect because they lack sufficient robustness to constitute a broad analysis. However, Yin (1994) and Hamel, Dulfour and Fortin (1993) argue that the goal of a case study should be to establish parameters and then apply them to future research. Consequently even a single case study can be considered acceptable provided that it meets the established objective. Moses and Knutsen (2007: 289- 290) believe that there is ‘need to encourage problem-driven (not methods-driven) science’ in terms of research methodology.

The typical characteristic of case studies is that they work towards a holistic understanding of cultural systems of action (Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, 1991). Cultural systems of action refer to sets of interrelated activities engaged in by actors in a social situation (Stake, 1995). Feagin et al. (1991), Stake (1995) and Yin (2002) believe that although case studies are not sampling research, the selection of a case must maximise what can be learnt from it, taking account of the time and funding available for the study. Case studies therefore tend to be selective, focusing on issues that are essential to understanding the structure being examined. This means that the researcher considers not just the perspective of the participants, but also the perception of relevant groups and the interaction between them (Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, 1991).

Literature provides an insight into the acceptance of case studies, despite criticism of them as a methodology when used as a single case. Hamel (1993) characterises the use of a single study as a concentration of the global in the local. Yin (1989) believes that general applicability results from case study methodology, which can be seen to satisfy the three tenets of qualitative research: describing, understanding and explaining. Despite
reservations about the application of the particular to the general in case studies there has been a renewed academic interest in their application. Glaser and Strauss (1967) developed the concept of grounded theory and this, in part, stimulated the renewed use of case study methodology (Tellis, 1997).

Grounded theory is a systematic generation of theory from data that contains both inductive and deductive thinking. One goal of a grounded theory in the context of researching SSR, for instance, can be to formulate hypotheses based on conceptual ideas and to discover the participants’ main concerns and how they try to resolve them. Grounded theory attempts to conceptualise what is going on by using empirical data. The researcher does not formulate the hypotheses in advance since pre-formed hypotheses are excluded (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Consequently, qualitative research logic, which employs a systematic and comprehensive examination of a limited number of cases in order to provide generalisations, is created and is termed analytic induction (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 2006; Znaniecki, 1934; Becker, 1958). Cressey (1971) asserts that the stages of analytic induction are: defining the field; hypothesising an explanation; studying one case to see if it fits the facts; modifying the hypothesis or the definitions in the light of this; and reviewing further cases. According to Cressey, analytic induction re-defines the phenomenon and re-formulates the hypothesis until a universal relationship is established.

In terms of the process of how theory is generated, such qualitative research is broadly characterised by the process of analytical induction, in which the researcher moves from observation to generalisation. Inferences are made from specific observations to more general rules in order to construct a hypothesis. This methodology was developed as a means of systematising and adding rigor to the process of analysis and the development of theory from data. Within the broad tradition of qualitative research, rather than collecting information to test a hypothesis, the explanation arises from the findings of the research (Henwood and Pidgeon, 2006; Clarke, 2005; Charmaz and Mitchell, 2001; Pidgeon, 1996).

Field Research

Having decided on how to proceed with the study of a particular event the academic researcher must turn his/her attention to how the field research is undertaken. The practical methodology normally used consists of a series of interviews. The interviews can be designed to allow participants to discuss the security management or reform project and relate their views on the interactions of the actors in the process.

In the context of academic research an interview is a formal technique whereby a researcher solicits verbal evidence or data from a knowledgeable informant. After the verbal evidence has been obtained the researcher will normally need to convert the record
of the interview into a written transcript before analysis is performed, and the objective of the interview is to obtain insightful data for this purpose. Some academics regard an academic research interview as an asymmetrical event where the objective of the researcher is to maximise the amount of data or evidence that can be collected from the participant and thereby increase the likelihood of being able to answer the research question. In this view it needs to be remembered that the objective of the academic research interview is not to have an interesting dialogue with the participant but to collect evidence that will be useful in answering the research question.

Semi-structured questionnaires can be used as a basis for the interview dialogue. It is often found that set questions frequently lead the participant to cite examples to support his/her perceptions on matters of institutional and personal interactions, as well as the reaction of the local population and leadership. Interviews can vary in length but are often around 30 to 90 minutes, dependent on participant responsiveness. The majority of the interviews would be conducted face to face, with some being conducted on the telephone. In some cases, participants are interviewed more than once; this will occur either because additional information had been gained from other sources or needed to be verified by a second or third participant, or because the participant ran out of time and the interview needed to be continued at a later date.

Auerbach (2003: 24) suggests that, ‘...the qualitative research paradigm assumes that the best way to learn about people’s subjective experience is to ask them about it, and then listen carefully to what they say.’ Although, examination of current social practices shows that interviews are a pervasive way of acquiring information, the understanding of the information gained from such interviews is often complicated. In order to gain maximal understanding as many as possible of the interviews should be tape-recorded. The recorded and fully transcribed interview provide distinct advantages over the non-recorded interview where notes are taken, either contemporaneously or made soon after the interview is concluded. The recorded interview allows the researcher to analyse the responses of the participant and take heed of emotions, hesitations and responses which might otherwise have been missed had the interview not been taped. In addition, by being able to transcribe every word and response, the possibility of missing vital information is reduced.

However, in interviews conducted in a foreign language, the advantages of the recorded interview can be lost. The immediacy of the response is frequently impeded by the need to translate back and forth. The added length of the recording can also outweigh the advantages of recording the interview as transcription can become convoluted and time consuming. Unrecorded interviews can also present difficulties; the process takes longer and the flow of the dialogue, on occasions, is interrupted when the researcher has to check that a point had been fully understood or clarify a statement.
Many cultures dictate that lengthy reviews of history, cultural differences and perceived wrongs are undertaken whenever participants are asked to comment on their relationships with other nationalities, organisations or political parties. Auerbach (2004) believes that people almost always talk about their experience in a storied form and thus qualitative research is based on stories. Allied to the tendency to relate experiences in story-form, the participants prefer to have the full attention of their interviewer and this may be difficult when taking contemporaneous notes. This problem can be overcome by having an interpreter/assistant make notes of the interview alongside the researcher. This had two advantages; firstly, it allowed the researcher to concentrate more fully on the participant’s demeanour and body language and, secondly, the opportunity is presented to check that the researcher has correctly noted what was being said. Initially, however, the researcher must plan how he/she intends to illicit the data necessary to inform the study and reach the right conclusions in a systematic and coherent manner. To do this the researcher needs to determine the collection methodology and the way in which he/she will interpret it.

**Qualitative Interviews and Focus Groups**

Qualitative research is designed to be an in-depth investigation and exploration that gets beneath the surface and allows the understanding of the situation from the participant’s point of view. It needs also to describe and explore a context/process and unravel patterns and associations. The researcher needs to uncover the underlying factors and causes so that he/she can generate ideas and theories and. The fundamental strength of qualitative methods is they enable a researcher to explore subjective experience, practices, values and attitudes in depth and establish their meaning for the people involved.

There are a variety of qualitative methods; observation, participant observation, diaries/life histories, and so on, but the most frequently used methodology when researching the security sector is the interview. Interviews can be divided into two main groups; the highly structured interview, which are mainly used in survey research usually with tightly-defined questionnaire and closed questions, although there might be some open-ended questions. This interview technique will usually involve large samples. Alternatively, interviews can be semi-structured. These types of interviews are based on an interview guide, with open-ended or semi-structured questions. For the semi-structured interview the researcher has an ‘interview guide’ with a list of fairly specific topics to be covered. This allows flexibility in how the participant responds, but the aim is to ask all the questions consistently of all the interviewees.

The semi-structured interview facilitates informal probing, allowing the researcher to get beyond surface responses and to explore motivation values and attitudes. This type of interview usually involves small samples. There are, however, limitations to these
interviews in that bias can occur and care must be taken to ensure the validity of the participants as being representative for whole population. Hence, the importance of sampling (Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2009; Berinsky, 2000).

Another method of conducting interviews is the focus group and its variations; paired interviews and triads, workshops, panels and citizens’ juries. There is also the possibility to conduct an ‘unstructured’ interview, where the researcher uses a brief list of topics to be explored, allowing maximum flexibility in content and direction of the interview. Organising questions for focus groups can be challenging, ranging from using structured questions to a topic guide. The researcher needs to ensure that all perspectives and issues are covered and will need to have ‘prompt’ and ‘probe’ questions ready to keep the interviews on track. He/she will also need to be ready to challenge views in order to test the robustness with which views are held and to explore contradictory or conflicting views.

The systematic analysis of the discussions within a focus group provide clues and insights into the perspective and views of the individuals involved, without pressure on them to reach some kind of consensus. Focus groups are flexible, low cost, and give a voice to individuals, but there is a unique attribute in that the participants may not know each other but, having a common interest or sharing some characteristics, interact, discuss and challenge each other on a particular topic.

Focus groups can help to explore or generate hypotheses (Powell and Single 1996; Powell, Single and Lloyd, 1996) and develop questions or concepts for questionnaires and interview guides (Hoppe, Wells, Morrison, Gilmore and Wilsdon, 1995; Lankshear, 1993). They are, however, limited in terms of their ability to generalise findings to a whole population, mainly because of the small numbers of people participating and the likelihood that the participants will not be a representative sample. Another limitation of focus groups is that they are not always random or representative (often researchers fall back on local organisations to assist in putting together the focus group, which may lead to bias and an unrepresentative sample) and do not give valid information on individuals and could well limit the opportunity to collect data at individual level. The focus group process may also inhibit full and open participation and the participants will be required to give a greater commitment of time and effort than for an individual depth-interview.

**Coding**

When analysing the material gained from field research, a computer-based qualitative data analysis software programme, such as ATLAS.ti (http://atlasti.com), might be used to code and analyse the data. Such programmes provide a reasonably easily understood and operated tool for the systematic coding of data. They are beneficial to the analysis of the research in that they save time and collation effort whilst presenting a record of
analysis and interpretation of data which could be interrogated by other researchers or reviewers.

Often, however, many researchers take the data from interviews, whether transcribed from notes made by the researcher and the interpreter/assistant during the interview or in the case of taped interviews soon after the event, and then manually code the results using a naming and colour-coding process. This time-consuming manual process is often the only practical way of capturing the information in situations when operating in an environment where there is an acute lack of electricity, which precludes the reliable and efficient use of computers and the software package designed to assist in this task. It may also be the case that the researcher and the assistant/interpreter are sufficiently conversant with the subject matter to be able to analyse the data in a more systematic and critical manner, using data immersion techniques, than the specialist package can provide. However, it is noted that Lee and Fielding (1993) and Dey (1993) suggest that the shortcoming associated with computer coding have less to do with the programmes and more to how they are used and applied.

In interviews, conducted in a language in which the researcher is not fluent, an interpreter will be needed. However, it is acknowledged that difficulties can arise when using an interpreter during interviews and therefore great care should be taken in the selection of a suitable individual. Although the interpreter will probably attend all interviews in the foreign language, some interviews in the researcher’s native language may be conducted without the presence of the interpreter. This might be preferable for two reasons: firstly, if there are security restrictions (for instance, when visiting a Military Headquarters or in an area where the ethnic origin of the interpreter will cause difficulties); and, secondly, is a research participant wishes to speak to the researcher privately. Whenever possible, however, the interpreter should be included in the interview process to verify that data had been recorded accurately. In matters of interpretation from the foreign language, the researcher should generally defer to the native language speaker’s elucidation of what had actually been said rather than what he/she thought had been said.

Conventions covering the protection of the rights of participants must be observed throughout the interview process. Whenever a tape recorder is used it was essential that the principles on the usage and ownership of the material be established. There is, therefore, a need to confirm that the participant is comfortable with a recording being made, thereby gaining informed consent. Some participants may state that they are unwilling to have their voices recorded whilst others may wish to be assured that the recording would be destroyed immediately after transcription. Others interviewed, when asked if they wished to remain anonymous, might indicate that they do not wish to be identified by name or position.
No matter how much preparation goes into the design and mapping of a research programme the challenges to the researcher remain the same. There is a need to assemble findings in a coherent form and to ensure that ensure findings are inclusive. The researcher needs to demonstrate rigour of the research and to clearly explain research methodology. The research needs to demonstrate that it has grounded its findings in the data collected and that the data is ably presented and wherever possible triangulated through multiple methods or corroborated with data from multiple sources. Examples, quotations and case illustrations must be shown to amplify and illuminate but not replace analysis.

Conclusion

Researching in a conflict, post-conflict or transitional environment brings multiple challenges to the academic. In essence, however, the methodologies for research remain the same as for more tranquil environments but the preparation for, and the execution of, the research in the field, must be more rigorous. Conflict zones bring risks not found in more benign environments and the researcher needs to be very aware of what these risks are, particularly to their own safety and that of those they may employ as interpreters or assistants.

It is most unlikely that an academic institution will allow a researcher to put him/herself into a dangerous and life-threatening situation but it must be remembered that research, particularly in the security field, may also bring risks to those who agree to participate in interviews or discussions. This aspect of the risk assessment must be carefully considered and planned for. To do no harm has to be at the heart of the planning process.

Security is a highly political process and therefore there is always a risk that research efforts will be manipulated by elites, political factions or combatants and ex-combatants. The researcher needs to be aware of this risk and guard against it. Care must be taken when sampling and, wherever possible, data should be triangulated.

When deciding on the methodology to be used for data collection the researcher will need to judge what is possible in the environment he/she is entering. Focus groups may work well but can those invited to participate travel safely to take part and will their attendance be noted and used against them? For individual interviews is informed consent enough? Should the participant always be anonymous, even if it detracts from the veracity of the interview? Should the participant be able to withdraw consent at any time? All these imperatives need to be considered.

Researching security in combat zones or in the wake of war or violent change is rewarding and stimulating. Nevertheless, issues concerning safety, privacy, boundaries, and limited resources are not uncommon in the severe conditions in which academics in
In addition, researchers operate in an environment governed by rules that are significantly more rigid than those encountered in the normal peacetime sector. From the unique paradigms in which researchers practice their craft, questions about how they address the challenges inherent with their research will arise and will have to be dealt with at an early stage.

**Bibliography**


Abstract: This Chapter describes how the research design for the author’s PhD was developed. It analyses whether established research methods are adequate to capture the complexity of post-conflict operations. The Chapter raises key issues about how such research should be conducted. The Chapter also addresses the role of the author as an active participant in the post-conflict operations under scrutiny and what, if any, impact this might have on the research. Critically, it proposes that the nature of participant observation should be re-examined, so as to recognise that ‘decision makers’ in the process are also ‘participants’ and that those engaged in research can also be ‘active participants’ and ‘authoritative observers’.

Introduction

This Chapter will demonstrate how the research design for the author’s PhD (Finnen, 2011) was developed in order to take advantage of the empirical knowledge of what happened, or was planned to have happened, during the international community’s (IC’s) management of the post-conflict operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo as well as how such operations were linked.
to academic models and methodologies. The approach adopted enabled the thesis to examine which of the models was most relevant to the IC’s management of post-conflict in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and to indicate whether these models are evolving to respond to the increasing complexity of post-conflict operations. In order to do this, the thesis itself referred to texts (both academic and supplied by organisations directly involved in the operations) and discussions about the IC’s engagement in post-conflict environments. This Chapter will also illustrate that some academics, often of considerable stature such as Donald Horowitz (1985), were also present as practitioners on the ground in BiH and Kosovo and the thesis for which the research took place examined how closely their practical decisions ‘on the ground’ matched the academic propositions that have been made in their work. In particular, the thesis attempted to map the impact of politics and the policies of contributing states upon those implementing post-conflict strategies, by using all of the data available.

This research design for the PhD thesis was based upon a novel approach to the collection of empirical data. It also raised key issues about how such research, and perhaps this type of research in general, can or ought to be conducted. Finally, in its conclusion, this Chapter will propose that the issue of the nature of participant observation should be re-examined, so as to recognise that ‘decision makers’ in the process are also ‘participants’ and that those engaged in research can also be ‘active participants’ and ‘authoritative observers’.

The role of the observer

In discussing the research design for the thesis, it was necessary to start by addressing the matter of the author’s role as an active participant in the process of post-conflict development and what impact if any, that may have had upon the narrative of the thesis. In particular, as the academic literature currently defines it, the author can either be a discrete and impartial ‘analytical observer’, or a ‘participant observer’. It can be argued that in the author’s case, and as referred to but not discussed by Bernard (2013), he was neither of the above, but was in fact an ‘active participant’. As this Chapter will go on to indicate, the role and definition of an ‘active participant’ have yet to be adequately defined, but the Chapter will demonstrate that there remains a need for such a definition, given that there are, a significant number of academics deployed as ‘active participants’ on post-conflict operations and who themselves go on to publish academic works relating to their activities. In addition, many of those who go on to obtain higher level degrees through the dissertation by publication route have themselves done so by being active participants in post-conflict, such as Mark Etherington (2005).
The means by which they have achieved this will be outlined in this Chapter and will delineate clearly the division between an ‘active participant’ and a ‘participant observer’. As a review of Etherington’s book (2005) will demonstrate, to describe someone who has been the administrator of a key province in post-conflict Iraq for one year as a ‘participant observer’ would not adequately reflect the influence that he brought to bear upon the post-conflict process.

Traditionally, the role of an impartial analytical observer has been the approach taken in most studies of post-conflict environments. However, if the author has acknowledged their role in the events as they occurred and has stated that this could be seen to challenge their impartiality, the experience has given them a particular insight into what happened. As such, this may be designated as a ‘participant observer’ approach. This is also a valuable approach and is becoming increasingly common, given the unwillingness of the military in particular, to have remote and dangerous areas visited by academics. The participant observer approach too, will often make best use of the material that researchers may have gathered during their period in the post-conflict area.

For the purposes of the thesis, the use of the ‘impartial observer’ approach would have permitted the author to cite a number of ‘elite interviews’ and so on within the text. This would not have been possible if the ‘participant observer’ approach had been adopted, as the ‘elite interviews’ would have to have been recognised as part of the everyday work routine, as is made clear by the discussion on the preparation for elite interviews in Arksey and Knight (1999). They state that some 60% of the time devoted to such interviews is ‘negotiating access’. In this case, it would clearly be inappropriate to claim an ‘elite’ interview with someone, for example, the OSCE Ambassador in BiH, or even the High Representative, to whom the author (by nature of his employment) had daily, or at least regular, access.

Arguably, if the observer were to be totally independent, then they would have to depend solely upon published resources. If an author were to totally disassociate themselves from the events which took place and to present them as an independent observer, then this is what they must do. Alternatively, if an author has adopted the participant observer approach as described by Wisker (2001), it would have to be acknowledged that some information to which he has been privy cannot be corroborated by documentary evidence, either simply because none is available or, alternatively, it may be withheld from public purview either for a few more years or, perhaps, permanently. This might be true particularly for the period from March 1994, when the author again became involved with Yugoslavia at the UK Joint Headquarters (JHQ) at Wilton near Salisbury, to the period in May 1997 when he officially ceased to be attached to what had by then become the Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

As stated above one of the most useful discussions on the roles of observers is conducted by Bernard (2000) who, whilst primarily discussing ethnographic research, identifies three rather than two different classes of observer; ‘the complete participant’, ‘the participant observer’ and the ‘complete observer’. Rather unhelpfully, Bernard then proceeds to describe the latter two groups and to illustrate them with examples from his own research, whilst making no further comment on the ‘complete participant’. This may be, in part, because Bernard (2011) has perhaps had no direct experience of being an active participant. So, whilst recognising the need to identify a third class of observer, still felt unqualified himself to define it more fully. However Bernard does comment on the participant observer as follows:
By far, most ethnographic research is based on the second role, that of the participant observer. Participant observers can be insiders who observe and record some aspects of life around them or they can be outsiders who participate in some aspects of life around them and record what they can (Bernard, 2000: 321).

In the absence of definitions of the ‘complete participant’ it is likely that the most apt current definition for the position in which the author found himself, is that of the participant observer ‘insider’. However, it is suspected that this rather understates the role and that there is, as has just been described, a place for describing the ‘complete participant’ in terms of their role as a researcher as well as a participant. None of the academic descriptions which have so far described the role of a ‘participant observer’ indicate that a ‘participant observer’ can frame or indeed drive and alter policy. Yet, some of those who have recently completed academic papers, have done just that. Indeed, throughout the literature, the emphasis is on the word ‘observer’, but particularly in the field of post-conflict, there are now a generation of researchers and academics who are, or who have been, in the position of decision-maker, even if only at a local level and for whom clearly the term ‘complete participant’ is more appropriate.

As an example, take the recent career of Dr J H Nichols, Professor of Rule of Law, Security, Reconstruction and Transition at the US Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PSKOI), who has written extensively about BiH and Afghanistan. Nichols served in BiH as a military officer in the US Army Reserve (USAR) in 1996 and then in increasingly senior roles within the OSCE in BiH as a civilian between 1997 and 2000. This was before returning to the military in the office of the US Assistant Secretary for Defence as part of the Balkans task force in 2000 – 2002, at which point he retired as a colonel. After a spell at the PSKOI he served as the field Program Officer for USAID in Gardez, Afghanistan 2003-2004 and then returned to the PSKOI. Given that Nichols was accredited to the academic staff of the PSKOI from 2000, to say that his ‘field texts’ were based on those of an informed ‘participant observer’ (Bernard, 2000), would do a disservice to those who genuinely are ‘participant observers’ and who will have lacked the access and experience that Nichols clearly enjoyed and continues to enjoy. Throughout, Nichols’ involvement with post-conflict operations, he has maintained the complete confidence of his employers and his government, thus permitting access to and a detailed knowledge of the processes involved, such as would be denied to a traditional academic researcher. The constraints of the existing approaches determined that the PhD thesis as written by the author was based on that of the ‘participant observer’ approach, albeit, for the reasons given, this was an inadequate definition, particularly in areas such as the electoral policy of post-conflict in the Western Balkans. Within that specific context the author was the Director General for three years in BiH and the drafter of the policy and the de facto first Acting Head of the OSCE Elections Department in Kosovo, so hardly a ‘participant observer’.

There is another and related area to the role of the ‘complete participant’. Within the sphere of business and indeed within the community involved in post-conflict recovery, there is a very specific research and analytical role assigned to them in the context of ‘lessons learned’. Lessons learned has become an increasingly complex methodology for recording what happened, ‘what went well’ and, in particular, ‘what went wrong’, and why and how that happened. Increasingly, the ‘lessons learned’ methodology is making use of academic approaches to research, including the use
of ‘elite interviews’ and it will be worthwhile examining their approaches to ‘complete participants’, to see if the void left by Bernard (2000) can be filled.

In business and government, ‘lessons learned’ techniques evolved originally from the field of ‘project management’, but have now moved across the whole sphere of government and business and have been further complemented by ‘project audits’, which are often more detailed and are certainly more time sensitive. To quote ‘Get Smart’, a semi-official UK website for project managers⁶, ‘lessons learned’ are designed ‘to incrementally capture with 20-20 hindsight (lessons learned) and turning that hindsight into 20-20 foresight (best practices), you will achieve far greater long-term success than if you simply ignore or forget what occurred once a project ends. This approach can greatly reduce the negative effects of attrition on a company’s intellectual assets when people leave because they quit, retire, are laid off, or were temporary workers to begin with’.

Whilst couched in ‘business language’, such a definition is clearly very relevant to post-conflict engagement, where the process is by its very nature transitional and ephemeral and the staff, with their multi-national membership and typically ninety day and six month tour rotations, even more so.

In defining project audits Michael Stanleigh (2011: n.p.) says that:

... a project audit provides an opportunity to uncover issues, concerns and challenges encountered during the project lifecycle. Conducted midway through the project, an audit affords the project manager, project sponsor and project team an interim view of what has gone well, as well as what needs to be improved to successfully complete the project. If done at the close of a project, the audit can be used to develop success criteria for future projects by providing a forensic review.

Again, this is a very relevant process for post-conflict environments and one that was, to an extent, conducted during the Bosnian and Kosovan post-conflict phases, but one which was apparently ignored in the latter phases of the planning for post-conflict Iraq.

The role of autobiography and auto-ethnography

It is also clear that any academic paper, such as the thesis under discussion, which is attempting to analyse the IC’s changing management strategy towards post-conflict environments, is not the place for any element of autobiographical or auto-ethnographical writing, as it is currently defined in the literature. In any event, the literature on auto-ethnographical writing currently focuses almost exclusively upon the literary, clinical and psychiatric areas. Indeed, unlike many such events (for example, the mass killings which took place in Rwanda or elsewhere in the ‘Great Lakes’ region of Africa in the 1990s, where everyone present, both participants and observers, were profoundly affected), it is possible to argue that in the Western Balkans by simply not being Bosnian or Kosovan, many of the tensions that may have arisen, because of one’s direct participation in events, may not be so acute. In that case any such auto-ethnographic experiences would be of very limited use and would not produce a text which adequately ‘seeks to describe and systematically analyze personal experience in order to understand cultural experience’ Ellis, Adams and Bochner (2011: n.p.). Denscombe (2003: 89) makes some asides on the problem of ‘self’ in his chapter on ‘ethnography’. Unfortunately as with much of the other available literature of which Blaxter,
Hughes and Tight (1996) are but one example, Denscombe takes a purely ‘ethnographic’ approach. In Denscombe’s work, a considerable amount of the focus on participant observation is specifically focussed on the subject of participant observation in the context of ‘ethnography’ and little else. Gray (2004: 243) too takes the same approach, but comes closest to describing the true nature of the author’s role within the fieldwork model with his description of the ‘practitioner researcher’. That might particularly be the case if one could argue that the participant observer was able to display a sense of ‘professionalism’, during his or her deployment to the areas that are the subject of study and had also been exposed previously to other conflict situations in various areas of the globe. In this case the author did indeed have such expertise.7

Furthermore, auto-ethnography, as outlined in Clandinin and Connelly’s (2004) hypotheses, is not particularly relevant, nor is the comment accurate when related to the work of a member of the IC in a post-conflict environment. It is certainly not true to state that the ‘field text’, where these exist, contains ‘stories’ and does not contain analysis and interpretation (Clandinin and Connelly, 2004: 121) and that this is solely the province of the academic researcher (Clandinin and Connelly, 2004). Indeed much fieldwork, particularly in the area of elections, which has principally been the author’s own post-conflict ‘discipline’, is almost exclusively of an analytical and interpretative nature and in many cases was focussed upon accurate quantitative data collection. It is, however, recognised that in many, if not most cases, such activity is focussed upon ‘operational’ and current issues, rather than the ‘strategic’ and long term or theoretical and even hypothetical, as is much academic work. Indeed, the role of either a political officer or an elections officer in a post-conflict environment can be described as almost entirely analytical and interpretative, when placed within the practical setting where he/she is employed.

It is also unlikely that a participant observer will ‘need to be aware of his or her role as a researcher’ as described by Jones (2005: 113), but it is, of course, essential that they were and are aware of their roles and aims as a participant observer and of the distortions in viewpoint that this might (necessarily) bring about. It is perhaps also relevant that the work which had led to the production of the PhD thesis was first initiated in 1997 as part of the study for an MA and that the process of data collection whether of oral, written or other testimony and documentation has been a deliberate and systematic one since that date, as has been the pursuance of academic research into the topic. It is also worth noting at this point, that were the position of a participant observer to have been taken by the author, several other key members of staff in the IC organisations were either themselves academics, such as Donald Horowitz (1985), whose seminal work was on the topic of ethnic groups in conflict, and Arend J Lijphart (1994 and 2004), or people who were undertaking similar research work in parallel with their official duties.8

In practice, for the ‘participant observer’, there will exist a considerable blurring of the roles, where the ‘field text’ (Clandinin and Connelly, 2004) will have been in fact generated as a result of employment which is also ‘field work’. Similarly, the role of the participant observer will result in much of the subsequent academic work taking the form of a written ‘elite interview’, so that the concept of ‘interviewing one’s own self’ as outlined by Devault (1997: 216-228), Hobbs (2004) and others, is not relevant within this model. It is also perhaps worth noting that much of the extant literature incorporating auto-ethnography such as that by Devault (1997), Jones (2005), Jago (2002), Ronai (1995) and others, focuses on the use of auto-ethnography in a social or purely
clinical environment, but that this need not invalidate auto-ethnography as a methodological approach used within the post-conflict environment.

Auto-ethnography is a method which, if developed correctly, is ideally suited to recovering the experiences of both ‘participant observers’ and ‘active participants’ which can then be exploited by subsequent academic research. Indeed, at the ‘strategic’ level this already takes place in terms of the academic commentary on political memoirs and so on9. That auto-ethnography may be a useful methodology is particularly true for research, which will examine those mechanisms adopted by post-conflict practitioners at the operational and tactical level, where there are few direct or detailed reports of what took place10. There is clear evidence that this lack of first hand exposure to and experience of practical post-conflict problem solving was recognised at the time in UK official circles. This can be indicated by the use of the Defence Debriefing Team (DDT) to conduct skilled debriefs of civilian officials upon their return to the UK at the completion of their mission so as to aid the ‘lessons learned’ process. One could argue that had the UK trained and encouraged its own civilian staff to undertake an auto-ethnographical approach to their work when deployed the DDT would not have been required, nor would it continue to be required11.

The role of ‘elite interviews’

The use of military debriefing teams to conduct in-depth interviewing of post-conflict practitioners, leads directly to the use of the analogous academic research methodology the ‘elite interview’. The role of ‘elite interviews’ has been mentioned briefly in the introductory paragraphs to this Chapter, both in the case of the discrete and impartial ‘analytical observer’ and with the ‘participant observer’. It will be appropriate at this stage to examine whether the methodology for ‘elite interviews’ might not also be employed effectively by the participant observer. In this context, it will also be important to identify what are the likely differences in the approach, the conduct of the interview, and the results obtained, between the discrete ‘impartial observer’ and the ‘participant observer’ and then to link these observations specifically to the context of the research for the thesis.

In addition to having examined the academic literary sources on the topic of elite interviews. The author has been fortunate enough to participate as the ‘interviewee’ in some thirty to forty ‘elite interviews’. These ranged from the discrete ‘impartial observer’, through those who were in practice ‘participant observers’ to colleagues and associates such as Lijphart (1994 and 2004), who were interviewing the author specifically for their own academic purposes. Unsurprisingly, the author was able to observe significant differences between those interviews conducted by ‘impartial observers’ from those who were already intimately involved with the specific processes to which the interviews related. Whilst the views given are necessarily impressionistic, some clear points emerge which indicate that it would have been impossible for someone so heavily engaged in the process as the author then was, to have conducted typical, discrete and impartial interviews. Whilst the interviews conducted did not in every case form part of the everyday work routine and in some cases were conducted, usually in an informal setting, so as to gather material with the consent of the interviewee for their own theses, it is clear from Arksey and Knight (1999) and others that these did not constitute elite interviews, even if they were conducted in the same manner.
As previously stated, Arksey and Knight (1999) have said that 60% of the time devoted to obtaining elite interviews is ‘negotiating access’. It is this emphasis upon ‘access’ which is perhaps the key element and in which is reflected the difference between an elite interview by an ‘impartial observer’ and an interview conducted by a participant observer. In other words, the discrete ‘impartial observer’ has a need to demonstrate that they have come as close as they can to the ‘ground truth’ of the decision-making process and that this can be achieved through the mechanism of the elite interview. The participant observer, on the other hand, has no such requirement, as they can demonstrate that they themselves were part of, or were closely associated with, the processes taking place.

It is true that in a similar interview conducted by a ‘participant observer’ access is not usually an issue nor is there often a need to demonstrate that such access was possible. There are, however, a number of other more relevant factors which will inform the outcome of the interview. The ‘participant observer’ is likely already to know exactly where the interviewee will be located within the overall architecture of the post-conflict structure and so will be better able to ‘situate’ their questions accordingly. Hence the ‘participant observer’ is likely to be better able to focus upon the questions to which they need to find the answers, rather than asking broad generalities. As the depth of perception of the questioner will be greater and the questions more focussed, it is likely that they will be more challenging to the interviewee. Indeed, it is possible that the interview may take the form of two meetings with the first discussion largely raising the topics to be discussed and the second providing answers which may have had to be researched by the interviewee or his staff. There are, it should be stated, potential problems with this approach. If the interlocutors are familiar with each other, much may be taken for granted or assumed. There may be issues of rank and seniority which will affect the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee. Finally, if both have been involved in the same long term project, there may be a fear by both participants of identifying systemic problems or difficulties and in either upsetting a cosy atmosphere or simply exposing an inability to break through ‘groupthink’.

As for the interview itself, it is most likely that both participants know each other, if not formally then informally. So, that the meetings are usually more relaxed and the questions can hence be wider ranging and, as Bernard (2000: 191) states, ‘semi-structured’ and often ‘unstructured’. Neither the interviewer nor the interviewee are required to establish any ‘groundwork’ as to their role and so on, nor be distracted by discussing details of which both participants would already be aware. Additionally, there is the issue of ‘trust’ to consider. The interviewee is likely to ‘trust’12 the ‘participant observer’ to a greater extent, in terms of what is discussed, recognising that this is a purely ‘academic exercise’ and that both of them will be continuing to work together in the future. Why is this issue of ‘trust’, relevant? It is because those members of the IC working in post-conflict environments (and probably elsewhere) know that many post-graduate students, particularly from Central and Eastern European countries and the United States, fund their studies and, in many cases, their research visits by also acting as part time ‘journalists’; indeed some appear to be full time journalists and part time students. Being cautious of appearing on the front page of Česky Pravda, as happened once to the Director General for Elections in BiH13 having participated in an ‘elite interview’, those being invited to take part in ‘elite interviews’ are likely to be extremely restrained in what they say and the interviewer will, in many cases, get little that would not otherwise be available elsewhere. With the participant observer on the other hand, the interviewee may well be willing to explain ‘why’ they took a particular decision and what the thought process
was behind the decision and, in some cases, what particular information drove them to take a particular decision at a certain time, confident that the privileged information will not be later revealed. This is valuable to the interviewer, as they can then understand the context in which decisions were taken and in many cases the competing pressures upon key decision makers, in particular from participating states and donors.  

**Ethical issues**

The impact of ethical issues on either the analytical observation or participant observer approaches should also be examined, and it is important that both analytical and participant observers are aware of these. Critically, both types of observer should be open and transparent with their ‘subjects’ about their aims and the methodologies they will use to achieve them. In the cases examined within the PhD thesis, both the role of the observer and the majority of the process itself was open and transparent. It is also a limiting factor, that in line with their conditions of employment, the participant observer will not disclose confidential material or that which is gained ‘in confidence’ by nature of their employment. This raises a second ethical issue. If, to the participant observer, there is for them at least, as Rumsfeld (2011) would say, a ‘known unknown’ and this information is not reported, then he or she, is guilty of deliberately misleading their audience. It was specifically for this reason that the author focussed the case studies on the period after he had left military service.

The fact that one of the active participants in the electoral and other processes was also observing them, was in this case, neither harmful nor raised ethical issues. Indeed, the author had been actively encouraged to adopt this approach by his management. Additionally, the thesis did not make use of excerpts or quotes from personal correspondence or e-mails, except on those rare occasions where information was specifically requested for the purpose of the thesis.

Furthermore, the fact that ‘participant observation’ was taking place was also widely known at the time, as it was openly discussed in the author’s places of employment and, as has been suggested earlier, was taking place across the process with a number of other participant observers of differing specialities and in various locations.

On balance, the benefits of the ‘participant observer’ approach do outweigh the ‘impartiality’ of the ‘discrete, impartial observer’ approach. The participant observer approach is also intellectually and, in every way, ‘more honest’ in that having been a ‘participant observer’; it is very difficult to act as if one had not been present. It is also worth noting that much of the literature discussing research, such as Wisker (2001: 178) and others, discuss the participant observer ‘inserting themselves’ into a group for anything up to three years, so as to conduct research. For his research the author did not need to ‘insert himself’ as he was present by nature of his employment. As such, the phrase ‘practitioner researcher’ or ‘active participant’, both of which are used by Gray (2004), appear to come closer to the reality. Unfortunately, his terminology and approach, which allows a number of participant observer approaches, is not widely used elsewhere, perhaps because his work post-dates much of the other material on the subject and that work which is equally current, such as that of Seale (2004) whose chapter six on participant observation simply abstracts a chapter from McCall and Simmons (1969). The work by McCall and Simmons consists of the original journal piece by Becker and Geer (1957) with an additional unattributed commentary by Trow and a ‘riposte’ by
Becker and Geer (1957). Other recent literature, such as that by Bauma (2004), fails to discuss the issue at all, whereas Robson (2002), unlike much of the other literature, at least recognised the participant observer as ‘a full participant in the process’ while Richards and Pestle (1988) also recognised that the role of participant observer put the researcher under considerable additional pressure.

At the very least, if one were to claim to be a disinterested observer, one would be intellectually dishonest, as there are things that a participant observer knows that would be denied to the outside observer. This is not a matter of ‘going native’; it is a question of, by being directly involved, being ‘grainier’, ‘grittier’ and being able to add more analytical nuances. The participant observer will also have access to information and impressions which would be denied to the researcher, who had not been present when these events took place. Moreover as the observer was present in a natural way, by virtue of his employment, it was not ‘disturbing the environment’ as a reporter or researcher would have done and which has been one of the concerns of Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (1998). Nor did he have to negotiate ‘access’, as this was given by nature of his employment.

This access and the means by which it was acquired, was particularly relevant in the case of BiH and Kosovo and, it is suspected, in other post-conflict situations, as so many activities took place which were neither minuted nor recorded in any way, often in informal meetings with no agenda and no set list of invitees. This was not in an attempt to preserve secrecy, but simply because the key aim of the participants was to ‘get the job done’ and to take ‘sensible’ decisions. An example of such a process may be seen in the meetings between the IC and generals such as Ratko Mladic. The IC routinely met the generals commanding all the warring factions, including Mladic. The meetings with Mladic stopped because it appeared appropriate to do so, not because of a formal order, although this would have undoubtedly been issued at some stage had it proved necessary to do so. This action was taken despite the fact that at that point Mladic had not been formally indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It is highly unlikely that any written record exists of the initial decision taken, nor of any similar decision that officials from the OSCE should not meet Karadzic.

In addition, whilst the author may have needed to get permission for certain statements and documents to be used in, for example, the bibliography, or as footnotes, most, if not all, are now in the public domain; for those which are not, as a participant observer, he was at least aware of their existence and could acknowledge them. The discussions at the US Army Institute for Peace in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on the nature of the future pillar structure within Kosovo (and on which organisation was to carry out which activity), which were held before these proposals were put to the UN in May 1999, would be a case in point. The minutes and notes from these discussions, which included the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in BiH and the future Deputy High Representative in Kosovo, have never been made public. However, the author attended as a guest speaker, talking about elections, and could clearly report on the decision-making process as a ‘participant observer’. Similarly, both the elections and ‘policing’ plans presented to the participants at the ‘Rambouillet’ summit have never been made public.
A discussion of the methodology that was used

The preceding elements of this Chapter outline the initial question as to which methodology to adopt. This inevitably led to the conclusion that the PhD thesis would lean very heavily on practical fieldwork or as Yin (2003) described it, ‘the method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its context’. This, it is suggested, was an accurate description of BiH and Kosovo in the post-conflict period. The methodology would also utilise the available empirical evidence. Casley, Lury and Richard (1981) describe in some detail the nature of the data that may typically be collected by using this approach, although their illustration is founded upon a business and governmental example based upon one state, while the range of data collected for the thesis was somewhat wider, being by definition multi-national. The research material was gathered during a 14-year stay in the Balkans, in which the author held increasingly responsible posts whilst seconded by the UK Government. Over seven years of this time was spent in BiH (1995 – 2002) and the author was present on both the date of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement (hence the formal move to a post-conflict state) and on the 1st July 2004 (the date at which BiH formally moved from a post-conflict to a transitional state in EU and European terms). He also made frequent visits to other areas within the Western Balkans, including Serbia and Kosovo, both before and after the NATO bombing campaign. For the majority of that period, he was directly involved in the management and organisation of elections for both BiH and Kosovo, for a significant period as the OSCE Director General for Elections in BiH. These electoral processes included the very large refugee populations in Croatia, Serbia (including Kosovo) and Montenegro (at that time still part of Federal Yugoslavia), hence the visits to those places.

The empirical fieldwork gathered using participant observation in this type of qualitative research reaps benefits as described by Bryman (1988) He debates participant observation at length and would indicate that, for most social scientists, qualitative research is superior to quantitative research. Bryman’s views are shared by Waddington (1994). It is clear from the evidence presented, as a result of previous academic research, that the correct methodology for this thesis was to use the participant observer approach making use, wherever possible, of an auto-ethnographical methodology in order to obtain most value from the available material.

Using the empirical evidence available from the participant observer approach, it was necessary to carefully select certain themes for more detailed investigation. The empirical evidence which was collected and which then formed the core of the thesis, was set against both a historical perspective of post-conflict intervention as well as the perspective of international colonialism, imperialism, cosmopolitanism and liberal interventionism and any other theoretical models which were relevant and which it was considered appropriate to discuss.

Theory and practice in this research

Whilst it may not be appropriate within any research design to delve too deeply into the theoretical construct within which a thesis is emplaced, it is important to state that it is this which will underpin the empirical evidence throughout. As an example, whilst liberal interventionism can be traced back to Palmerston in the mid-nineteenth century and even before, it was also the model used by US academics such as Peceny and Sanchez (1998) and Daalder (1999) to describe president Clinton’s ‘lift and strike’ proposals made with regard to Bosnia in 1992. Additionally, Beck and Cronin
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(2006) believe that the UN can be seen as one element of the idea of cosmopolitanism. They also see within that vision the development of the thought that crimes against humanity should become an accepted concept within humanitarian law and that it was this idea which led to the development of the International Criminal Tribunals (ICT). Of the ICT, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) forms but one example and the ICT is of particular relevance not only to BiH, but also to the other conflict-affected environments. For some such as Klitou (2010), it was specifically these human rights elements which attracted them towards the cosmopolitanism model.

This thesis however focused upon the IC’s management of post-conflict operations and not that of humanitarian intervention, which has been defined amongst others by Murphy (1996: 343) as;

… the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivation of internationally recognized human rights.

That said, it is impossible to de-link the two activities or phases within a conflict. It would also appear that not only do some textbook writers, such as Heywood (2002), understandably given his undergraduate audience, take a simplistic definition of humanitarian intervention and the immediate issues surrounding it, so did many of those responsible for political decision making, with regards to BiH and Kosovo including, perhaps, many close to President Clinton.

In general, it can be argued that humanitarian intervention and post-conflict interventions should, and in most cases necessarily are, intertwined. It was arguably the principal problem with the UNPROFOR mandate (1992 – 1995) that it was not, and that each ‘issue’ had been addressed independently in the case of the ongoing conflict, if at all. For the policy and practical effects of this strategic de-linkage both in BiH and elsewhere Shawcross (2000) gives a good catalogue of the impacts, both upon those within BiH and the peacemakers, whilst Rose (1998) illustrates the practical impacts at the operational level across BiH, and Richardson (2000) and Stewart (1994) describe the impact at the local level in Gorazde in 1994 and Central Bosnia in 1993. Except in so far as they directly related to the conduct of operations both within BiH and Kosovo, these issues were not covered within the thematic chapters of the author’s thesis. Where they were relevant to the concepts and ideas examined (one example being the response drawn from the unplanned and impromptu ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Kosovo caused by Milosevic’s expulsion of the Kosovars in 1999) they were discussed primarily in the ‘lessons learned’ elements of the thesis. Chomsky (1999) in particular gives a more general description of the impact of these events upon Kosovo.

The thesis focused primarily on BiH and Kosovo as the basis for its case studies. Whilst Brady and Collier (2004) and Gray (2004) amongst others, talk about the selection of case studies, this was not relevant to this particular research design, in that the observer was only able to participate directly in these two relatively recent post-conflict situations. As such, the thesis did not identify ‘third world’ IC intervention and post-conflict activity in very much detail. The thesis did, however, determine clear examples of each type of intervention. This included those interventions that prevented further worsening of an already existing conflict or internal chaos and which were not perhaps, post facto, recognised as ‘post-conflict’ as, in these cases, full scale military operations never took place. The Italian intervention during Operation ‘ALBA’ in Albania in 1997 – 98 was one such example, and several of the US interventions in Haiti would also fit this model. However,
in both the Albanian and the Haitian examples, interventions by in excess of 8,000 military personnel, albeit with a primarily humanitarian focus, at least initially, would perhaps be deemed by some commentators as ‘full scale military operations’.

The thesis further attempted to identify if there are, or were, clear models for IC post-conflict activity in BiH and Kosovo, and which were relevant for elsewhere, even if these were not immediately apparent to those implementing them at the time. Furthermore, this thesis examined whether the evolutionary nature of the methodologies employed, was in part linked to the fact that they depended upon the same relatively small group of technical experts who are simply ‘recycled’ through each post-conflict operation as they occurred. The field of elections is one such area where the number of practitioners at senior, middle and even junior levels, are limited and where inevitably those practitioners base their current practices on the lessons they personally have learnt from past operations. Additionally, given the limited number of practitioners, the academic community has been forced to reply upon a limited source of references when sampling direct experiences of electoral operations in post-conflict. For an example of this, one need look no further than the bibliography of writers such as Sisk (2008), where it can be seen that many of the practical references come from a limited number of sources including former International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) employees and the Swedish based international Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

Fieldwork

The author’s fieldwork and empirical evidence was also used to help identify and define the ‘legacies’ and ‘consequences’ of the IC’s involvement in these two post-conflict environments and to compare them not only with previous examples, including those from the traditional ‘colonial’ period, but also those others that were taking place in parallel such as in Lebanon. One purpose of the fieldwork was to define clearly the terms ‘legacy’ and ‘consequence’ and to differentiate between ‘intended’ and ‘unintended’ legacies and consequences. Furthermore, the fieldwork was also used to identify and exemplify any ‘lessons learned’ from both BiH and Kosovo, particularly those which have a utility elsewhere and to demonstrate whether any of those lessons learned have been either implemented or ignored, where they were relevant to later or current post-conflict environments.

Finally, the research design was formulated so as to situate the study within the context of the key literature on the subject and attempted to identify where the thesis either corroborates or departs from this existing thinking. Whilst this element focused on the literature in areas such as post-conflict reconstruction, democracy promotion, the character of the IC, its intervention strategies and record, it also looked at the issue of the EU’s attempted ‘governance’ of non-EU spaces; in other words ‘government without governance’.

How to compensate for the lack of ‘Elite Interviews’

As discussed earlier in this Chapter, ‘elite interviews’ and similar devices were not part of the research design, as they would have appeared as an artifice for a participant observer who had a considerable degree of access to those who might be interviewed. However, so as to ensure ethical compliance, a record was maintained of those people interviewed in a rather more formal manner.
and authority sought in writing for direct quotes or the use of written materials supplied by the ‘interviewees’. As a result, the intent in this thesis was to maximise the practical benefits that elite interviews would otherwise bring, particularly to theses which are based primarily upon qualitative research as described by Arksey and Knight (1999), Bryman (1988) and others, by integrating the empirical material which was collected orally.

It is important to return at this point to the ethical question which affects all participant observers. Where the author quoted from written texts which had been requested or received in a personal capacity and where they have not been written specifically for the purposes of inclusion in this thesis, it was necessary to obtain informed consent. This was done. In all cases where it was possible to refer to material which is now in the public domain the author did so. In a similar manner the author only used oral material, such as the comments from Fisher19 on the referendum, where it has been necessary, in this case to indicate that the shock at the Indonesian response went right to the top. Rather than submitting these documents as individual papers, instead, these actors and the relevant papers were in the thesis where they were relevant and as part of the main body of the text. For a similar reason, questionnaires and sampling techniques were not employed, except where they occurred as a result of work carried out at the time and which was then quoted as ‘evidence’ within the text.

**Weaknesses in the current description of research methodologies and the role of the ‘observer’**

In the discussion of the research design for the thesis, the role of the ‘analytical observer’ and the ‘participant observer’ was reviewed along with that of the ‘active participant’. It was clear that the term ‘active participant’ offered by Bernard (2000), had neither been fully defined nor discussed in the literature; in the absence of any alternatives, it came closest to defining the role of the author during the field research phase of this thesis. One particular reason for the absence of an adequate definition is that Bernard (2000) had focused on the role of an observer in an ethnographical or clinical context and not that of an observer who is observing a political or other process, such as post-conflict recovery.

Clearly, the term ‘active participant’ is of value as a descriptor and would adequately define the roles of Horowitz and Lijphart, who were actively interested in developments in BiH and Kosovo20 and who, although active participants in the process, were not central to it. In other words, in the larger scheme of things they were neither ‘influencers’ nor ‘decision makers’. In practice, their role, to use a project management definition, was that of an ‘assurer’ (Prince 2™, 2001: Glossary of terms), someone that provides confidence that the ‘deliverable is appropriate’ (Prince 2™, 2011: Glossary of terms) to the task in hand. Similarly, those who conducted their field research while engaged in a fairly minor role within a post-conflict mission, such as serving in a rural field office of an international organisation (IO) or major non-governmental organisation (NGO), might sensibly, if closely defined, be termed ‘active participants’.

**Conclusion**

These definitions are adequate to define the two groups discussed, but they do not represent an adequate descriptor for the category into which the author of the thesis fell - people who are
‘influencers’ and ‘decision makers’ at a managerial level. Such people are not only ‘active participants’ and ‘assurers’, but also have an opportunity to shape policy and to affect the decision making process. Here again, project management terminology, given that post-conflict missions are by definition ‘projects’ albeit on a large scale, may provide a useful starting point. Prince 2™ terminology defines the ultimate decision makers, in this scenario the Heads of Mission (HOMs) or the political leadership, as the ‘executive’ (Prince 2™, 2011: Glossary of terms). It then goes on to describe the senior managerial functions as the ‘authority’ and the ‘approvers’, the people who have:

… the right to allocate resources and make decisions (applies to project, stage and team levels) (Prince 2™, 2011: Glossary of terms).

They are also:

… identified as qualified and authorized to approve a (management or specialist) product as being complete and fit for purpose (at which point there may be a further ‘assurance’ process) (Prince 2™, 2011: Glossary of terms).

These terms, while not wholly adequate for the purposes of both this thesis and further academic research, begin to define the role of someone who is in the position of being both a manager and a critical observer.

The previous paragraphs and the experience of conducting such research suggested that there are two additional descriptions by which observers should be categorised. Firstly, there is the ‘active participant’, a description initially provided by Bernard but as qualified above. Secondly, there is the ‘authoritative observer’, someone who is either in a position to influence events, in the way that the author of the thesis was, or someone whose standing in their own particular field is already so great, at the time that they participated in the events, that they had been brought in specifically so as not only to ‘assure’ (Prince 2™, 2011: n.p.) that the process was ‘appropriate’, but also who could as a result both influence and shape future events.21

Notes

1. Horowitz was a member of the elections advisory panel in Bosnia in the period 1997-99. This appointment was directly relevant to his academic experience. It is believed that he performed a similar function in Kosovo.

2. Mark Etherington, for example, who had previously served in more junior positions both in BiH and Kosovo, then went on to become a provincial governor in Iraq and wrote a book about the year that he spent there; Revolt on the Tigris – The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq (2005). Senior post-conflict managers, such as Paddy Ashdown also write memoirs or autobiographies; A Fortunate Life: The Autobiography of Paddy Ashdown (2009), which are in general self-justifying or self-congratulatory rather than detailed examinations of the processes involved. In Ashdown’s autobiography, only pp 331 – 372 are devoted to BiH with pp 345-347 briefly describing his twin role as both High Representative (HR) and EU Special Representative (EUSR).
3. The author was the Director General for Elections in BiH from 1997-2000 and then Director of Operations for the OSCE from 2000-02.

4. The author had previously been in Yugoslavia with the FCO in the 1970s.

5. He had previously served briefly in Belgrade in the 1970s.

6. It was established to support those who are, or who have, undertaken PRINCE 2 project management courses and are project management professionals.

7. Amongst other activities, the author served with the Diplomatic Service in Lebanon during the Arab-Israeli conflict in October 1972, Greece during the coup in February 1974, and subsequently during the Cyprus invasion June 1974 and its aftermath, including the transition to democracy in Greece. The author also had cause to visit the Mayan Highlands of Guatemala in 1978-79 during the Mayan revolt, again whilst serving with the Diplomatic Service, and the Kurdish areas of Eastern Turkey in 1983 whilst serving with the military. During the ‘Great Lakes’ crisis, which overlapped the Yugoslav conflict, the author was employed as part of a small team in the UK on the creation of an information campaign for refugees. These products were in a range of media, given the lack of a written form of the principal language Keena-Rwanda, and designed to assist the return of Tutsi refugees in the camps of Eastern Zaire, mostly women and children, to their homes in Rwanda.

8. Both Horowitz and Lijphart served as members of the OSCE’s Elections Advisory Commission (EAC) in BiH and this presumably led to their joint interest in ‘Consociationalism’. Indeed, given his experiences it comes as no surprise, seeing that he saw it being implemented first hand by the practitioners in the period from 1996 – 2000 in BiH, that Lijphart could say of Consociationalism in 2004 that he had ‘merely discovered what political practitioners had repeatedly – and independently of both academic experts and one another – invented years earlier’ (Liphart, 2004: 97). This active participation by academics enabled considerable scope for academic discussion both during the course of the operation and subsequently. It also gave considerable exposure not only to the academics themselves, but also to the practitioners of academia and academic methods of problem solving. Furthermore, as the requirement for appointment to middle and senior management appointments within the OSCE required a higher level degree or equivalent, much of the methodological discussion around resolving practical problems were often conducted in an academic manner. A further factor and one perhaps not easily appreciated was that it exposed academics in this environment to the real ‘political pressures’ being experienced by the practitioners. To cite just one example, Horowitz stated publicly in BiH while a member of the EAC and sharing a platform with the (US) OSCE Ambassador that ethnicity need not be the primary motivating factor in BiH post-conflict politics. This statement is contrary to the central tenets of his seminal work which states that where and once ethnicity becomes an issue it will always be the primary driver of the political process and political parties.
9. See, for example, the extensive and often highly critical commentaries on Donald Rumsfeld’s *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (2011). Reviewed by Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s former chief of staff, in the *New Statesman* on the 9th March 2011, Powell (2011: n.p.), quoting Talleyrand, said that Rumsfeld; ‘learned nothing and forgot nothing’.

10. In contrast to both the ‘strategic’ level and the military sphere of post-conflict where there is often a wealth of, admittedly not impartial, political and other memoirs.

11. It is believed to be still active in this role in 2011, but whether it is only partially effective due to a lack of resources is not clear. The author recently received a presentation from and had a conversation with the UK political officer who had served for a year in Sangin within Helmand province, Afghanistan in 2009-10. He stated that he had not been formally debriefed for the ‘lessons learned’ process by his seconding department, DFID.

12. In this context, ‘trust’ in the broadest context and not in the context of the interviewer having received security clearance and so on, although this might also be relevant when for example interviewing a senior military officer or a key member of the High Representative’s staff.

13. The author was interviewed by a Czech MA student of International Relations (IR) at the Charles University in Prague at the time of the Sarajevo Conference. Her visit had been funded by *Česky Pravda* and whilst she had been unable to get any personal interviews at the Conference itself, she was able to conduct others by presenting herself as a legitimate IR and politics MA student.

14. A practical example can serve to illustrate the proposition just made. One can observe the skewing of social and developmental programmes as a result of decisions taken in remote capitals by donors and particularly from those states which grant substantial amount of aid funds directly and not through third parties such as the EU or the UN. In 1998-99 if on a field visit to BiH, a discrete and impartial observer may well have noticed that many of the programmes being run by a number of agencies such as the OSCE were focussed particularly upon the development of the roles of women in a wide range of areas of society. If they asked a question in an ‘elite interview’ about why there was such a focus they might have been told that it was because this was an ‘important issue’, ‘there was a lot of ground to make up’ in the treatment of women, and so on All of which was, of course, true. What they might not have been told and a participant observer might know, or may indeed already have known or guessed, was that the sudden switch of emphasis across those agencies, such as the OSCE, which were implementers of aid provided from elsewhere, was because they had all been told that the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) would only fund those programmes in the coming two years which had a major gender component. Bureaucrats, being what they are and wishing to maintain their departments and a significant number of their staff, had adjusted their programming accordingly, but they are unlikely to say this publicly. There are many similar cases and indeed the same adjustments were made in Albania for exactly the same reason in 2006 when, once again, SIDA decided to focus its funding almost exclusively on women’s issues. As a result, the emphasis in post-conflict developmental terms was (and often
is) guided by what funds were (and are) available and who was prepared to commit funding, rather than on the basis of the strict criteria of needs, as assessed by the experts on the ground.

15. That this should be so, is perhaps not a surprise. De Vaus (2001) makes this point in his discussion on ethical issues. Were this observation to be an investigation of, for example, criminal or domestic violence issues it will, De Vaus suggests, be more relevant.

16. Whereas, were the author to have presented himself as a disinterested academic observer and analyst, he should have, if he were to have been academically honest, ignored their existence.

17. In 1998 there were estimated to be 30,000 Bosnian Serb voters registered within the boundaries of Kosovo and four registration and polling stations in Pristina, Mitrovica/Kozarska Mitrovica Pec/Peja and Prizren. All had to be established and manned by international personnel in the period May – July and September 1998.

18. It is worth noting that this specific ‘lesson’ does not appear to have been ‘learned’ by the IC. Consider, for example, the expulsion of third country nationals from Libya.

19. Jeff Fisher, at that time Vice President of the Institute For Electoral Systems (IFES) talking to the author about the East Timor referendum in 1999. Fisher was the senior referendum advisor for that process.

20. This has been evidenced by their later writings on the topic.

21. An example of such a person would be Jeff fisher, the Vice President of IFES, who performed just such a role in Kosovo.

References


The Challenges of Conducting Research in Conflict-Affected Environments

Dr Eleanor Gordon

Abstract: This Chapter looks at some of the most significant challenges of conducting research in conflict-affected environments, focusing particularly on ethical and security challenges. A number of recommendations to address these challenges are provided. These include: to undertake, regularly review and utilise security analyses; to be flexible in terms of research plans, while adhering to ethical principles; to develop an in-depth awareness of the context and also recognise the value of local knowledge; to avoid underestimating the amount of time required for planning research as well as building trust with research participants; to be careful in the decisions made throughout the research process, from choosing gatekeepers and interpreters to choosing what subjects to discuss and what language to use; to have respect for research participants, and be aware of the risks they face and the trauma they may be suffering from; to attend to perceived imbalances in power between researcher and research participant; to be self-reflexive and regularly consider the impact of the researcher on the field as well as the impact of the field on the researcher; and, fundamentally, to adhere to the principle of doing no harm, while recognising the value that research can have in understanding and, thus, better responding to the challenges of conflict – and ultimately giving something back to research participants.

Introduction

This Chapter considers some of the main challenges faced by researchers in conflict-affected environments. The Chapter focuses, in particular, on ethical and security challenges as well as challenges familiar to other researchers working in cultures different to their own. A number of recommendations are provided to address these challenges. Many of these recommendations relate to the fundamental principle of doing no harm, while recognising the positive as well as negative impact that research can have on the field – and that the field can have on the researcher. The importance of taking time, showing respect and being honest – with research
participants and oneself, in terms of who, ultimately, the research benefits or should benefit – also underpin many of the specific recommendations throughout this Chapter. To begin, this Chapter briefly considers the extent to which social science research in conflict-affected environments may be different to research conducted in other environments, before considering the challenges faced in such environments in more detail.

As detailed by Porter (2005), there are shared principles of social science research methodology and ethics. These include the need for an appropriate research methodology and theoretical framework (drawing on a single theory or multiplicity of theoretical perspectives) to analyse and explain the research findings. Common ethical principles include confidentiality, anonymity and privacy (protecting the anonymity and privacy of research participants), transparency (being open and honest about the research and its objectives), as well as the need to obtain informed consent from research participants, treat them with respect and not expose them to harm (see, for example, Cramer, Hammond and Pottier, 2011 and Wood, 2013). In conflict-affected environments, ethical concerns are often heightened (Cramer, Hammond and Pottier, 2011; Ford, Mills, Zachariah and Upshur, 2009; Goodhand, 2000; Wood, 2006 and 2013) partly due to increased insecurity and partly as a result of the vulnerability of many research participants. As a result, research methods can be problematised.

There is not an extensive literature providing guidance on conducting research in conflict-affected environments and overcoming challenges, beyond the security challenges of working in insecure environments (Henry, Higate and Sanghera, 2009). There are, however, a number of notable publications which provide useful guidance for the researcher in this field, paying particular attention to the ethical as well as security issues that are often pronounced in such environments. Some of these publications are publicly available online (others are available in the online library of the University of Leicester, for those affiliated to the University) and listed in the list of references at the end of this Chapter. Some of these resources focus on specific research methods and how they can be effective in environments where security and ethical issues can inhibit movement, interaction and engagement. One excellent example is the collection of papers on participatory research methodologies edited by (and with contributions from) Dr Richard Bowd (a member of the SCID Panel of Experts) and Professor Alpaslan Özerdem (2010). This book provides a critical analysis of participatory methods and lessons learned for both researchers and practitioners. The book concludes with recommendations for the improved use of such methods in conflict/crisis-affected environments as well as in the development context. These recommendations include the need for flexibility of approach, given the fluidity of the research environment: in the aftermath of conflict, for instance, there can be seismic power shifts and widespread instability. As such, a researcher needs to be prepared to make last minute amendments to research strategy and methods, not least to respond to developing security situations and minimise risk to the researcher, research participants and others (see also Cramer, Hammond and Pottier, 2011). Of course, remaining flexible and adopting innovative ways of overcoming obstacles as a result of the rapidly changing environment can pose further problems; it is vital that flexibility and innovation remain bound by ethical and security considerations.
It is also important to consider that in post-conflict environments, the dynamics which impede the work of the practitioner are likely to impact research. So, for example, it is important to remember that there could well be a proliferation of areas with mines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) yet to be cleared as well as widespread ownership of small arms. Poor security, limited rule of law, weak governance, damaged infrastructure (roads, buildings as well as electricity and water supply networks) and services (such as healthcare) can also impact research and the researcher in post-conflict environments, particularly countries in the immediate aftermath of conflict. So, it may be relatively difficult to travel within an area or to certain areas, or engage in the range of research methods that might have otherwise been used. Electricity cuts and shortages as well as internet connectivity problems can also impact research, but reliance on electricity and the internet can be minimised. Adaptability is, therefore, important as certain methods or ways that access can be gained, for instance, that might be suitable in other situations may not be in places affected by conflict (Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale, 2013). Indeed, methods applied to conflict-affected environments without appropriate adaptation can compromise the validity of the research findings. This was the case, for instance, with some Iraq mortality surveys carried out in the mid-2000s, which used sampling methods that ‘assumed homogenous distributions of violence and static makeup of households, which are uncharacteristic of conflict settings’ (Ford, Mills, Zachariah and Upshur, 2009: n.p.)

When endeavouring to research in conflict-affected environments it is important to conduct a conflict analysis. A conflict analysis will help identify key conflict actors as well as potential developments and flashpoints. As detailed by Mazurana and Gale (2013), a broader security analysis is also recommended, which should also be revisited throughout the research process. Such a security analysis identifies key factors which can influence the security situation, including:

- history and current dynamics of the country, including any regional influences
- politics within the country or region
- economy/resource base and infrastructure
- crime profile (overall and in particular in the area the researcher is working)
- likelihood and/or frequency that the country or region will be affected by a natural disaster
- nature and structure of conflict or violence
- up-to-date information on the level of hostilities (including ground movements, aerial bombings, indiscriminate attacks, land mines) and military developments (including troops moving into particular areas and raising of militias) (Mazurana and Gale, 2013: 283)

From such an analysis, threats can be identified, assessed, prioritised and avoided. Such an analysis can, thus, form the basis for a security plan (what action should be taken and when in the event of a security incident and in order to remain safe), which should be revisited regularly. Ideally, such security plans should be tested where feasible (especially if engaged for prolonged periods) in order to best prepare for worst-case scenarios.

Background research should also help identify activities, behaviour and issues that may provoke hostile reactions and, thus, better prepare the researcher for engaging in the environment. Knowing what to wear, where to go, what not to do or say is important in respect of gaining trust and
credibility, as well as maintaining safety. In short, conducting research in conflict-affected environments requires careful planning and preparation, including ‘assessing how to keep yourself and your team physically safe and emotionally healthy’ (Mazurana and Gale, 2013: 277), which means equipping yourself with the necessary knowledge and skills in order to make good decisions throughout the research process. Such knowledge will include familiarity with signs used to warn people of the presence of mines and other UXO, in places where there is a known threat. It is important to know where suspected mined areas are, which may not have been formally identified, as well as where three are on-going or potential hostilities. In this regard, it is vital to build relationships with local actors and reply upon their knowledge. Mazurana and Gale (2013) also recommend a number of staff safety manuals developed by the UN (2003), International Federation of the Red Cross (Tangen, Dryer and Julisson 2009) and others (Overseas Development Institute, 2010; People in Aid, 2003), for those who intend to engage in research in conflict-affected environments. Security for United National Peacekeepers developed as a training course by the Peace Operations Training Institute (2014) is also useful.

It is also important to gather useful contact information and develop trusted local contacts, prior to engaging in the research. This will help avoid exposure to security threats and will help in being prepared in the event that an incident occurs. Likewise, always having a fully charged mobile and/or radio as well as a small overnight bag ready with water, food, emergency contact information, passport and medicine, if relevant, is also recommended. It is also important in insecure environments to inform people where you are at all times. It is also recommended to learn at least some of the local language(s) as well as first aid and basic survival skills (such as navigation skills – see Mazurana and Gale, 2013). It is also advisable to read daily security sitreps (situation reports) from reliable sources (for example, UN Police), as well as build relationships with people on the ground – particularly from the local community – to get a fuller, richer picture.

While consideration of the security situation is particularly important when researching in conflict-affected environments, as Goodhand (2000: 12) has described, research even within conflict is possible for researchers who familiarise themselves with ‘the patterns and dynamics of conflict’, ascertaining the times and places during conflict where security may allow for research. It should be remembered that not always and in every place during conflict and its aftermath is security non-existent. Likewise Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale (2013), Longman (2013) and others contend that research in conflict zones is both possible and necessary; necessary because new social orders, power relations and forms of power emerge in such environments and it is important to investigate these. Moreover, it is important to challenge the dominant narratives that often justify, perpetuate or disguise conflict and other forms of large-scale violence (Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale, 2013; Nordstorm, 2004; Wood, 2006). Such research can, as a result, contribute to building peace and preventing conflict, through a better understanding of the phenomena of conflict.

It is important, nonetheless, while conducting the research, to remain savvy as well as flexible – avoiding certain places, or places at particular times (such as during night-term, elections or demonstrations), for instance, and adapting research to the changing conflict dynamics (as mentioned earlier). Of course, decisions about what places are safe will often depend upon the researcher and his or her gender, ethnicity, age, knowledge and language skills, which is important to consider. Research in conflict-affected places can be dangerous (see, for example, Smyth and Robinson, 2001). As will be discussed in more detail shortly, there can be people who are
suspicious of those perceived as, perhaps falsely, claiming to be researchers or who don’t want information getting out about certain issues. This can potentially expose the researcher, research participants and others associated with the research to risk. In places where authorities or armed groups may be suspicious of outsiders, may not want incidents of human rights violations being recorded, or may have an interest in detaining foreign nationals as a bargaining tool with foreign governments, it is particularly important to consider whether research is possible and, if so, take all necessary precautions. For post-graduate students (such as those on the SCID programme) about to engage in research, it is unlikely that any primary research will be authorised by university ethics committees where security of the researcher and research participants cannot be wholly assured.

**Communication**

To avoid being exposed – and exposing others – to security risks, research in conflict-affected environments needs to be especially attentive to the way in which research is conducted, where it is done, who are chosen to be the research participants and gatekeepers, and what questions are asked. As Goodhand (2000: 13) describes: ‘Reflection on how you conduct research, to whom you talk and what you talk about is essential to avoid putting communities at risk’. Large gatherings, for instance could increase the likelihood of a security incident. Going to specific individuals to gain access to communities could expose them to security risks, if they become perceived by others as leaders (Goodhand, 2000). People in conflict-affected environments are often more vulnerable and exposed to risk than those who are not and, as such, ethical concerns are heightened (Ford, Mills, Zachariah and Upshur, 2009). Alternatively, speaking with certain individuals or groups may expose the researcher to increased risks. Similarly, asking sensitive or politically-charged questions can increase hostility, or expose those who choose to answer such questions to repercussions. In conflict-affected environments, research concerning corruption, organised crime, conflict-related sexual violence, domestic violence, and security-related activities of insurgent groups and/or state security institutions can be highly sensitive. Goodhand (2000), referring to direct questions on the opium economy in a part of Afghanistan as inadvisable, remarks:

> Researchers have to be constantly aware that while they are present only for a short time, their questions and the discussions they provoke may reverberate for a long time afterwards. (Goodhand, 2000: 13)

It is important for the researcher to be familiar with the type of sensitivities that can be present to avoid exposing anyone to risk or harm as well as to avoid misinterpreting (lack of) data. For example, some of my work with Saferworld (Gordon, Sharma, Forbes and Cave, 2011) and other organisations has suggested that women in certain post-conflict environments are reluctant to comment on conflict-related sexual violence and domestic violence. Women’s silence on this issue during research could have been misinterpreted that such phenomena are not prevalent or do not concern these women. This might have been the case had previous experience not suggested otherwise, other research not been undertaken (in an effort to understand the cultural context and test assumptions and data retrieved), and had other research methods not been employed (to corroborate or otherwise existing data and encourage greater openness – for example, interviews after building trust rather than just focus groups or questionnaires). As Cramer, Hammond and Pottier (2011) recommend, triangulating between different sources, as well as methods, can guard against misinterpreting silences or anomalies in data, as well as corroborate data retrieved.
Similarly, Hammond (2011) and Brun (2013) argue that in getting the full meaning it is important to listen to and understand the silences as well as what is said. In the example above, it is significant, of course, that women were reluctant to talk about conflict-related sexual violence and domestic violence. The cultural taboos and fear of repercussions from communities play a significant role in determining the extent to which women, in this instance, talk about their security concerns; it is, thus, likely that they play a similar role in determining the likelihood of requesting protection from security providers, reporting such crimes, or seeking justice in the event that they have been the victim of such crimes.

It will, of course, be difficult to interpret the meaning of silences in less than familiar places, not least because there are a number of reasons for silence. As Brun (2013: 136) elucidates:

… these silences can have different purposes and take different forms. First of all, for protection, people are silent about their sympathies and antipathies, and they avoid speaking openly about the identity of actors behind atrocities and sometimes omit mention of atrocities they have experienced. For protection, people may also be extremely wary about recounting where they have been at different times, whom they were with, and how they got there. In other situations, people’s silences represent the inability to speak of terror they have experienced because it is too painful and will recall the trauma they experienced. In other instances, silence may be a way of taking control over an interview situation and consequently be experienced as empowering. In the latter case, silence does not necessarily represent a lack of voice, but rather a space one creates for oneself, to maintain a sense of self or as a means of protest.

People may also be silent so as not to expose themselves to harm, should they say something that others might think they shouldn’t (if they are a woman speaking about security or political matters, for example) or should their identity be ascertained by their accent (if they are a refugee or internally displaced person (IDP), for instance) (Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale, 2013). Brun advocates spending a lot of time with research participants and engaging in non-interview communication – including ‘hanging out’ (Rogers, 2004 cited in Brun, 2013: 136; see also Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale, 2013: 13) – and finding ‘safe spaces’ as well as triangulating data in order to help interpret (and respect) silences.

Aside from the sensitivities associated with certain topics of conversation, it is also important to try to be aware of the sensitivity of certain words or concepts before engaging in primary research. For instance, the commonly used concepts in the international community of ‘Security Sector Reform’, ‘demobilisation’ and ‘reintegration’ of former combatants can cause offence, where similar concepts (such as ‘Security Sector Development’, ‘standing down’ and ‘reinsertion’ may not), as I have found in my work in parts of South Asia and the Balkans. Of course, it is important to become familiar with the way similar terms may be used by different groups to mean different things – again so as to avoid causing offence and, as a result, harm to the research or research participant, and to avoid misunderstandings or misinterpretations. There are often specific reasons why certain concepts may be rejected or adopted, which should be identified. Similarly, acronyms and colloquial terms may have different meanings or be misunderstood in different languages and cultures. In addition to understanding how language can be differently interpreted, it is important to be familiar with the culture and expected or polite ways of behaving and interacting to avoid
causing offence or harm and to avoid misunderstanding the actions and words of others. As Thrift (2003: 105 cited in Brun, 2013: 133) has described, it can be difficult ‘negotiating with people when you don’t know all the small and unspoken ethical ground “rules” that make up everyday life, rules which you have arduously to construct.’

The fact that researchers, as well as practitioners, in conflict-affected environments often rely upon interpreters also needs to be considered. The impact of the research on the interpreter should be considered as well as, conversely, the impact of the interpreter upon the research. Effort should be made to learn relevant languages, where appropriate. Where interpreters are required, great care should be taken when selecting interpreters in order to ensure ethical principles (of confidentiality, anonymity, impartiality, security and so on) are not compromised. There may also be multiple languages used, and assumptions should not be made that the official language(s) will be spoken by all or that there is only one official language.

As well as considering who are engaged as gatekeepers and research participants, what questions are asked, and what language is used, it is important to consider the place where research is conducted, for example where interviews or focus group discussions are held. This has implications for security as well as broader ethical considerations, such as whether privacy can be assured. Places chosen can also communicate meaning to research participants and observers. Places chosen can inadvertently adversely impact the research if such places have specific symbolic associations that may influence the perception among others of the research aims, processes or audience: if buildings are owned or associated with particular individuals or groups (political parties, organised criminal groups, certain ethnic or religious groups, and so on). Similarly, if areas in which research is conducted have a particular demographic (for example, dominated by a particular ethnic/religious group or affiliated to a political party where such demographic characteristics are politically sensitive) this can also influence the extent to which research can be conducted safely, effectively and result in credible, valid data. The decision on whether to have interviews in public or private spaces also has implications for security and openness: people may speak more freely in private spaces, while in public spaces people can leave more easily and are not responsible for ensuring the others’ safety, for instance (Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale, 2013).

Aside from the ethical risks posed by cross-cultural research in which meaning is interpreted differently by a researcher from another culture (see Letherby, 2000), research in other cultures can pose further ethical challenges given concepts of privacy and consent, for instance, are also often culturally specific (Hett and Hett, 2013). Consequently, it is necessary, if working in other cultures and especially other languages, to ensure there is clear understanding and agreement regarding such important ethical principles. In Syria, for instance, Hett and Hett (2013) found that privacy was understood less in terms of physical space but more in terms of a sense of security. Robinson-Pant and Singal (2013) have also discussed how ethical principles can be culturally specific and what is understood as meaning informed consent, for instance, may be understood quite differently outside certain Western cultures. In conflict-affected environments the concept of informed consent can be particularly problematic, especially when speaking with potentially traumatised people. Additionally, as described by Moosa (2013), there may be a tension between ethical principles during the research process where, for instance, university ethics committees require anonymity to be assured but where research participants view research as an opportunity to have their voices heard. In conflict-affected environments, while distrust may be prevalent, some people may want
their voices to be heard particularly where they feel there have been injustices or misrepresentations. As Longman (2013: 270) has described, in such places ‘many people will make a principled decision to provide information about human rights abuses even if doing so puts them at clear risk’. As such, those engaged in research have a responsibility to be more cautious than research participants might be about the need to avoid causing harm. It is also important to consider that harm may be differently interpreted by different people – particularly in conflict-affected environments – and is, in any respect, often an ambiguous and fluid concept (see Wood, 2013).

What can help in the research process is, as Goodhand (2000) elaborates, for clear, comprehensive and consistent information about the research and its objectives to be given to participants, in order to avoid false expectations and to ensure that prospective research participants have all the information they may require in order to make an informed decision about whether or not to participate. Such information should also outline the steps that will be taken to protect research participants from harm (such as ensuring confidentiality and anonymity). Such information should be prepared in advance of fieldwork and translated into the necessary languages, and form the basis of securing informed consent.

**Do No Harm**

Being attentive to the issues addressed, language used, choice of gatekeeper and participant, and places where research is conducted, can reduce security risks as well as help build more fruitful relationships with research participants. Of course, the way in which research participants are treated is also crucial in building positive relationships and facilitating the research process. As Özerdem and Bowd (2010) maintain, honesty, respect and humility are essential in building the trust required in participatory (and other) research methods. Empathy and identification can also play a role in human relations and, to no lesser extent, in the relationship between a researcher and a research participant. Women, for instance, may be more inclined to speak with a female researcher, particularly about issues of security, just as they are often more inclined to report crimes to female police officers (Gordon, Sharma, Forbes and Cave, 2011), for instance. Likewise, those researchers with a policing or military background may be more likely to generate rapport with serving or former police or military personnel. As indicated earlier, respect and understanding can also be generated through the researcher endeavouring to become knowledgeable about the context and dynamics before (and throughout) engaging in primary research. A shared knowledge and potentially shared motivation – in perhaps addressing certain conflict dynamics or drawing attention to groups or issues that may have been overlooked – can also help generate the desired rapport.

As detailed by Özerdem and Bowd (2010), researchers (as well as practitioners) should possess conflict management and negotiation skills in conflict-affected environments. Indeed, the success of much primary research depends upon inter-personal, listening and analytical skills. It is essential that there is trust between the researcher and the research participants. It is important to remember that people in conflict-affected environments have generally been engaged in or suffered the consequences of armed conflict. Many will be deeply traumatised, distrustful and fearful of others. As Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale (2013: 14) describe, if they have been badly treated by government authorities, for example, ‘people with notebooks recording details about their lives can appear threatening, especially if they are using interpreters and recording in a language the informant does not understand’. Furthermore, as Goodhand (2000) remarks, keeping silent and inconspicuous can also be a survival strategy learnt during conflict.
Particularly in conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable environments – where fear, anger and distrust between groups may be manifest, and where there may be suspicion towards external actors – it will be particularly important to spend time building that trust. This can be done through ‘hanging out’ (Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale, 2013: 13) or ‘listening to people on their own terms by observing and participating in daily events’ (Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale, 2013: 14). This will help build a rapport, being very open and honest about the nature and purpose of the research project, securing informed consent, and taking every measure to ensure the research causes no harm to the research participant and others (see Norman, 2009, for example). Causing no harm entails causing no physical, psychological, material or other harm, including harm to their enjoyment of their human rights and civil liberties. Endavouring to ensure no harm is caused can be done through providing and honouring assurances of confidentiality and anonymity (and how such concepts may be interpreted, as mentioned earlier); allowing research participants to express concerns and disengage at any time from the research; addressing security issues during and after participation; and engaging research participants in discussions and, ideally, developments regarding the process and outputs of the research. The consequences of the research process itself also need to be considered, as these can cause harm in places where people have been traumatised and may be encouraged – by a researcher – to relive traumatic experiences or remember grievances, hatreds and harms (see Wood, 2013). There will be certain subjects that will be very difficult to gather data on, such as conflict-related sexual violence for instance, without causing harm or distress (see Jok, 2013). In her research on this subject, Wood (2013: 304) has said that she had not sought to interview victims of sexual violence because she ‘did not think it ethically justifiable for an essentially academic project’, instead preferring to ‘draw on the many narratives from victims gathered by colleagues in human rights and women’s groups for the victim’s perspectives’. As warned by Özerdem and Bowd (2010: 267) regarding the use of participatory research methods in these environments:

> Questions can lead people to remember their trauma and losses and unless managed properly [they] could easily open up old wounds and be highly damaging for peacebuilding efforts… participatory research strategies have little to offer to mend strained relationships as a result of their impacts. Wounds are left open for communities to deal with by their own means. Without means and resources for counselling or community work, there are serious ethical issues in the way communities are made part of such research processes without being supported [or] without any means of assistance once the process is over.

In many conflict-affected environments, there is often an abundance of external actors: potential research participants may be unhappy with the activities or lack of activity of these external actors and so may be hostile to approaches from researchers, or may resist contact as a result of previous negative experiences, or may not recognise the value of the proposed research particularly in light of pressing needs such as humanitarian relief, security, jobs, and so on:

> Informants in stressful situations are likely to feel that nothing useful will come out of the research and do not want to waste their time and energy answering questions. (Mazurana, Jacobsen and Gale, 2013: 14)

Or perhaps the way in which other research has been conducted has led to researchers becoming unpopular and, perhaps, unwelcome (Kappler 2013). In addition, as Kappler (2013) describes, there
are mechanisms that potential research participants use to protect themselves from being over-researched as well as misinterpreted or misrepresented, which can hinder the extent to which meaningful research can be conducted and credible data retrieved. Potential research participants can resist the approaches of the researcher, thereby channelling the attention of the researcher to more amenable research participants (thereby privileging certain voices over others). Potential research participants can also present a narrative that they want to project (or expect is desired on the part of the researcher), again impacting the credibility of the research conducted. In conflict-affected environments, research participants may reiterate discourses that help make the conflict make sense, or may reiterate official discourses for fear of repercussions and the long-arm of the state, as Bouka (2012) found in Rwanda, for instance. Conducting a conflict analysis and research into the political, historical and cultural context of a place prior to engaging in primary research can help diminish suspicion or resistance on the part of the research participant; it can also help identify the extent to which the research participant has utilised various strategies to impact or influence the research (in interviews through silence, language use, omission, diversion, for example – see Kappler, 2013), or the extent to which research has solicited only partial perspectives of certain phenomena or omitted key voices.

In endeavouring to avoid causing harm, it is important to consider the harm that can be done after fieldwork is completed: can confidentiality continue to be protected (when travelling through checkpoints, for example); will research participants remain vulnerable after the research is concluded as a result of their engagement in the research; and what could be the impact of the research output? As Brun (2013: 145) has said: ‘We have to acknowledge that even when publishing in academic journals we are still in the field, we are still connected with the field, and our actions and writing may place people in danger.’ Particularly when researching sensitive subjects, such as conflict-related sexual violence, the voice of research participants can be hijacked and used against them (Jok, 2013) or the research output can influence policy (or be otherwise used or misused) in ways that was unforeseen by the research participants, or indeed researcher, during the research process.

It is also important to consider that harm might be caused to those not participating in the research – to those perhaps made less visible as a result of light being focussed on others. For instance, if the attention of policy makers and donors is drawn to female victims of conflict-related sexual violence as a result of significant research interest and output, can this inadvertently inhibit the protection of and attention given to male victims of sexual violence (see Wood, 2013), or the attention given to other harms suffered by women and girls, or the attention given to sexual violence outside conflict and its aftermath? As such, it is important to reflect upon the impact on the conflict-affected environment that the process and output of the research can have. However, where harm is often a contested concept, truth is subjective, and politics often polarised, it can sometimes be difficult to be certain that no harm will be caused. It may also be problematic in cases where the subject of the research is those who have themselves caused harm and where the research may contribute to highlighting this harm or developing specific policy responses. As Wood (2013: 302) has suggested, in these cases ‘the suggestion that research should lead to no harm to anyone surely violates other ethical principles… if those who carry out human rights abuses suffer no harm from research that documents those abuses, the principles of justice and accountability are violated.’ It is important, as such, to reflect deeply upon what ‘harm’ can constitute, what impact the research may
have on various people, and what the aim of the research is – and, ultimately, to be honest and open about this to those engaged in the research and in research outputs.

**Access**

Of course, challenges may occur during the research process despite the best of intentions on the part of the researcher to address all ethical considerations. Alternatively, research participants or others engaged in the research may request certain issues are not addressed or findings are excluded from any research outputs or publications. This can particularly be the case when conducting research for organisations operating in conflict-affected environments, rather than academic institutions. For example, when engaged in practitioner research for international organisations as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), I have been asked to remove reference to data that would have painted the state or its institutions in a poor light. In one case it was because the data would have meant revisiting an agreed strategy of the international community, which was dependent upon the state meeting certain criteria within a certain timeframe – whereas revisiting that strategy would have been potentially destabilising and hard to defend. In another case it was because inclusion of such data would have problematised relations between the state and the NGO concerned and, thus, potentially jeopardised the future of the NGO’s other work with that state. Academic researchers might also self-censor or refrain from sharing certain data, not just to protect research participants but in order to ensure they don’t inadvertently close doors to future research projects or jeopardise access to certain places or people (see also Helbardt, Hellmann-Rajanayagam and Korff, 2010).

Research participants and others engaged in the research may also withhold information or guide the researcher away from issues, places or people that the researcher may have otherwise wanted to engage with. Gatekeepers in particular may have a significant impact on the research by guiding the researcher towards or away from certain people or groups or can stop contact with research participants. Highgate (Henry, Higate and Sanghera, 2009: 476) found that his interpreter in Kosovo increasingly steered the research ‘limiting access to respondents with different narratives and more critical accounts’. Alternatively, government officials may stop research projects unless the identity of research participants is divulged. Thomson (2012), for example, describes how the Government of Rwanda stopped her research in Rwandan prisons after she refused to disclose information that could lead to the identification of research participants she had interviewed.

Of course, gaining access to communities, particularly in conflict-affected environments and especially in other cultures, can be problematic – not least because ways in which to meet people and to build trust can vary significantly between cultures. Cohen and Arieli (2011: 423) advocate the snowballing sampling method as a means of locating, accessing and building trust among people in conflict-affected environments as it ‘increases the likelihood of trusting the researcher by introduction through a trusted social network’. Gaining entry to conflict-affected countries can also sometimes be problematic, particularly where governments may be suspicious or concerned about the proposed research. Likewise, conducting research once in situ can also raise suspicion among the authorities, as mentioned earlier. One recent example is the arrest and detention, on suspicion of espionage and treason, of a Tajik national in Tajikistan, who was contracted to the University of Exeter to participate in an ESRC-funded research project on Rising Powers and Conflict Management in Central Asia (Heathershaw, 2014). This risk presented to researchers (including
academics and students, journalists, and civil society actors) can be heightened if they are nationals of the country or if they present certain opportunities for the authorities (for example, in this case to dissuade others from researching in Tajikistan, particularly on sensitive issues such as the tension between the Tajikistan Government and the minorities in the Badakhshan province, Rickleton, 2014). The reaction of the authorities in this case threatened to undermine prospects for further scholarship in this area, civil society development, and continued international co-operation in research and study (Heathershaw, 2014). However, such a case – and other examples where authorities have taken extraordinary measures to halt academic research or the publication of data (see, for example, Ford, Mills, Zachariah and Upshur, 2009) – highlights the potential power that research has: it can draw attention to certain phenomena, offer explanations, and effect change. Particularly in environments in which conspiracy, rumour and disinformation may thrive, the power of knowledge (and possession of data) – and ways in which to present that knowledge as legitimate and authoritative to different audiences – can be seen as being a particularly potent power. Nonetheless, of course, with this potential power can come significant risks for the researcher.

While state authorities may seek to curtail or control research, where research is sponsored or allowed by state authorities, suspicion may result among prospective research participants and potential gatekeepers if there is fear or distrust of authorities. Permission may be perceived as tacit approval or support from the government authorities for the research. Similarly, distrust among prospective research participants can arise because of perceived relationships with certain gatekeepers and others. For instance, if certain organisations, groups or individuals, which are not perceived to be impartial, are relied upon as gatekeepers or to provide security or translation support, for instance, prospective research participants may be disinclined to engage (or may provide information that they imagine is expected). Gaining access to the field and individuals through the UN or other international organisation – or through a group or individual with political, religious or ethnic affiliations or associated with one or other side of the conflict – can affect people’s perceptions of the researchers and the research and cause distrust (as it did, for example, in Kosovo for Higate - Henry, Higate and Sanghera, 2009). When engaged in practitioner research for the UN and then an NGO in Kosovo, for example, I found some people related differently to the questions I asked – I assume in response to the perceived agenda and influence of the organisation I was working for. Those engaged in academic research but with the support of other organisations, such as the UN, might similarly find that they are treated as if being part of that organisation or at least sharing similar values or possibly able to access decision-makers within the organisation. Relationships with those who are gatekeepers or provide other forms of assistance (such as security or translation support) can also hinder the extent to which the researcher might feel able or inclined to reflect critically upon the role of those providing the assistance, if relevant to the research questions. For example, it may be more difficult to question the legitimacy of a peacebuilding actor, such as the UN, if that actor has a key role in enabling access to research participants, interpreters and also provides security for the researchers.

These challenges are particularly prevalent for the scholar-practitioner; those who are engaged in conflict-affected environments both as academic researchers and as practitioners. While negotiating access and relationships can be easier for scholar-practitioners (including SCID students, many of whom have extensive practical experience in the environments in which they undertake research for their Master’s dissertations), additional challenges present themselves, particularly in the form of clearly separating the roles of the researcher and practitioner. It must be clear to the prospective
research participant that participation will not affect the relationship he or she might have with the researcher in his or her role as a practitioner. For example, someone working for UNHCR who engages in research for a Master’s dissertation needs to ensure it is fully understood that the research participant will receive no benefits or favour that a UNHCR employee may be in a position to provide, as a result of participation. Nonetheless, as Jok (2013: 156) details, distinguishing between his role as a researcher and relief worker was difficult and initially risked ruining established relationships where research participants later approached him ‘with hopes that I would sneak relief items to them behind the backs of foreign aid workers’. As Jok (2013) also details, as a scholar-practitioner, he also wasn’t afforded the luxury of being able to ask stupid questions, which is often an effective way of soliciting useful data and ensuring that false assumptions aren’t integrated into the research. While prior contacts and knowledge of a conflict-environment may help expedite research planning and gain access, it can also inhibit the research as a result of prior assumptions held by research participants of the level of knowledge the scholar-practitioner has or should have, of their allegiances or motives, with whom the information gathered might be shared with, as well as false expectations of the benefits associated with engaging in the research.

Bypassing the process of identifying and negotiating access, which can expedite research for the scholar-practitioner who already has contacts, can also result in inadvertently bypassing some of the ethical considerations that can inform early research planning. So, if research participants are already known to the scholar-practitioner, it is important to take time to reflect upon ethical considerations such as whether the participant has provided informed consent and whether every effort has been made to ensure no harm is caused. It is also important to acknowledge that the researcher and the practitioner are bound by different obligations to their respective employer, if relevant, which should impact research design and implementation. Likewise, the researcher and the practitioner are afforded different levels of legal, security and other forms of protection or support. For example, in some insecure environments, while practitioners working for international organisations, for instance, may be constrained in terms of where they can go and with whom, they are afforded security protection should security be particularly poor or deteriorate (see Brun, 2013). It is important, therefore, to distinguish between the roles of the researcher and the practitioner and be attentive to the constraints of conducting research when planning and implementing research projects. It can sometimes be difficult, for instance, for the scholar-practitioner to accept that proposed research may not secure approval from university ethics committees if research participants are considered to be vulnerable or at risk, even if he or she is in contact with the same people on a daily basis as a practitioner.

**Power**

In engagement in conflict-affected environments – whether as a researcher or practitioner – the power relationship, between practitioner or researcher and those with whom they engage, needs to be considered. Local ownership is a widely accepted principle of effective peacebuilding – although rarely translated into practice – external ‘experts’ tend to determine how peace is built and impose external solutions onto disempowered others (Gordon, 2014). Similarly, the power relationship between the researcher and the researched is skewed, with external ‘experts’ explaining, exposing or describing dynamics in other places or among other people – often with more perceived legitimacy or authority than those that live these lives under scrutiny. As Staeheli and Lawson (1995: 332 as cited in Henry, Higate and Sanghera, 2009: 473) have said, researchers from the
West, in particular, are in ‘a position of power by virtue of their ability to name the categories, control information about the research agenda, define interventions and come and go as research scientists’. As Henry, Higate and Sanghera (2009: 473) mention, issues of Westerness and whiteness (and masculinity) can be especially potent in peacekeeping missions (and other conflict-affected environments) ‘where ‘differences’ among and between the local population, peacekeepers and researchers may be acute, in ways not obvious in other research contexts’.

The power imbalance can start to be addressed if meaningful and inclusive local ownership is better promoted and if, in academia, as suggested by Kappler (2013), a conversation is developed between researcher and research subjects rather than just about research subjects. This can be done, for instance, through sharing research with research subjects throughout the research process for their review and input. The researcher should also continuously reflect upon issues of power, including asking such questions as who the research is for, whose interests is it in and who can access it (Cramer, Hammond and Pottier, 2011). Essentially, recognising and addressing power imbalances is about respecting research participants and accepting that they are people and not simply sources of data (Wood, 2013). Such an approach will not only be more honest about the nature of research, it would engender trust and openness as well as result in research which is more relevant and useful to those it concerns.

However, the nature of power relationships shouldn’t automatically be assumed. As Hett and Hett (2013) describe, in contrast to university ethics committees which are likely to regard the researcher as being in a position of power, they found that their doctoral research in Syria led to feelings of disempowerment, due to perceived perceptions of their status as student researchers and as outside observers. Feelings of powerlessness can also ensue because of perceived perceptions of the researcher as a non-participant in conflict dynamics – as an observer rather than an actor and, thus, as possessing less power to influence the environment (at least immediately). Likewise, Henry, Higate and Sanghera (2009: 469), drawing upon their research in Liberia and Kosovo, claim that ‘researchers’ multiple positionalities do not always result in them being in positions of power over researchees’. In other words, the way in which identity is projected and perceived is variable and comprised of multiple facets, including a researcher’s gender or race, which can problematise the conventional power relationship between researcher and researchee.

The issue of power must be attended to, and how it permeates the work of the researcher and how it may be perceived. Perceptions among research participants that researchers have power, for instance, may result in misinterpreting information provided by the researcher prior to engagement, particularly regarding statements that no benefit may ensue as a result of engagement in the research. For instance, as Wessells (2013) has said, the desperate circumstances of some research participants may lead them to think that a researcher is in a position to help or their research may result in aid or assistance. This is particularly so in the case of scholar-practitioners (see Jok, 2013), as mentioned earlier. Such hopes and expectations, if dashed, can be traumatic and lead to feelings of frustration or feelings of abandonment. These feelings can further develop into ‘resentment, distrust, and reduced willingness to cooperate with outsiders’ (Wessells, 2013: 94). This can compromise not only future research but also prospective aid and assistance for traumatised and other communities. The harm that results from perceptions of power between researcher and research participant can, therefore, be significant and needs to be attended to prior to engagement. The researcher needs to be aware of how his or her presence may be interpreted and how research
participants may interpret their engagement in the research. Endeavouring to be very open and forthcoming about the research, engaging research participants in the research process, and considering how the research process and outputs can give back to research participants can help address these concerns and help avoid unwittingly causing harm.

**The Psychology and Politics of Research**

Power, perceptions of power, and misuses (or non-use) of power can also result in heightened emotions on the part of the researcher. Feelings of powerlessness, or feeling as if action should be taken but isn’t for purposes of maintaining academic objectivity and, thus, distance, for example, can engender feelings of guilt. Feelings of guilt can also arise if the researcher feels as if he or she is taking time from people who could spend their time more effectively in the aftermath of conflict than speaking with a researcher; or perhaps because he or she feels like a ‘disaster tourist’ in the words of Ansoms (2012: 42):

> Sometimes I don’t know what I’m doing here. Is this what research is about? ‘Extracting’ information from people to feed my own career? On these days, I really feel like a parasite, a disaster tourist making the inventory of human suffering and misery for my own personal benefit.

These types of feelings can be challenging and potentially adversely impact the research unless such feelings are recognised and attended to. The strength of such feelings may vary depending upon the type of research being undertaken and for whom (for example academic institution, think tank, media organisation, NGO, or policy-based or governmental organisation). Ways in which the research and its output are perceived to have value or have an impact will also affect these feelings. Maintaining awareness of conflict dynamics, subjectivities and ethical considerations will help – as well as adherence to whatever moral code or impetus drives an individual’s research.

While the value of research in conflict-affected environments may be questioned in comparison with humanitarian assistance, for example, as Cramer, Hammond and Pottier (2011) and Wood (2006) suggest, the importance of research in these environments often lies in the long-term value of documenting histories, experiences, dynamics, fears and losses in conflict-affected environments and, through so doing, at least contribute to a better understanding of conflict, peace and the human experience. Helbardt, Hellmann-Rajanayagam and Korff (2010: 362) question whether ‘we unintentionally by merely looking into and reporting it, not only glamorize, but legitimize war’ and thus feed it by drawing attention to it. They conclude, in fact, that the value of research in conflict zones is in the ability for it to ‘shape perceptions, give voice to the voiceless and so prevent these conflicts becoming invisible—war without witness’ (Helbardt, Hellmann-Rajanayagam and Korff, 2010: 349). As the edited volume of papers in *Research Methods on Conflict Zones* (Mazurana, Gale, and Jacobsen, 2013: 7-8) reveals, others ‘are motivated by different goals – to advocate, to gain information to assist, to represent unheard voices, or to reveal marginalized or suppressed experiences or perspectives’.

As a scholar-practitioner, the motivation for me is to try to contribute to effecting change through raising the profile of injustices that have been overlooked or hidden; drawing attention to voices that have been silenced or marginalised; advocating for inclusive and accountable approaches to peacebuilding and governance; and/or potentially contributing to a better understanding of ways in
which to build security and justice for all after conflict. Whatever the motivation, it is important for the researcher to reflect upon his or her role, power and responsibilities, as well as how the research can be used. As Brun (2013: 135) has said: ‘Such ongoing reflection may move us closer to an answer as to where and in which ways our actions as researchers are most useful in a conflict situation.’

Many argue that the research output should not just benefit academia. Rather, there should be a clear understanding of and commitment to how research can impact research subjects – and a responsibility towards those research subjects:

Knowledge should not only build a researcher’s career or improve the publication output of a university, but it should yield benefits for our partners in the field. (Kappler, 2013: 137)

Wessells (2013) argues that research in conflict-affected environments which is not action-oriented – in other words, research in which data is simply extracted from communities or individuals without feeding research back to those communities or engaging communities more directly in the research itself – causes more harm than good. Likewise, Wood (2013: 306) suggests giving back to research participants in the form of ‘political or policy engagement in ways the subjects would value’. Similarly, Jok (2013) argues that researchers should bring something of value to research subjects in order to avoid lopsided power relations between the researcher and research participant, as discussed earlier. While it is important to recognise the impact that research can have on research subjects (both positive and negative), Jok (2013) further argues that there is a need for academic researchers to be honest about the limitations of the impact that their research can have on the research subjects. In recognition of this, Jok (2013) has said that, instead, he acts on the knowledge his research has equipped him with, which led him to establish a primary school in South Sudan focussed on enabling young women, through education, to be the primary decision-makers in their lives.

Maintaining an objective distance, which continues to characterise much mainstream social scientific research, is often antithetical to this type of engagement and impact, however. Academic research often refrains from empowering research participants by sharing decisions with them about the direction of the research project, for instance, or feeding research back into the environment in a way that might benefit research participants or others affected by conflict. There is a need for academics to fully accept that research can never be wholly objective and value-free (Helbardt, Hellmann-Rajanayagam and Korff, 2010; Johnson, 2013; Thomson, Ansoms and Murison, 2012) and that research always impacts the field. It is, therefore, important to admit to bias and also to acknowledge impact and endeavour to ensure it is positive. To be self-reflective and open about subjectivities will enhance the credibility of the research, and to accept the inevitability of impact should lead to a greater reflection upon the ability and, perhaps, moral responsibility of researchers to share their work and participate in the positive transformation of conflict-affected environments (see Johnson, 2013).

Aside from reflections upon the value of research generating feelings of powerlessness or guilt, for instance, there may be other strong emotions which impact the research process and output. Witnessing or listening to recounts of traumatic events or atrocities, for example, can result in ‘vicarious trauma’ (Mazurana and Gale, 2013), which can harm the research. Such strong emotions can also potentially expose the researcher to harm if feelings of anger, despair, compassion result in
the researcher going to places that he or she might otherwise not (because they might be unsafe). Potentially, it can also compromise the ethical principles of the research if these strong emotions prompt the researcher ‘to “make a difference” by passing on field data “confidentially” to some (supposedly responsible) person’ (Wood, 2006: 384). As adherence to ethical principles often relies on the sound judgements a researcher makes during the course of the research, research in conflict-affected environments can be particularly challenging as heightened emotions, stress, insecurity and trauma are prevalent and can influence judgment. This, as Wood (2006) argues, is why it is necessary to have a prior understanding of the way that conflict-affected environments can impact emotions and cause stress, as well as regular self-reflection throughout the research process. In prolonged fieldwork, being away from established social and support networks can compound feelings of stress or influence research in ways that might not otherwise have occurred; a further need for continual self-reflection. Likewise, as Brun (2013) has highlighted, researchers in conflict-affected environments can become accustomed to the risks that can be present and, consequently, unwittingly expose themselves to harm. As Bell has said:

Every time I return from Sri Lanka I am asked whether I experienced fear. Whether there was any immediate threat. My response has always been negative, “of course not”: one quickly (all too quickly) adjusts to the military presence, the checkpoints, even body searches. (Bell, 2009: 87 cited in Brun, 2013: 129)

Psychologically, there are many ways people deal with trauma. For the researcher it is important to ensure mental well-being is addressed and to recognise the impact of the research environment on the way the research is conducted (perhaps hurriedly or in a disengaged manner) and the way in which understanding is formed (perhaps assigning certain meanings that are less complicated, fractured or devastating than others). Ultimately, it is important to adhere to the principle of doing no harm, which means no harm to the researcher as well as the research participants and others, while remaining conscious of the complexity of the term ‘harm’. Through so doing, opportunities to understand and, thus, potentially contribute to addressing the harms caused by conflict and its wake can be seized – and the potential power of research in this field be harnessed.

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Building Security and Justice in Post-Conflict Environments


Rule of law in conflict-affected environments: how ‘international’ lawyers can work more effectively with their national counterparts¹

Alex Batesmith

Abstract: This Chapter discusses how international lawyers in overseas rule of law and transitional justice projects can become more interculturally effective when working with their national counterparts. It describes the environmental, organisational and individual barriers to international lawyers working effectively. It then identifies how improving and further refining specific knowledge, skills and attitudes can help any lawyer become better able to meet the considerable challenges of working in conflict-affected and other difficult environments. Finally, the Chapter offers some practical suggestions for organisations and employers as they seek to make structural changes to enable their consultants and employees – and also the projects on which they work – more effective.

Introduction

Improving personal effectiveness has been a popular subject for many decades in the business world. The personal effectiveness of lawyers in general domestic practice has also been discussed, particularly in the United States (Link, 2005; Cunningham, 1999). The concept has also been explored in the context of development work (Weyers, 2011). However, in transitional justice and rule of law, personal effectiveness has only relatively recently been a topic of interest, as researchers investigate reasons why international legal interventions succeed and why they fail (Kavanagh and Jones, 2011).

In 2011, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon published the latest of his reports on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (UNSC, 2011). Describing
how the practice had evolved since 2004, he stressed that interventions require political will and local ownership as well as technical expertise and programmatic support (UNSC, 2011). He also welcomed the newly created UN Rule of Law Indicators (‘ROLI’), the metric by which the strengths and effectiveness of law enforcement, judicial and correctional institutions can now be empirically measured (UN, 2011). However, neither the Secretary-General’s report nor the ROLI specifically acknowledged that the recruitment, training and retention of effective field-based professionals were critical factors to the success of any mission.

Similarly, most previous and on-going studies on the effectiveness of rule of law and transitional justice interventions focus principally on the structural, environmental and intra-international relationship aspects (Baylis, 2014 and 2008). This short Chapter aims to examine the issue of effectiveness of rule of law and transitional justice interventions from the somewhat narrower perspective of the actors themselves – the international lawyers, or ‘the internationals’ as they have been called (Baylis, 2008: 363) – in particular, as they work with their national counterparts to achieve the project’s objectives.

Successful transitional justice or rule of law interventions depend on positive interactions and strong relationships - yet few organisations provide guidance on how such interpersonal relations in international settings can be optimised. It is at the individual level where lawyers can make an immediate difference to the project, and I argue that the concept of intercultural effectiveness is particularly helpful for transitional justice and rule of law projects. I discuss how intercultural effectiveness might be measured, drawing heavily on Canada’s Centre for Intercultural Learning and their seminal paper *A Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person* (Vulpe, Kealey, Protheroe and MacDonald, 2001).

I will briefly examine environmental and organisational issues before looking at the barriers to intercultural effectiveness at the individual level for international lawyers. The main part of this Chapter then focuses on the specific knowledge, skills and values through which an international lawyer may be able to optimise their own intercultural effectiveness. In particular, I highlight the desirability of a full factual briefing before starting work in a different country, the need for effective intercultural communication and organisational skills and the importance of adopting a flexible attitude and an understanding of one’s personal and professional limitations.

I will discuss how institutions hiring international lawyers can take also concrete practical steps to improve the success of interventions, by helping their staff and consultants to become more interculturally effective. This includes creating measurable personnel selection criteria for interview, developing more practical pre-departure orientation programmes for the international lawyer once selected, sending staff on intercultural awareness courses, developing benchmarks for on-going personal evaluation and setting realistic objectives, both in the short- and long-term (Vulpe *et al.*, 2001).

As the Centre for Intercultural Learning has observed, it would be ‘inevitably idealistic’ for any one person to possess all the attributes of intercultural effectiveness (Vulpe *et al.*, 2001: 7). However, the aim of this Chapter is to encourage ourselves as international lawyers to consider how we can continually seek to optimise our personal effectiveness. By enhancing our individual intercultural effectiveness, we are likely to help improve the success rate of rule of law and transitional justice interventions in which we work.
I acknowledge that this Chapter is written principally from a western-oriented, global north perspective. However, as the majority of transitional justice and rule of law interventions emanate and originate from the western and northern hemispheres, the themes discussed should be relevant for most international lawyers working on such projects.

The methodology for this Chapter is qualitative and impressionistic rather than quantitative and statistical. More than fifty lawyers with experience working in international interventions were asked for their personal reflections on effectiveness in their workplace. The author has also drawn on his own experiences and discussions with both international and national colleagues, having spent more than ten years working in the field of international criminal law, transitional justice and rule of law development.

**Intercultural effectiveness for international lawyers**

The extent to which international lawyers liaise with their national counterparts and the functions required of them varies with each project. Most vacancies in rule of law and transitional justice nonetheless require an additional set of intercultural attributes with which lawyers are not habitually blessed, and in which they are not (certainly not initially) specifically trained. Few, if any, international organisations hiring lawyers for their overseas projects give their new staff any meaningful pre-deployment briefing, let alone provide specific training for their staff on how to work effectively in a multicultural environment. Inevitably some international lawyers may be insufficiently prepared for the challenges of their work.

I suggest that the concept of intercultural effectiveness could be adapted for use by international lawyers and the organisations that hire them to improve relationships and interactions at the individual level. Intercultural effectiveness, also known as cultural competence or cross-cultural intelligence, has been extensively used and discussed across a broad range of disciplines and professions. Many universities and private organisations offer training courses on the topic, and it has been a subject of academic study for many years.

As well as the ability to communicate in a way that earns the respect and trust of people from another culture, interculturally effective people will demonstrate the capacity to adapt both professionally and personally to the conditions in the host culture. The expected benefit to the project is the creation of a co-operative workplace that facilitates personal and professional fulfilment, and ultimately greater overall effectiveness and the achievement of the originally desired objectives.

Various models have been created to measure intercultural effectiveness (Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman, 2003; the Kozai Group (2015)), and there are many organisations and institutions across the world promoting their courses on the subject. One particularly useful method comes from Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, and their Centre for Intercultural Learning (CIL). In 2001, CIL produced their seminal paper *A Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person*.

The Profile lists nine ‘major competencies’ of intercultural effectiveness focusing on both the personal and inter-personal qualities of a culturally effective person. These are further broken down into additional core competencies and observable behavioural indicators.
Most lawyers who have experience of rule of law and transitional justice projects will recognise many of these from their original job descriptions, but the theory underpinning the competencies bears greater scrutiny. Domestic legal practice has only relatively recently recognised the need and embraced the concept of intercultural effectiveness – and chiefly in the United States (Demers, 2011; Adams, 2012). The arguments for increasing a domestic lawyer’s personal intercultural effectiveness generally focus on the realities of an increasingly multicultural society – the need to understand one’s client, to relate to a jury, to interact appropriately with a witness – topics that were being flagged 25 years ago in U.S. domestic legal practice (Kessler, 1988).

The dangers of ethnocentrism become even more pronounced – and the potential consequences even more damaging – for lawyers working in an international development or transitional justice setting. Somewhat surprisingly, there has been nothing written previously on the subject of intercultural effectiveness relative to the international legal fields of rule of law and transitional justice.

**Barriers to effectiveness**

(1) Environmental and Organisational Factors

Rule of law and transitional justice interventions occur in conflict, post-conflict and other hazardous or difficult locations. Severe and sometimes unexpected environmental challenges – whether practical, political, economic or social – can seriously compromise the goals and effectiveness of any mission. The vast majority of these external problems are outside the control of individual lawyers or the employers for whom they work. However, the way in which organisations are structured and how their staff are managed to help them cope with the challenges of a different cultural environment are certainly areas that can influence the success of the project, for better or for worse.

As was repeatedly highlighted by the lawyers interviewed by the author, one of the principal barriers to effectiveness is that the intervention sets unrealistic objectives. This can result from the duration of the intervention being too short, the scope being too broad, or the implementation too superficial; inadequate funding and resourcing is not the only cause.

Secondly, some lawyers have criticised organisations for their insistence on form over substance in the implementation of the project (interviews on file). Organisational rigidity is also part of the problem when it comes to the criticism of a ‘one size fits all’ approach to international intervention, and a lack of nuanced understanding of the contextual issues for the particular project (Wheeldon, 2010).

Another commonly cited organisational criticism is the failure to learn from previous interventions or to share information and knowledge. Baylis (2014) suggests that competitiveness between different rule of law project teams is the principal cause of the failure to share information. Although local context is key for each new intervention, there are real advantages in building on the work of similar projects or harnessing the knowledge and skills of those who have experienced similar challenges. The time, money and effort it takes to establish and maintain complex interventions should not be wasted on re-doing what others have previously done. Baylis (2014) has also referred to the pressure to secure funding for the organisation’s next project, which results in a
competitive culture where information is not shared and projects are duplicated across several institutions – although she notes this applies more to the rule of law field than to the world of international criminal law.

Human resource management has been flagged as another potentially troublesome area for international intervention. Hiring and retaining good quality staff is key to the success of a project. Appropriately qualified professionals must be selected, given specific initial and on-going training, and properly managed throughout. However, some organisations, especially in the transitional justice sphere, offer contracts of very limited duration. Many organisations fail to provide any initial briefing for their staff, or to offer them in-country on-going training in areas that will enhance their effectiveness. Finally, if key management personnel are themselves interculturally ineffective – whether they are based in the host country or at headquarters – then the project is also likely to suffer.

(2) Individual Barriers to Effectiveness

What makes an effective lawyer in the domestic setting does not necessarily make them effective internationally. Attributes such as single-mindedness and tenacity, being a tough negotiator and having a confident or theatrical formal advocacy style may be well respected at home, but transplant them to a rule of law or transitional justice project overseas and the reaction may not be so favourable. Western lawyers, even those from a continental civil law background, are trained to be adversarial and direct. However, lawyers working on rule of law and transitional justice projects are likely to need rather more collaborative skills, as seen in the field of international development.

One of the most commonly heard criticisms of some international lawyers is their poor knowledge of the local context. As Baylis (2008: 365) has observed, a lack of deep understanding of the local situation can result in ‘critical errors in judgment based on cultural, legal, historical or other misunderstandings.’ Poor understanding of the local culture may result in unintended insensitivity. A lack of knowledge of basic greetings in the local language, or basic comprehension of the political situation, may potentially alienate the national counterpart lawyers or the wider community in which the internationals operate. An incurious attitude towards the new environment may also result, as one international lawyer suggested, in counterpart national lawyers being reduced to ‘tour guides to international rule of law tourists’ – meaning that the under-used national lawyers are unlikely to promote change – to the obvious detriment of the project (interview on file).

Neglecting to take the time to understand customary or traditional law has been highlighted as another major problem for rule of law projects. International lawyers naturally fall back on the systems of law with which they are familiar, and few will have spent their formative career in countries where traditional law co-exists with the formal justice system. As a result, rule of law projects may exclusively focus on (the sometimes dysfunctional) formal judicial mechanisms of a post-conflict environment without balanced attention to the places ordinary people go to settle their social, domestic or economic affairs such as informal dispute resolution mechanisms at the village level.

As I will develop in the next section, specific communication skills are critical to successful working in a different culture. It is unlikely that many international Lawyers will be fluent in the local language, although developing the specific skill of communicating through interpreters will
always be valuable. Poor communication of the project’s aims and objectives, as well as a failure to share the methodology and rationale of evaluating effectiveness, can also lead to misunderstandings being embedded between international and national counterpart lawyers that can seriously impact the project’s chances of success. More generally, an overly inflexible attitude towards the goals and the implementation of the project can be similarly damaging.

Lawyers in the West and global north, especially those working in the justice sector, are admired for their independence and self-reliance. For the most part, trial advocates work individually, devising and implementing the strategy for each individual case independently. Although rule of law and transitional justice vacancies may call for candidates to be team players, even the most senior domestic lawyers may have had little experience working in teams, and even less in multicultural teams with professionals whose legal training may be very different from their own. As one international lawyer put it, ‘pursuing a personal agenda or acting in disregard of any real concerns expressed by the counterpart or colleague can be devastating’ (interview on file).

Many international lawyers to whom the author spoke highlighted the problems caused by some internationals arriving at the project with unhelpful attitudes. As one lawyer expressed it, those Western lawyers with highly deadline-driven, ‘type A’ personalities ‘need to relax and not place so much emphasis on getting everything done in the shortest space of time’ (interview on file). Another rule of law consultant described how he had often observed foreign lawyers conducting meetings with national lawyers as they would do around a law firm boardroom back home, where dominant behaviour and the robust challenging of ideas is often accepted and admired (interview on file). As Nicholson and Low (2013: 1) have argued, a failure to listen to local stakeholders means law-focused aid ‘remains ethnocentric, self-referential, neo-colonial and possibly destructive.’

Working overseas can be very stressful. Most international lawyers have had the experience of or witnessed ‘burn-out,’ and high staff turnover and the corresponding drain in institutional knowledge become barriers to the effective operation of a project. However, experience from other disciplines has shown that lawyers too can become better able to withstand the pressures of the job, and to retain personal and professional motivation, by improving their own intercultural effectiveness, as I shall discuss in the next section.

**Becoming a more interculturally effective international lawyer**

Some work undertaken in rule of law and transitional justice projects may be more recognisable to a lawyer’s domestic practice than others. Acting as an advocate in an international criminal tribunal will call upon familiar courtroom skills, notwithstanding perhaps unfamiliar procedure. In contrast, lawyers may not be so accustomed to undertaking post-conflict capacity building work such as drafting or delivering training curricula, assisting in the development of new criminal justice policies or conducting public outreach on fundamental principles such as the rule of law.

I do not say that a wholesale re-programming of a lawyer’s fundamental attributes is needed before working effectively overseas. However, I suggest that all of us working on an international project may benefit from reflecting on the specific additional knowledge, skills and values that could improve our overall effectiveness in the field.
(1) Improving Knowledge

(i) Know your host and their culture

That international lawyers should be more aware of the political, social and economic context of the country, the organisation in which they work as well as the local legal issues with which they will be dealing is uncontroversial in itself. However, others have written about how a lack of local knowledge is an inevitable consequence of the structure of international interventions Baylis (2008). I suggest that the incentive to understand a new environment should come from a lawyer’s sense of vocation. As I argue throughout this Chapter, lawyers can always make a difference at the individual level.

In terms of intercultural effectiveness, learning about a country and the relevant context should be seen as a process, which starts before deployment and continues throughout the assignment (Vulpe et al., 2001). Interculturally effective people are curious about their hosts and strive to develop a deeper knowledge of their new environment – through investing time and effort in attempting to understand different social groups, local structures, history and traditions from a variety of sources.

International lawyers should also seek to understand how the law and the institutions of justice are viewed in the host country. In many developing countries judges, lawyers and the courts are not afforded the same respect or position as they are in the West (McAuliffe, 2009). International lawyers need to understand how law and its institutions function and how they are viewed by civil society, by the government and by the local media. As one senior international consultant expressed it, a failure to comprehend what people understand by ‘law’ in the host country is often at the root of the indifferent success of many international projects (interview on file).

Additionally, in order to work effectively with their national counterparts, internationals should cultivate an understanding of the educational and professional reality for lawyers. This includes an understanding of the state of legal education in the host country. In some post-conflict and developing countries, university law curricula can be out of date or poorly funded. In others, continuing professional development for lawyers, prosecutors and judges can be patchy or even non-existent.

(ii) Know yourself and your own culture

Public-facing confidence is a critical skill for domestic lawyers whose job is to convince an often-sceptical audience of the merits of a case. For most domestic lawyers, being self-assured is a more highly prized skill than being self-aware.

The situation is different for lawyers who work on rule of law and transitional justice projects. CIL’s seminal paper, A Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person (Vulpe et al., 2001), explains the importance of knowing one’s own preferences, characteristics, strengths and weaknesses and culture. Such self-knowledge enables us to understand how we think, feel and react to different cultural stimuli. This in turn helps us to understand why people from the host country might react to situations in a different way from ourselves, and prevents us from unhelpful stereotyping.

CIL suggests that knowledge of one’s own strengths and weaknesses is helpful for the overall emotional wellbeing – and therefore effectiveness – of those working overseas. Knowing one’s own
personality type, communication or leadership style enables the international to improve the chances of operating in or assembling a compatible team of people from the host culture. Self-knowledge is also useful for the international to recognise and to manage one’s own reaction to ambiguity – in other words, what it is that the people in the host country may not understand about them (Vulpe et al., 2001) Additionally, knowledge of our own culture enables us to understand how our cultural conditioning and values shape what we do, and how this in turn may be problematic in another country (Vulpe et al., 2001).

The process of acquiring self-knowledge is also extremely useful for international lawyers seeking to manage the challenges of working in a culture sometimes very different from their own. Similarly, knowing the host country and culture will inform the way in which the international can reflect on how his or her personal preferences, characteristics, strengths and weaknesses. One example came from an international lawyer who quickly realised that his direct, adversarial approach from over 25 years of work in a Western legal system would not be appropriate for a rule of law training programme in South-East Asia, and adapted his own style accordingly, although in other parts of the world he felt that his native style would have been acceptable (interview on file).

Another rule of law practitioner emphasised the importance of self-awareness for the lawyer from a more holistic perspective. In her view, a lawyer who is able to reflect on their own position within the legal profession, and in society generally, is more likely to empathise with the people they are trying to help (interview on file). In an international setting where intercultural relationships are crucial to the success of the project, the self-aware lawyer actually increases the chances of the project being more sustainable by being able to understand and anticipate issues of cultural misunderstanding.

(2) Improving Skills

(i) Develop effective intercultural communication

A Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person (Vulpe et al., 2001) divides intercultural communication into five individual ‘core competencies’: expressing oneself in a way that is understandable yet culturally sensitive; participating in local culture and language without being afraid of making mistakes; establishing shared meanings with locals through effective listening, observation and verification of mutual understanding; developing capacity in the local language to demonstrate one’s interest in the local people and culture; and cultivating empathy with the people of the host country.

Undoubtedly, all these skills would enhance the profile of the international lawyer working on a rule of law and transitional justice project. When lawyers undertake legal development work in another country, how they interact and communicate with their counterparts and with others in the host country will have a considerable impact on how others see them, and ultimately the success of the project. Effective listening is a critical skill for international lawyers, but one that may not be particularly developed from their domestic practice. As one respondent put it, ‘It’s a matter of listening, and understanding one’s role as an international lawyer. One of the problems is that lawyers are all egoists. Your role as an international lawyer is to support the locals, listen to them and explain ideas in a way that is not saying “I think, I suggest we do that”…’ (interview on file).
Seeking collaborative working relationships and promoting mutual understanding of the methodology and main project goals will certainly improve both the working environment and the relationships within it. Most international lawyers will say that efforts to understand and use the local language and to participate in local cultural events is recognised and appreciated by their national counterparts. It may take some time, but learning another culture will enable the international lawyer to better understand the subtleties of communication in the host country. This can only be beneficial for forming strong intercultural relationships that are so important in post-conflict and transitional environments.

(ii) Cultivate your professional and personal relationships

Good relationship building skills are central to any collaborative project. Lawyers working on rule of law and transitional justice projects will almost invariably be working in groups, often with extremely varied roles, interests and positions within the hierarchy. The manner in which an international lawyer relates to local colleagues, both at and outside work, will determine the level of confidence and trust reposed in them.

One international lawyer spoke of the importance of ‘frontloading’ the relationship between national and international colleagues; in other words, spending time at the outset to establish good working practices and to develop channels for open communication in the event of disagreements (interview on file). Knowing how the host culture processes information, and recognising the different working habits, will ensure all team members have a common understanding of the project objectives and how these will be achieved. Another international lawyer spoke of the need to create an environment in which national lawyers feel free to speak and share their ideas and advice on an equal footing with foreign lawyers, ‘We must ensure that we don’t patronise national lawyers, rather that we show how much we value them. This comes back to appreciating where they’ve come from’ (interview on file).

Establishing a personal rapport outside the workplace can be equally important for the international lawyer. Retreating to the cultural safety of a gated community with familiar home comforts will reinforce the neo-colonial stereotype and be counterproductive for internationals looking to improve their relationships with local colleagues. Adapting the CIL ‘behavioural indicators’ of relationship building, whether this is attending cultural or community events, demonstrating a capacity to initiate conversations with locals or being aware of the different social protocols in the host country, international lawyers too can take steps to ensure their personal interactions are culturally appropriate (Vulpe et al., 2001: 39-40). Nicholson and Low (2013) have noted in their research that, amongst other efforts, working in the local language and socialising were much appreciated by the locals.

(iii) Develop organisational skills specific to intercultural environments

Another reason why overseas projects can be so disorientating for international lawyers is that the organisational culture, structure and processes may be very different from what they are used to at home. A Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person (Vulpe et al., 2001) lists numerous aspects of effective organisational skills. Of most relevance to international lawyers working in rule of law and transitional justice are the abilities of: effective networking in order to identify and understand the key stakeholders; synthesising a variety of organisational cultures and practices within a team in
a manner that encourages open discussion; maintaining a focus on the project goals whilst managing any organisational resistance; assessing competing forces within an institution; and operating on a different level of resources and support than they may be accustomed to in their home country.

The international lawyer needs to learn how to build or promote consensus in a multicultural team, regardless of whether they are in a position of managerial responsibility. Creating a working environment in which every member of the team feels valued and can undertake useful and productive work is extremely important. Whilst international lawyers may sometimes (but not always) have a better grasp of internationally applicable human rights treaties and standards, local lawyers will have a distinct advantage when it comes to the domestic laws and institutions and how they are applied, and the language, culture and history of their home country. In order to work successfully, an interculturally effective lawyer will need to develop a sophisticated organisational culture in which the varied strengths of individual team members are both harnessed and shared. This can be extremely challenging, especially when attempting to balance the short-term project goals with longer-term capacity building objectives.

Finally, as one senior international lawyer observed, organisational co-operation can only be achieved when both national and international lawyers in the team are motivated to serve the same purpose and goal (interview on file). Often this will require careful management of the expectations of not only all team members, but also external stakeholders including government, donors and civil society.

(3) Improving Attitudes and Values

(i) Show humility and respect

Humility is not a quality that is often associated with lawyers, yet in a rule of law or transitional justice setting it is vital. Equally, showing respect for the local culture can help relationships to develop and build the trust essential for a harmonious multicultural working environment. Almost every lawyer spoken to for this Chapter recognised the need for a markedly different attitude to that which is often adopted at home. As others also acknowledged, reflecting on one’s own motivation and values is an on-going process (interviews on file).

A Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person (Vulpe et al., 2001) identifies a series of behavioural indicators for demonstrating an attitude of modesty in relation to one’s own culture and attributes as well as humility about one’s knowledge of the local context. Particularly relevant for international lawyers is the ability to acknowledge the importance and contributions of the local context, which may include customary and traditional justice mechanisms and dispute resolution (Vulpe et al, 2001). As one lawyer interviewed for this Chapter remarked, ‘We shouldn’t go in and presume that everything that’s done in the West should be done in the host country. People communicate and think in a very different way, and you need to take account of local context as well as a recognition of local ownership of the project’ (interview on file).

As international lawyers, we should also take care that the interesting work we do does not lead us to feel or to give the impression of superiority or privilege – even if, as Vulpe et al. (2001) say, power and respect might in fact accompany the position in the host country.
Vulpe et al. (2001: 31) make the interesting point, however, that displaying an attitude of modesty and respect should not prevent internationals from having the self-confidence to take initiatives and promote change ‘where called for by the assignment’ (Vulpe et al, 2001: 31). They point out, there may be occasions where internationals may be required to engage their national counterparts to collaboratively re-examine either their professional behaviour, with a view to improving skills and attitudes, in order that the sustainable project objectives can be achieved. Clearly, it will be important to gain the trust and respect of colleagues from the host country first before the international begins to suggest changes to the policies and procedures of the host institution (Vulpe et al., 2001).

International lawyers working within another country’s justice institution often find themselves in a very difficult position. One person interviewed for this Chapter described how working on an international human rights capacity building project, embedded in the state prosecution service of a highly corrupt country that did not respect the rule of law, was constantly required to deliver reports that the host government found unpalatable (interview on file). Ultimately, without proper institutional commitment it will be impossible for the international lawyer to have any impact on the people with whom he or she works despite recommendations based on international standards delivered in a culturally-sensitive manner.

(ii) Cultivate personal and professional commitment

It might be taken for granted that lawyers who choose to leave the comfort, security and predictability of their domestic careers and environment will do so because they are committed to a new challenge overseas. It might also be said that most people working in rule of law and transitional justice are not particularly motivated by monetary gain. For most international lawyers, an expectation of vocational and personal fulfilment is usually the driving factor in their decision to work overseas.

However, the stresses of working overseas may challenge a lawyer’s level of commitment, and expectations of fulfilment can be unexpectedly dashed from time to time. How an international lawyer manages these challenges is critical to ensuring he or she maintains the commitment to continue. Cultivating a closer connection to colleagues from the host country, and reflecting upon what all members of the team are learning and contributing at the individual level, can be an effective way to maintain the necessary commitment at both personal and professional levels.

Demonstrating that one wants to contribute to the host community and the effectiveness of the organisation in which one is based is a very helpful attitude to cultivate (Vulpe et al., 2001). This can be achieved, for example, by taking the time to help colleagues and by discussing professional concerns, or by facilitating or participating in joint training sessions and seminars. Developing a mutually encouraging working environment within which both international lawyers and their national counterparts can fulfil their potential will also be of great benefit to the project.

(iii) Be(come) adaptable

Adaptability is the most important attitude an international lawyer can cultivate when working overseas, especially when unfamiliar challenges and myriad unforeseen circumstances may threaten the direction or objectives of the project. A Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person (Vulpe et
Vulpe et al. (2001) have also noted, internationals can face numerous logistical, political or environmental difficulties outside their control that may mean that personal and professional needs are unmet. To counter any adverse impact on motivation caused by unforeseen events, internationals may need to reassess and revise their personal and professional expectations. Being realistic in terms of what can be achieved, both individually and for the project, is a particularly useful attitude to adopt when working overseas. As one respondent said, ‘The most important thing when going into a situation is understanding how you can and you can’t help’ (interview on file).

Lawyers in their daily domestic practice are used to understanding everything down to the last detail: they master the facts of their case, ensure they know the law and are totally familiar with the court and its procedure. Understanding one’s own society and its values is also taken for granted. Transplanted to another country, a lawyer will be faced with many uncertainties – not just in their working environment, but also in virtually every aspect of the culture. As one rule of law practitioner expressed it, ‘The first thing a lawyer needs to do when working internationally is to understand that they don’t know what is going on, and they have no chance of knowing it in the full depth they’re used to’ (interview on file).

International lawyers therefore need to recognise this lack of knowledge and adapt their attitudes accordingly – in other words, to become more comfortable with the idea of not being fully in control of both the immediate working environment and the wider cultural surroundings.

**Some practical suggestions for organisations and employers**

Whilst this Chapter is principally focused on the personal attributes of individuals, the organisations hiring lawyers to work in rule of law or transitional justice projects also have a role to play in increasing the personal effectiveness of their consultants and staff. I posit five practical suggestions that may help achieve this.

Firstly, organisations should do all they can to ensure they select the right people in the first place by appropriate interviewing and vetting processes that include an assessment of intercultural effectiveness. Most large organisations have a standardised interview protocol. Although an obvious point to make, careful pre-interview preparation for the interviewers is as important as for the candidate. Specifically, interviewers should identify the particularly important intercultural attributes the successful candidate will be expected to demonstrate, and to develop targeted questions to explore this. A short psychometric test focusing on intercultural attributes could be very useful in this regard. It would be particularly helpful to have a mixed interview panel of both national and international staff: most interviews these days can be successfully conducted over the Internet, so there should be no reason why national lawyers and local staff cannot also participate.
Secondly, those joining a rule of law or transitional justice project should be required to participate in both a compulsory initial orientation course and also an on-going information programme relating to the host country and the organisation’s activities within it. Done thoroughly this will ensure that all international project staff will have a similar understanding of the new environment within which they will work. This may be time-consuming but the potential benefits to the project could be considerable. This need not be overly formal – seminar discussions, interactive exercises and even social or cultural visits could be incorporated into the programme, making the most of the national counterpart staff to share their knowledge and experiences with their international colleagues.

Thirdly, organisations should consider developing a specific course on intercultural communication for lawyers in advance of their arrival in the host country. Many organisations such as the United Nations require their staff to undertake certified online training courses relating to issues of security and personal safety awareness. To my knowledge, no organisation working in the field of rule of law and transitional justice offers their staff training on intercultural effectiveness. There are scant few courses on this subject worldwide aimed specifically at lawyers: Advocates for International Development has an annual Law and Development training programme; and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) also has a Centre for Intercultural Learning, which runs courses and workshops for professionals and volunteers working in fragile states. Given how poorly domestic legal training prepares us for the challenges of legal work overseas it would be of tremendous benefit to developing and maintaining the necessary positive, flexible outlook if lawyers attended a suitable course. In the absence of requiring staff to undertake specific and certified intercultural courses, one senior international lawyer interviewed for this project suggested that there should be a series of briefings on the topic of intercultural communication: one for the national lawyers, one for the internationals, and a further briefing attended by both groups (interview on file). This could be facilitated through a series of workshops and other team building exercises.

Fourthly, organisations should consider implementing an evaluation system for their staff incorporating aspects of intercultural effectiveness. A box-ticking performance appraisal is of little value and is sometimes seen as a considerable nuisance. However, the procedure would be vastly improved through periodic self-evaluation, self-reflection as well as discussion on the personal as well as project objectives, based on recognised interculturally effective knowledge, skills and values. In a supportive and non-judgmental working environment, staff should be encouraged to discuss candidly any obstacles to achieving their own and the project’s objectives, to share solutions, and to recognise the limitations on what can be achieved.

This leads to the fifth and final suggestion. Organisations should consider setting more realistic goals. Monitoring and evaluation in the development sector is an industry all in itself, and every project manager will be familiar with the need to demonstrate to donors that the intervention is relevant, effective, efficient, has a measurable impact and is sustainable. Sustainability, or capacity building as it is more often called, is perhaps the most frequently cited metric of success by which rule of law and transitional justice projects are judged. At the end of the intervention, have things changed for the better and will this change be long lasting? The short- and long-term objectives of a project may be clearly articulated, but in reality they may be too ambitious. Developing a training course for new judges in the host country is a challenging but relatively achievable goal. In some
countries, changing the culture of the judiciary – so they act impartially, independently and do not accept or solicit bribes – remains an extremely difficult long-term objective.

International organisations also need to relinquish control of and involvement in the project when it is over: as one lawyer acknowledged, it is difficult for internationals to let go (interview on file). The sustainability of an intervention is built on local people participating and owning the project themselves, and the objectives set at the outset should ensure that capacity building is a part of every lawyer’s daily work – rather than an optional extra at the end when discussing the legacy for the host country. In the experience of many of the lawyers spoken to for this Chapter, one particular factor that improves the effectiveness of a project is the extent to which national lawyers have ‘ownership’ of the process, from the development phase onwards. Establishing good working relations from the outset, meaningfully devising joint project strategy and planning is key to ensuring that local commitment can be maintained throughout. The concept of ‘change management’ is also gaining credence in the rule of law and transitional justice fields, and much more needs to be done to understand how a desired impact can in practice be achieved (O’Connor, 2015).

**Conclusion**

Although the skills of individuals do not guarantee success, without these skills overall success of international and intercultural projects or assignments will rarely, if ever, be achieved. They are a necessary condition of success (Vulpe *et al.*, 2001: 10).

The UN Secretary-General’s report of 2011 suggests that international interventions in rule of law and transitional justice have developed considerably in the first decade of the new millennium. However, it would be a mistake to concentrate exclusively on the macro issues of politics, finance and logistics. I suggest that the time has come to focus on the individual, and to develop the personal qualities that all of us need as international lawyers to operate effectively in cultures that are not our own. This Chapter has attempted to highlight some of the intercultural attributes that organisations need to identify, and lawyers might attempt to cultivate, in the challenging personal and professional conditions in which they operate.

The opinions of experienced practitioners in the field reveal that there is quite some work to be done to improve standards of personal effectiveness. I argue that part of the essential preparations for lawyers embarking on work overseas should include an understanding of intercultural effectiveness. I have demonstrated how barriers to such effectiveness can adversely affect a project’s objectives. I have identified particular improvements we can make to our knowledge, skills and values to be more interculturally effective, and have also offered practical suggestions for organisations looking to help their staff and consultants fulfil their potential whilst working overseas.

Changing the ingrained culture and habits of lawyers to maximise their effectiveness in international interventions will ultimately depend on the individual. Perhaps rule of law and transitional justice work to some extent self-selects those lawyers that are already open to difference, uncertainty and environmental challenges. Nevertheless, there is always room to learn more about the cultures in which we work, and our reactions to them, no matter how many consultancies we have undertaken and missions we have completed. Whilst it would be unrealistic
to expect all international lawyers regardless of the length of contract or exact nature of their work to possess all the intercultural attributes described in this Chapter, an awareness of where we can improve our knowledge, skills and values to increase the effectiveness of the project can only be beneficial.

It is hoped that this Chapter and others that follow can help to further professionalise the field of rule of law and transitional justice lawyering, by inviting lawyers and those who hire them to reflect, and to continue reflecting, on how they interact with others.

Notes

1. This Chapter has been adapted from the paper ‘Improving the Effectiveness of International Lawyers in Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Projects,’ originally written by the author in December 2014 for Queen’s University Belfast’s Lawyers, Conflict & Transition project – a three-year initiative funded by the Economic Social Research Council, exploring the role of lawyers during conflicts, dictatorships and political transitions in six case studies (Cambodia, Chile, Israel, Palestine, Tunisia and South Africa). For further information on the Lawyers Conflict & Transition project, please visit http://lawyersconflictandtransition.org/.

References


The Challenges of Putting the Right People in the Right Place

Douglas Brand OBE

Abstract: This Chapter considers the adverse impact that not recruiting the right people can have upon the delivery of aid and development. In particular, the Chapter looks at the harm that results from conflict between those delivering aid or implementing development programmes, and those recruited to facilitate such work (such as those engaged in logistics, procurement, transportation and security). Part of the reason for this conflict and for underperformance in delivering aid and development programmes, the Chapter argues, is that those who are recruited and deployed can lack all but the technical skills for the job. What is required is pre-deployment and in-theatre training, as well as assessment of non-technical competences – including attitudes and cultural sensitivities – during the recruitment process for development professionals.

The subject of this Chapter might be seen as rather insignificant and its concerns not really recognised as being important in the grand scheme of things. That is, if such factors are considered as the larger and arguably more controversial debate that surrounds the UK’s foreign aid policy (including the alleged scramble to meet the government’s spend target of 0.7% of GDP on foreign aid), or the increase in foreign aid spending itself (£10.6 billion in 2013, up from £8.3 billion the year before) at a time when domestic spending is subject to ‘austerity’ measures, and the allegations in the Tax Payers Alliance report last year that ‘British aid does not have any discernible impact on freedom in developing countries’. However, I think that whatever the policy debate, or the argument about the size of the budget, or whether countries are making development progress, competence at the point of service delivery is the fundamental principle that is going to determine whether or not the intended results in provision of aid will be achieved.

In our context, it is the aid funded by taxpayers, and its delivery to where it’s intended to do maximum good, that’s the issue. Assuming that the funding is focussed appropriately, planning has been exact and empathetic, activities deemed realistic, outcomes identified as achievable, the last link in the aid chain is the deliverer – and it is these people I want to focus my comments on.
From my experience, deliverers fall into two broad categories of people: the first category is the development people, sometimes referred to as the post-conflict people; the second category comprises those who facilitate the ability of the development people to deliver their aid.

Professional development people are those who should have the skills, expertise and motivation to deliver the aid or support (whether it be in the field of education, health, rule of law, and so on) effectively in the context of the aid policy, as well as in the context of the culture and condition of the country they are working in. Those who facilitate the work of these development people come from professions such as logistics, transportation, procurement and, of course, security. It’s the relationship between development people and those who facilitate or support their work, particularly in relation to security, that I’d also like to make some observations on.

The research by Alex Innes – he is one of the Master’s students I supervised on the SCID course - confirmed what other literature and experience has found, which is that aid missions are often staffed by development people who don’t know how to implement their knowledge, or who, despite being in the foreign aid business, find difficulty working in cross-cultural environments. He found too that these development people often feel intimidated or otherwise negatively impeded by development ‘facilitators’, particularly security actors, who they feel sometimes prevent them from delivering their aid or support because of the rules under which they, the development people, are forced to operate under.

Sometimes these impediments arise from ideological differences of approach; the development people perhaps having a looser approach to planning or finding the best way to deliver their support, while those providing security support may have more rigid procedures and approaches. Support people or facilitators may often be accused of having a ‘business as usual’ mentality in the provision of support, emulating perhaps conditions more appropriate to the domestic environment from which the actors came from than the realities of operating in fragile or unstable environments.

So, on the facilitator or support side, we can find that a ‘can’t do’ rather than a ‘can do’ attitude can prevail. This can range from transportation hold ups, through to logistics shortfalls and accommodation problems, to the extent that the development people perceive that their efforts to deliver aid or fulfil their mandate are undermined.

From the support or facilitator side, the development actors’ apparent lack of structure in the way they operate, the apparent lack of appreciation of the conditions of security, risk, or even supply chain, can cause frustration and a difficult work environment for support people or facilitators.

Some of us will have been in those fragile state environments where development activity is influenced as much by the attitudes and disposition of the actors as it is by the conditions and environment of the area in which we are working. So, what should we be looking for in the development actor and in the facilitating actor in order that we get the intended result of effective delivery of aid or development?

Well, in the first instance we would probably agree that individuals should have the technical competence to undertake the functions to which they are assigned. In my area of interest, if an individual is providing rule of law support in the development of policing, I would expect her or him to have the technical skills of a competent police officer. If I were looking for support to the
deliverer from a security person I would expect them to have been trained in relevant security procedures. So far so good? Well yes, but it is often the case that that is often the extent to which a person’s qualifications are considered before recruitment or deployment.

In my experience and in that of many colleagues, failure to look beyond the technical competence often leads to both development actors and facilitating actors being deployed without their suitability for the conditions or context being examined or considered. Having arrived in country, and having found an alien working environment exists, they will often seek to apply their technical competence in the way they had done in their domestic environment, with little or no appreciation of the conditions, culture and context they are now working in. I have found that this can lead at the very least to frustration, and at worse to negative attitudes and hostility towards the local recipients of the aid they are there to provide, with consequent damaging effect on the delivery of their part of the aid.

In the case of security, failure to understand the context and culture can lead to a ‘fortress’ or ‘lockdown’ mentality where perceptions of security threat become so rigid that it becomes the primary or only consideration and, consequently, it compromises the development or aid agenda.

Here’s an example from a colleague of mine. Tonita Murray, former head of the Canadian Police Staff College and an acknowledged expert practitioner in gender mainstreaming policy development, who until recently had worked within the Ministry of Interior in Afghanistan for nearly 11 years, described a trip to Mazar-e-Sharif during the Afghan Naw Roz (New Year) celebrations. Based on fear rather than any known security threat, the security manager of the commercial company providing logistics and security ‘locked down’ the Regional Training School where Tonita and her team were based for the whole period, even though the festival was always noted for its peacefulness and there was a low security threat in the region. After a frustrating visit of several days where none of her development activities could be accomplished because of the lock down, she travelled to the airport via a circuitous route in a heavily armed convoy. At the airport, on her way back to Kabul, her frustration was complete when she encountered Afghan-American women who had come home for the holiday and who had been out in the city shopping and enjoying the festivities.

So, a lesson to learn in considering the type of person to deploy, whether as a development actor or a support actor, is to ‘look beyond the technical competence’. This will require more time to be spent in the pre-deployment activities to ensure that potential actors are appropriately sensitised to the environment to which they will be deployed. It might also require a combination of briefing, training and scenario role plays to equip the participants with at least a theoretical concept of the conditions in which they will operate. But arguably, even this might fall short of the bigger question of ‘are we recruiting the right people in the first place?’

Here is an example of two development actors in the West Bank. The first, an American, was a lawyer, a former prosecutor, who also had extensive law enforcement experience at a federal and – as an elected sheriff – at a county level. On paper, he was an ideal candidate for the work being undertaken in developing material for a strategic leadership course involving senior police and security personnel. The reality was, however, that he had been recruited on paper only by a well-known commercial company specialising in providing personnel to overseas missions, and within four weeks and with nothing more than telephone engagement with the company, he found himself
in Palestine. He would have been deployed sooner but he had to await the arrival of his passport, the first he had ever owned, because he had never been out of his country and the only time he had been out of his home state was when he undertook his federal law enforcement training. He was a thoroughly nice person, but he had no orientation or clarity of role, and certainly no introduction to the conditions of the West Bank. As such, he was totally overwhelmed by the environment, the culture and the pace of work, to the extent that his deployment was eventually terminated and he returned to the USA.

The second had a leadership role. He was highly competent at the process-driven activities and schedules that were necessary for producing the right content for the training and on time. Unfortunately, he seemed to be unable to adjust to the cultural norms and working practises of the Palestinian members of the team or those from other nations. This condition appeared to provoke temper tantrums and antagonistic behaviour from him, which undermined the relationship building that was an essential part of the work. There was no doubt that the relationships, particularly with Palestinian colleagues, were damaged by this behaviour. In both these cases, not looking beyond the technical skills in the recruitment process had a deleterious effect on the delivery of the development project.

There is evidence that supports the notion that combined training and briefing on the context and in cultural awareness, can significantly improve the otherwise diverse perspectives that are found in development environments. Understanding the other player’s challenges, responsibilities, fears, performance expectation, and priorities can smooth the relationships between development providers and development supporters, as well as other actors, and can address some of the otherwise intractable differences that can impede the development effort.

However, we must also acknowledge the reality that some development actors are resistant to training or other efforts to raise their awareness of the roles of others. So, these awareness activities can only be really fruitful if the suitability of the person to operate in the aid environment has been given as much attention as has the technical skills the work requires them to have.

In relation to security, which is where there are often tensions, whether it be security management or the management of the delivery of aid, assessment of vulnerability to threat is all about managing risk. The security managers who ‘lock down’ everybody at the slightest hint of tension or threat, thereby impeding the work of development, are not managing risk, they’re trying to eliminate it – which is unrealistic in a fragile environment. Good security managers and good development actors take an intelligent and common-sense approach to managing risk; they balance the importance of the task that has to be completed against the risk of harm to those carrying out the task, and make decisions accordingly. So, the security managers who may be too lazy to do the intellectual exercise of assessing risk, or may be too timid to make a decisive judgement about the security situation, or the development workers who may not be acquainting themselves with their security environment nor taking personal responsibility for managing risk, are equally culpable if the aid is not delivered as intended.

So, in summary, my thesis is this: it is not sufficient just to recruit people into the development business because they have the technical skills required for the principle or support activities related to providing aid. Training and briefing, both pre-deployment and in theatre, can have a positive effect on developing better and more harmonious relationships between primary development
deliverers and those who provide support. This can, as a result, make for more successful delivery of aid. However, even training and briefing is not sufficient if the aptitude and attitude of the development actor is inconsistent with what’s required of the role they are to fulfil and in the conditions in which they are going to be working. That must be scrutinised at the point of recruitment, not after deployment.

Let me use an expression I learned from Sir Jeremy Greenstock in Iraq to distil the essence of my message: ‘In extraordinary situations, the application of ordinary solutions is bound to fail’.

When we consider the business of aid and development, when we acknowledge the honourable intentions it has, when we are moved by the plight of people often in extreme circumstances of misery that our aid might relieve, can there really be any place for conscious incompetence at its point of delivery?

The recruitment process for aid and development people should have as much attention given to the attitudes, cultural sensitivities, behaviours, and beliefs of a potential actor as it has for the technical skills that the work requires them to have.

Otherwise, the observations contained in the Tax Payers Alliance report of last year will be the reality, and the failure to deliver aid because of incompetence will be rightly criticised.
The question is not how to get a job in international development; the question is do you have what it takes to be a changemaker?

Emmicki Roos

Abstract: This Chapter explores some of the behaviours influencing the world of international development that are counterproductive to the objective of achieving positive social change and the role of the individual in challenging these behaviours. No matter if you are university graduate in the process of applying for your first job or if you have been working in international development for years, introspection is key if you want to be a changemaker. I will argue that the reason why progress is so slow is because unhealthy organisational cultures, toxic and authoritative leadership, and an inability to translate our values into meaningful action are all too common in value-based organisations. As long as we are unable to implement the values we profess outwardly into our own organisations, we will never be able to truly transform the world we live in for the better. Simply put – we are not living our values, and achieving social change is all about values.

Are We the Change We Want to See?

Like so many other university graduates entering the world of international development, I did so with the conviction that I would be working for a good cause and that I would be surrounded by people who had the same (or similar) ideals as myself. A number of years later having worked for a number of NGOs and the UN, I still believe in the work I am doing and that change is possible, but I also have a whole different understanding of why change is not happening and why we keep on repeating the same mistakes year in and year out.

A number of reasons can be given for the lack of significant positive social change in the development context. However, given the page limit and the purpose of this Chapter I will focus on...
values and how they are shaping the world of international development, from the micro individual level to the macro organisational level. I will argue that the gap between our values and our actions is, in many cases, too significant. Hence, if we want to achieve large-scale societal transformation we need to bridge this gap first.

Professionals will give different reasons for working in the field of development: some for the international experience and travel to exotic places; others because they actually want to achieve social change or what we call “make a difference”; others because of the high status and generous salaries (not among NGOs generally); and others because they just ended up where they are by chance. No matter why you ended up working in the field of international development, I hope that we can agree that the bottom line of international development is to achieve social change; to make the world a more humane and peaceful place for as many people as possible. Now if that is the bottom line, let us explore what it will take to achieve that.

**What does it take to be a changemaker?**

If we start with the micro individual level, what kind of qualities and values would a person have to have to be an effective changemaker? I do not know how many articles I have read directed at university graduates over the years giving tips on how to secure a job in international development, all with similar content. Get your Master’s degree; master at least two of the official UN languages; secure an internship; and get some field experience. What they forget to mention is that not all the Master’s degrees and languages in the world will make you a changemaker if you lack the fundamentals. None of these articles mention the fact that if you want to achieve social change you have to live your values. Meaning that when you can translate your values into action in your day-to-day life you may actually have a chance of being successful.

As an example, if you are being bullied by your boss and are unable to stand up for yourself and your colleagues at work, you have no business advising people in totalitarian regimes on how to stand up for their rights. You are risking a bit of unpleasantness and, at worst, losing your employment and source of income; whereas they are risking confinement, torture, and perhaps even their lives. As cliché as it may sound, change starts with you and before you decide to enter the world of international development you should take a long hard look at yourself and what you have to offer. Because, how can you empower others if you are not empowered yourself? The obvious answer is: you can’t.

Securing a job in international development may seem like a near-impossible task for many recent university graduates, with the almost endless number of internships most graduates have to endure and entry-level positions few and far between. But it does not get any easier when one has secured a job. If anything, it gets harder. All of a sudden the values that likely inspired you to go to university and work for free or next to nothing are to be tested. When securing your first job you will have to be careful not to be overwhelmed by the joy of being employed and the wish to please your employers. You will have to be careful so that you are not ‘moulded’ into an organisational yea-sayer without the ability to think outside the box or the courage to be critical of the organisational culture and the organisations outputs. If you lose these characteristics, you have lost your most important attributes if you wish to be a changemaker. Your ability to be critical of
yourself and the environment around you, including your work environment, is a prerequisite for achieving social change, as change is about transformation and questioning the status quo.

**Characteristics of a changemaker:**

- Changemakers aren’t people who take orders without questioning them; this is part of having a critical approach.
- Changemakers are not yea-sayers; they have integrity and speak up even when it is uncomfortable.
- Changemakers take things into their own hands and do not ask for permission to participate in dialogues or structures; if denied access they create their own platforms.
- Changemakers understand that change starts with oneself and that the values professed externally have to be internalised first.
- Changemakers understand that change comes from empowering others and a strong sense of ownership.
- Changemakers know that true leaders do not create followers, they create more leaders.
- Changemakers know that action speaks louder than words.
- Changemakers see flaws and shortcomings in themselves and their organisations and know that they can only be addressed if they are fully recognised.
- Changemakers do not fit into a mould; they see the gaps and fill them. In other words they don’t wait for opportunities to come to them; they find the opportunities to bring a new perspective and added value.

**Examining our Own Flaws and Shortcomings**

We spend our professional lives addressing social injustice and talking about respect, human rights, human dignity, equality and so on. And yet we rarely examine our own flaws and shortcomings in these areas. Having worked with the women’s rights movement in Sweden and globally, I have had the misfortune of seeing this up close. Unfortunately, it seems to be more the rule than the exception that women’s organisations who work for women’s empowerment disempower women in their own organisations to some degree. This is probably not unique for the women’s movement, but common in all value-based organisations. Throughout the years, many colleagues have borne witness to unhealthy practices in the women’s movement and civil society at large. It appears that there is often a disconnect between the cause we work for and how we treat our colleagues and employees. Colleagues who have tried to raise this issue in their organisations have often been met by criticism and it has been made clear to them that this is not up for discussion.

An illustration of the reluctance to address these issues in our own organisations and structures is a large conference held last year on new action on women’s rights, attended by tens of thousands of women’s rights activists. On the agenda was four days of seminars and discussions about new action on women’s rights, with some focus on patriarchal structures and how women’s voices are being silenced by men. Surprisingly, not a single event focused on the challenges within the women’s rights movement itself; not a single event looked at how women in the women’s movement are silencing each other. Yet most of my colleagues in the women’s rights movement complain regularly about toxic authoritarian leadership, age discrimination, and unhealthy organisational cultures. It makes me wonder, what are we so afraid of? What would happen if we
dared to raise these issues: would the whole women’s rights movement fall apart or would it make us stronger? I’m convinced that it is the latter and perhaps if we spent a tenth of the time and energy looking inward and reflecting on our own structures and organisations we would have a much better chance at achieving the goals we have established.

**Toxic Leadership in Value-Based Organisations**

Unhealthy organisational cultures are often the result of toxic leadership. This might be more common in the development context than we would like to think, and the effects on the programs and outputs of organisations more significant than we would like to admit. Before going into more depth on the impact of toxic leaders in the field of international development, let’s look at the definition of a toxic leader. Seeger, Ulmer, Novak and Sellnow (2005) define a toxic leader as someone who is motivated by self-interest or personal gain, lacks empathy, and has a negative impact on the organisational climate. Moreover, Carter and Yeo (2008) write that toxic leaders glory in turf protection; dominating and fighting rather than uplifting colleagues. Toxic leaders are also often destructive leaders who focus on visible short-term accomplishments and succeed in doing so by tearing others down (Carter and Yeo, 2008). Moreover, toxic leaders often use master suppression techniques to dominate their employees. The five master suppression techniques which have been identified by Ås (2008) include: making invisible; ridiculing; withholding information; damned if you do and damned if you don’t; and heaping blame and putting on shame.

The toxic leadership type appears to be fairly common in society at large; in the private sector as well as in value-based organisations. However, toxic leadership may be more destructive as phenomena in value-based organisations for two reasons. Firstly, in a value-based organisation toxic leadership and its characteristics, such as master suppression techniques and other destructive behaviour, is not supposed to exist. Hence, raising the issue of toxic leadership can be both sensitive and somewhat of a taboo. Secondly, in the private sector there is probably more incentive to get rid of toxic leaders since there is evidence that toxic leaders lead to loss in productivity. Gallup estimates that the average organisation has $3,400 in lost productivity for every $10,000 of payroll due to “disengaged employees”, which is one of the most common symptoms of dysfunctional leaders (Buckingham and Coffman, 1999 cited in Tavanti, 2011). What the figures are in non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations is not clear. However, the loss in productivity is also likely to be significant.

One may argue that the difference between the private sector and many international development organisations is that there is much less financial incentive to address the issue of toxic leaders in these organisations because these organisations are not-for-profit and because donors generally do not have a healthy organisational culture as a criteria for granting funding applications. Nevertheless, if the organisational culture is unhealthy and characterised by toxic and authoritarian leadership this will inevitably reflect on the organisations output, especially, I would argue, if it is a value-based organisation.

One way of mitigating the effects of toxic and authoritarian leadership might be to focus less on traditional leadership and more on communal leadership, as communal leadership by a collective or elected individuals exists for a common purpose. Communal leaders listen to their inner source, meaning beliefs, values, and knowledge and selflessness override any intention of selfishness.
(Praeter, 2013). With communal leadership there are close ties between organisations and communities, and organisations exist to serve the community. Moreover, if applied in an organisational context, communalism focuses on fairness, equality and justice for all its employees, not just those in a position of power. An organisation based on communal leadership is a place where employees thrive and constantly develop, not a place where they are controlled and dominated (Praeter, 2013).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Communalism</th>
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<td><strong>Integrity</strong>: All our actions are transparent and accountable and linked positively to our value base. Truthfulness and sincerity are vital.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Respect and Patience</strong>: We respect and do not harass or bully others. We are patient, gentle, approachable, sympathetic, and kind. All our actions promote peace and non-violence. We use our powers wisely.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom of Mind and Heart</strong>: We listen with an open mind and heart. We work with and listen to everybody. All our actions reflect this totality.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Courage and Hope</strong>: We are prepared to act and step into the unknown. We act bravely and let our values steer us in our work. We believe that change is possible and are confident enough to take positive risks. (Adopted from Praeter: 2013: 6)</td>
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**Adopting a Rights-Based Approach in our Own Organisations**

These days the phrase ‘a rights-based approach to international development’ is frequently used to describe setting out a vision of what ought to be and providing a normative framework to guide development. The normative justification for a rights-based approach is that focusing on rights puts values and politics at the heart of development practice. Hausermann (1998 cited in Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004) argues that a rights-based approach offers a moral and ethical dimension to development work, which often has been lacking. I would like to extend Hausermann’s argument by saying that not only has a rights-based approach been lacking in development work, but also in the organisations and structures set up to carry out the development work.

What is significant about a rights-based approach is that it can be viewed as a vehicle for accountability, by putting emphasis on accountability of policymakers and other actors whose actions and programmes have an impact on the rights of people. As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights notes, rights imply duties and duties imply accountability (cited in Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004). Limitations in accountability have long been one of the criticisms levied by those engaged in international development against those with whom they work in the field. However, lack of accountability can also be an issue in our own organisational cultures. When employees and leaders act in contradiction to the values of the organisation, without any effective system of prevention or sanction, there is a lack of accountability.

When adopting a rights-based approach in an organisational context, it is important to make value-based decisions. We often make decisions without reflecting much about the process leading up to
them and the question is: how often do we compromise our values? Praeter (2013) has developed an exercise to help you reflect on your decision-making style and ensure that your decisions more closely correspond to your values, which I find very useful. In the exercise you are asked to answer the following questions about decisions you have made:

- What was the outcome of the decision?
- Which internal aspects, for example, emotions, courage, skills, and knowledge had an influence?
- What are your biases and blind spots?
- How much did your values influence your decision-making?
- How selfless was your decision-making?
- Which external factors affected your decision-making? (Praeter, 2013: 91)

**What does an enabling environment look like?**

An enabling environment for achieving positive social change is an organisation which has a healthy organisational culture. A healthy organisational culture can be defined as an organisation that establishes work practices which promote and maintain mental, physical and social well-being among employees, which results in high quality performance and work efficiency. Employee participation is one of the prerequisites for achieving a healthy organisational culture, and all workers must be actively involved in shaping the organisational practices if this is to become reality (Jaimez and Bretones, 2011).

Employee participation is closely linked to concepts of empowerment and ownership, which are common goals for organisations operating in the field of international development as they are essential for achieving social change.

Moreover, I would argue that participation and empowerment is not possible without having what is referred to in Swedish as a “high ceiling”. This means an environment in which employees feel comfortable freely expressing themselves and sharing views and ideas without risk of ridicule, judgment or sanction by management. In many organisations, this is considered an ideal, but in reality it is something quite rare.

Achieving positive social change is about creativity. Toxic leadership or authoritarian management effectively kills creativity and this will inevitably be reflected in the organisations’ programmes and activities. If employees do not have the mandate to elaborate upon alternative ideas and propose creative solutions, this will also lead to a static view on how activities are carried out.

**Signs that you are in an enabling environment:**

- Employees are empowered and feel ownership over their day-to-day work.
- The values externally professed by the organisation have been internalised.
- Employees are encouraged to participate in the shaping of the organisational practices.
- The leadership is respectful and takes an interest in the well-being of its staff.
- There is an ongoing discussion about internal democracy, participation and empowerment.
- Issues related to employee satisfaction and wellbeing are addressed and employees feel that their concerns are taken seriously.
There is a “high ceiling” meaning an environment where employees feel comfortable expressing themselves freely.

Competence and drive is as important (if not more important) than age and number of years’ experience.

Signs that you are in a non-enabling environment:

- There is a culture of fear in the organisation.
- Authoritarian and toxic leadership exists.
- There is no room for discussing new ideas or perspectives, and employees risk ridicule, judgment or sanctions by management when expressing themselves.
- Employees are not empowered and do not have a sense of ownership in their day-to-day work.
- The values externally professed by the organisation have not been internalised.
- Employees are discouraged from participating in the shaping of the organisational practices.

**Action Speaks Louder Than Words**

In the world of international development, as with life in general, actions always speak louder than words. We can say whatever we perceive that people want to hear, but our actions will almost always give us away. In order to be a true changemaker, one’s actions need to correspond with one’s words. Yet, the world of international development is full of people who say one thing and do another.

A while back I attended a peace dialogue in a badly conflict-affected country. The dialogue had been set up to bring together people across all the provinces in the country to discuss the security challenges and how to build peace. Some of the conflict-affected people from the provinces had travelled for days to the capital to participate in the dialogue and share their perspectives with international community and government representatives. After a number of speeches by high-ranking officials and representatives from the international community on how important the peace dialogue is and how they are there to listen to the voices of the people, it was finally the turn of the people from the provinces to speak. Unfortunately, none of the high-ranking officials and representatives from the international community had stayed to listen. The lesson here is, don’t say that you are there to listen and then leave as soon as you have finished speaking: basically, don’t say one thing and do the opposite.

Another example of how our actions often do not correspond with our words is our treatment of young people wanting to enter the world of international development. Outwardly, we often speak of how important it is to empower the youth and that we need young people to contribute to our organisations and the overarching objective of achieving positive social change on a global scale. Nevertheless, in reality, entering the world of international development is increasingly difficult for young people who are often caught in a catch-22 situation; without experience they cannot get job and because they cannot get a job they cannot get experience. Moreover, even though we say that the voices of the youth are important, we seldom include them in decision-making and when they are included as speakers and panellists it is the exception. We often marginalise the voices of young
people, because in most organisations the person’s age and number of years of experience often trumps drive and even competence. Naturally, experience should be highly valued in the workforce, but so should a fresh perspective. Young people have a lot to contribute to the world of international development. Principally, because they have yet to be moulded into the organisational context, they tend to be more optimistic and can bring a much needed outside perspective.

Solutions and Way Forward

There is a need for a paradigm shift in the organisational cultures of value-based organisations operating in the field of international development and the extent to which we are acting in accordance with our values. Only when we are true to our values will we reach our full potential to achieve lasting positive social change. Below I have listed some of the proposed solutions for how this can be achieved.

Solutions for how to reach our full potential:

- Ensure there is continued dialogue within organisations and structures about how to achieve a positive and enabling organisational culture, where employees are empowered and have a sense of ownership in their day-to-day work.
- Encourage a willingness to see and recognise our own flaws and shortcomings as individuals and as organisations.
- Establish mechanisms for dealing with toxic and authoritarian leaders, ensuring that approaches are not ad hoc.
- Encourage donors to include organisational culture and well-being as criteria to receiving funding.
- Change our recruitment practices to focus more on a person’s drive, integrity, competence, and ability to think critically than number of years’ experience and credentials, which are superficially appealing.
- Adopt a rights-based approach in our own organisations and establish mechanisms for accountability.
- Develop internal policies for how to go from words to action when it comes to empowering young people to participate in decision-making, and so on.

Conclusion

In the beginning of this Chapter I asked if we are the change we wish to see: in other words, are we living our values? The answer to this question, as I see it, is no: the gap between our words and actions is too significant.

If reading this Chapter has led to an overly pessimistic outlook on the world of international development or a sense of hopelessness, I have failed. My reason for writing this Chapter has not been to promote cynicism or take away from the important work most organisations working to achieve social change do. The reason has been to promote the idea that introspection, as well as transparent and open dialogue about our actions as individuals and our organisational cultures, can help us achieve our full potential. Change is possible and you as an individual can function as an important changemaker if you are willing to examine your own values and recognise your
shortcomings and flaws. It may seem like a near impossible task to address an unhealthy organisational culture or transform toxic and authoritarian leadership, but it is not if we have the right tools and a clear vision. Moreover, the rewards will be significant both at the individual and organisational levels.

References


Creating Strategies for Security Sector Reform in V.U.C.A. Operating Environments

Peter J. Reed

Abstract: For many countries, reform and development of their security sector institutions is a constant iterative process – perhaps, just like a business, to preserve defensive capability and a competitive edge as cost-effectively as possible in the national interest. In post-conflict situations, SSR becomes an imperative, and can take on an urgency that may be at odds with the complexity of the challenge and often constrained resources. The US military has described such operating environments as ‘VUCA’ – Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous. Finding ways to ‘flip’ this acronym, and to help local leaders (both politicians and security services) to develop Vision, Understanding, Clarity and Agility, requires a strategic approach and an appreciation of the essential leadership dimensions (both political and technical) of the stabilisation process. This Chapter draws on current examples of the challenges presented by highly complex operating environments in fragile and conflict affected States (with short case studies from Libya and Somalia).

The VUCA Operating Environment

As Horney, Pasmore, and O’Shea put it in their 2010 paper ‘Leadership Agility – A Business Imperative for a VUCA World’:

The term VUCA, coined by the US Army War College, describes the dynamic nature of our world today and has caught on in a variety of organizational settings to describe a business environment characterized by:

- **Volatility** – The nature, speed, volume, magnitude and dynamics of change;
- **Uncertainty** – The lack of predictability of issues and events;
- **Complexity** – The confounding of issues and the chaos that surround any organization; and
- **Ambiguity** – The haziness of reality and the mixed meanings of conditions. (Horney, Pasmore, and O’Shea, 2010: 33)
If this description, and the leadership responsibility that it engenders, is true of today’s business environment, how much more true is it when one considers the challenges of post-conflict peace-building, stabilisation, and the reform (literally re-form) and effective development of a state’s security institutions, the architecture of its security sector, and the accountability (ideally democratic) that should be a foundation of their governance.

The term VUCA was coined, as Horney, Pasmore and O’Shea (2010) say, by the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Some excellent brief definitions or descriptions of the VUCA elements, and the leadership insights that are implied, have subsequently been created by a Course Director for Military Leadership Studies at West Point, US Army Colonel Eric G. Kail. Even though they may have utility for business, management and leadership development in a conflict-free and peace-time context, it is helpful for our purposes to view these descriptions in the context of the challenges and leadership implications that Kail envisaged for the military, and perhaps for security services more broadly.

**Volatility**

Volatility can be described as a state of dynamic instability brought about by drastic, violent and rapid shifts. Problems no longer arise in the distance; they emerge without warning and require immediate attention and action.

The leadership implications are:

- Translate data into information (the right data, not just raw data);
- Communicate clearly (Kail says quoting Churchill: ‘the small words are best!’);
- Ensure your intent is understood (the ‘End State’ should realistically describe what success will look like).

**Uncertainty**

It is human nature to see every challenge as something similar to what we have encountered before. But uncertainty becomes increasingly dangerous when we rush to understand it with only past experience. Uncertainty makes most people nervous. It is a leadership task and responsibility to reduce the level of uncertainty.

The leadership implications are:

- Get a fresh perspective – The ‘View from the Balcony’ in order better to be able to choreograph and orchestrate the dance (Reed, 2003);
- Encourage ‘Red Teaming’ (Devil’s advocates to test ideas and proposals);
- Be flexible (plans never survive contact with the enemy, so incorporate flexibility and contingency options from the outset);
- Glance back, but really look ahead (look for what can be done better in future rather than what should have been done in the past).
Complexity

Threats and opportunities are not simply collective; we must see them as interactive. Leading through complexity means thinking non-linearly. The most important strategy competence is the ability to see the big picture, to decide on a course of action, and to lead the team to achieve more together than they could individually.

The leadership implications are:

- Don’t try to seek permanent solutions;
- Don’t miss opportunities because you’re obsessed with conquering the challenge;
- Manage expectations;
- Opportunities exist in complexity – seek them out;
- Concentrate on a manageable number of vital, do-able things;
- Find ways to monitor and measure results.

Ambiguity

Ambiguity results in inability to conceptualise threats and opportunities accurately before they become lethal. It often results in increasing frustration that individual accomplishments don't seem to be adding up to comprehensive or enduring success. It makes people insecure and can disrupt their ability to focus on the critical path.

The leadership implications are:

- Provide clarity so that work assignments and goals are not as ambiguous as the environment, but nevertheless have ‘line of sight’ to the desired goal;
- Provide clear direction and synchronise the efforts of others through a phased and sequenced approach, while continually communicating any adjustments to the plan;
- Listen well – don’t select just what you want to hear;
- Think divergently – be open to new ideas;
- Create ‘Quick Wins’ to demonstrate tangible progress and generate confidence.

Operationalising the Process

As we have seen, business schools, academics and consultants have picked up on, and found merit in models like the VUCA acronym for describing and addressing the challenges inherent in the leadership of major change in the corporate world and the marketplace. It is equally true that some of the models that leading academics have created for the latter have utility when applied to the equally (if not more) complex challenges of international development in fragile and conflict-affected States (FCAS).

The fundamental building blocks for all subsequent planning and implementation are a comprehensive understanding – in so far as this is possible given the VUCA environment – of the existing situation, and a clear and unambiguous picture of the desired ‘end state’ or goal. Applying rigorous analysis of the former to point to the options for achieving the latter is what the military call ‘appreciating the situation’. What we must not do is to ‘situate the appreciation’ by jumping to
conclusions based on first impressions or previous experience of similar but undoubtedly different situations.

The required information, translated as indicated above from the right data and not just raw data, can be assembled by a variety of means. These could include a feasibility study, a thorough study of the geography, a political economy analysis, public perceptions surveys, reviews and evaluations of previous operations, security assessments, and – where possible – assessments of the beneficiaries or local implementing partners’ existing capability and capacity (both actual and absorptive).

It is not the purpose of this Chapter to give advice on how to conduct such an appreciation or analysis. Suffice it to say that analysis is not strategy, and strategy is not action planning. Too many people confuse all three. Frequently there is a surfeit of analysis which sometimes adds to the complexity and ambiguity, and consequently to confusion about strategy. The analysis should distil facts which answer the question ‘what are we dealing with?’ They may even answer the additional question ‘what do we think it is possible to achieve?’ Strategy provides the answer to ‘how are we going to get there in broad terms?’ It sets out a road map that persuades you that it is probably preferable to go round to the right, around to the left, or straight up the middle. Finally, an operational action plan tells you how to ensure that you have all that you need for the selected route. It will tell you when and where you might need to break the journey, how you will know if you on track, and eventually if you are successful.

**Securing and Preparing the Ground**

One of the most powerful models to guide the process of leading change was posited by Harvard Professor John Kotter (2000). He sets out an 8-step process in his book *Leading Change* which, although aimed at a commercial business market, has all the elements that make it particularly appropriate for VUCA operating environments. In synopsis the eight stages are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kotter’s 8 Stages for Leading Major Change:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure the Sense of Urgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Form or facilitate the Guiding Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Agree the Vision and ‘End State’</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Communicate, Communicate, Communicate!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Programme the approach and the process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Create Quick Wins (don’t just hope for them!)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deepen and broaden the process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consolidate the gains for momentum and critical mass (Kotter, 2000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experienced international development practitioners will readily note that it is only at stage 5 of 8 that Kotter advocates ‘programming the process’ – in other words bringing all of the tricks, tools, operational plans, budgets and technocratic expertise together for implementation of a plan. Far too often there has been a temptation to ‘parachute in’ development assistance, only to find that progress stalls very quickly because the ground was not sufficiently secured or prepared, or that major changes (in the political economy or the security situation) have impacted on the feasibility of the plan since its creation.
Using the 8-Stage Model to Phase and Sequence Interventions

A Libya Case Study

Let us take a highly topical example of a VUCA challenge: the mediation / peace talks for opposing sides in the Libyan post-revolutionary conflict that are currently being brokered by the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative Bernardino Leon and the UK Prime Minister’s Special Envoy Jonathan Powell.

It is suggested that the mediation and peace-building process be examined with consideration of whether or not the stages are relevant and recognisable, and whether it is possible to determine where the stakeholder parties are now on the trajectory.

The following advice has been provided by the author to relevant diplomats and participants:

1. Establish or confirm the Sense of Urgency
   - Examine the supply / demand relationship realities and operating environment. Who wants something from this situation? What do they really want, and when? How quickly could governance be structured properly to give it to them, and does anyone have the capacity and competence?
   - Identify threats and opportunities to the organisation and to the change effort (stability and so on).
   - Start to plan how to programme the strategy – identifying priorities and key stakeholder interests. Should a new Government be big or small; central or federal?

2. Create the Guiding Coalition
   - Identify and/or facilitate the putting together of a balanced representative group of key individuals with enough power, credibility and commitment to lead the changes.

3. Develop the Vision and Strategy
   - Create a clear and compelling vision to help direct the change efforts. Define a realistic ‘End State’ (and if possible intermediate stages with tangible milestones).
   - Develop policies, strategies and systems – in effect a Roadmap for achieving that vision.

4. Communicate the Change Vision
   - Use every means possible to communicate (and, even more importantly, to help the national leaders to communicate) the new vision and strategy constantly to all stakeholders – especially those who may resist it, both initially and throughout the change process.
   - Encourage Leaders and those with influence to role model the behaviour expected (for example, by not breaking cease-fire agreements just because some other party did).

5. Empower Broad-Based Action
> Get rid of obstacles – and side-line people who insist on creating obstacles.
> Change systems or structures that undermine the vision.
> Use systems thinking to improve processes.
> Encourage risk taking and non-traditional ideas, activities and actions.

6. Generate Quick Wins

> Plan for a manageable number of (a vital few) visible measurable improvements.
> Create these ‘wins’ (hoping they will happen is not good enough).
> Recognise and find ways of incentivising and subsequently rewarding those who make them possible.

7. Consolidate Gains and Produce More Change

> Use increased credibility to change all systems, structures and policies that don’t fit the vision or fit together.
> Hire, promote, and develop people who can make it happen.
> Re-invigorate the process with new projects, themes and change agents. This can be motivational and represent reward for results.

8. Anchor New Approaches in the Culture

> Performance improvement (for example, in security delivery or public services) through benchmarked and citizen-focused behaviour (perhaps local security provision by militias agreeing to operate under a set of protocols to reduce community based violence).
> Articulate connections between new behaviours and success.
> Attempt to map ‘Policy Outcomes’ (Impact) beyond operational Outputs (required deliverables): for example, a trend that shows increasing community confidence and trust in the security services as a result of their good behaviour could have line of sight to sustainable stabilisation.
> Develop the means for leadership development and succession – both political and technocratic.

Setting the Conditions

As stated above, it is only at Stage 5 of 8 that ‘programming the process’ is advocated – perhaps in this context with a wide range of technocratic or other, possibly donor-funded, inputs. The preparation and securing of the ground for this constitute what the military call ‘setting the conditions’. We need to focus initially on how the mediation process can facilitate, or perhaps catalyse these important steps in order to ensure that the conditions for future peaceful progress can be established to the extent possible.
In answer to the question ‘who constitutes the leadership?’ in the context of the desired peace process, the suggestion is that what is needed is a ‘guiding coalition’ of people who are both powerful and determined enough to drive the process. But the establishment of such a guiding coalition (or facilitating its creation) is the second stage in the process. The first requirement is a sense of urgency for the desired changes. From this we can extrapolate some immediate and important questions that reflect the implied phasing and sequencing of effort:

1. Is there an existing sense of urgency for a cease-fire and thus for the peace process?
   a. Do the leaders of the opposed fighting factions (and their sponsors and proxies) share or subscribe to this urgency? How do they demonstrate this? *The reality at the time of writing - February 2015 – is that both ‘sides’ think they can still win militarily.*
   b. Does the Libyan public – of either or both main groups (Traditionalists and Islamists respectively), and the wider community including minorities, share or demonstrate any sense of urgency for a peaceful settlement? *(A public perceptions survey of 1,000 citizens shows that the public are weary of the fighting but relatively powerless to stop it in the presence of so many heavily armed groups – DFID, 2015).*
   c. Is this voiced in the media (including social media), or does media coverage tend to influence greater polarisation? *The media is extremely polarised and this is counter-productive to peace-building efforts.*
   d. If the international community believes that there should be a greater sense of urgency, what is being done to enhance this through influence, messaging, diplomacy and strategic communications? *(Peace and mediation talks are being held in Libya and in Geneva brokered by the UN. Representatives from main opposing factions are attending, but others are refusing to take part. All tend to set impossible conditions).*

2. How can we envisage the desired ‘guiding coalition’?
   a. Would this be constituted exclusively from the leadership of opposed main factions or involve wider representation? *(Can we use a formula for the make-up of a ‘Government of National Unity’?)*
   b. Must it be more inclusive? Should it incorporate allies and sponsors (UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, USA, UK, France and the UN) or does this exacerbate polarisation?
   c. Is it necessary to include representation from the groups mentioned above in the description of the first mediation track (as well as to recognise the need to talk to them)?
   d. Should the mediation process exclude ‘extremists’ (who insist either on radical Islam or on the elimination of all Islamist elements) from either side if it is to stand any chance of acceptance or sustainability?
   e. Must a cease-fire precede (or be seen as a pre-requisite for) the establishment of such a guiding coalition, or would this be expected to be a product of the workings of such a body? *[Note: When considering sequencing, it is likely that any Demobilisation, Disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process (for example) will almost certainly need to be the outcome of a political process and perhaps even of militias agreeing to provide locally accountable security, and not the departure point for this.]*

3. How do we facilitate or catalyse a clear and unified vision?
The third stage requires the guiding coalition to have, or develop and agree, a clear shared vision for the ‘end state’ and the path to its achievement.

a. Can mediation efforts bring various factions and interest groups to the table, with or without a cease-fire in place?

b. Could agreement for this (and for it to be sustainable) be the first part of an agreed vision for the way forward?

c. Agreement on the envisaged ‘end state’ would, inevitably, have to involve a much broader and more complex set of issues. Should the list be limited to power sharing or reference access to resources (both natural and financial – as these are the bases of power) and the right to bear arms (in National or Federated security structures and forces)?

4. How do we facilitate strategic communications (STRATCOMMS) for a Unity Government?

The fourth stage is the need to communicate the shared and agreed vision to all concerned, exploiting all available means.

a. Will there need to be an effective and sustained information operations campaign from the outset – for example to help to raise or establish the necessary sense of urgency?

b. Do independent (unaligned) facilities or media exist for this or will it have to be a donor-funded initiative? How would a ‘Western–backed’ influence campaign be viewed? Can we afford not to counter increasingly professional psychological warfare from extremist groups like (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL))?

c. How do we ensure that nobody should be left in any doubt of the vision for peace and unity, or the proposed strategies to achieve this?

d. If there is to be any ‘stick or carrot’ (and if either of these are deemed necessary as incentives or deterrents), should it perhaps be at this stage that the details of such inducements or sanctions must be communicated? Should these be for local communities? People may continue to support the positions of one side or another, but they must know that they are required to trust and support the shared vision for unity through peaceful means. How do you compete with the huge flows of illicit funding from smuggling and other organised crime activities?

e. Is the responsibility for such communication a leadership task for which the Government must take responsibility? The international community can provide technical assistance, coaching, mentoring and overall expertise for this, but ownership of the messages must be seen to rest with the Government.

f. The message (for example regarding the need for unity or even a cease-fire) can, of course, be endorsed or amplified through other media from and through allied and supporting country sources. How can this best be co-ordinated?

5. Programming the Process

Once this stage is reached then multiple projects, initiatives, development aid, and assistance can be mobilised by the international community in support of an emergent Unity Government. In far too many instances in the past (and particularly in other VUCA environments and FCAS) there has been a temptation for donors and their contracted agencies or experts to pledge huge resources...
which in themselves create an incentive for a frenzy of international assistance before the required conditions have been set, largely through failure to adhere to the process outlined under Stages 1-4. The biggest and most challenging of such projects might well be a DDR programme that would, inter alia, provide the mechanisms for disparate militias to integrate into formal national security forces or demobilise and re-integrate into civilian society.

a. Should such a process be essentially ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’?

b. Would attempts to encourage (and perhaps incentivise) local community-based security provision by militias – and perhaps eventual co-ordination of such arrangements into an agreed set of protocols or behaviours – stand a better chance of success than a national Government-sponsored process for integration?

c. Could such a process be a precursor for a ‘federal’ system of security provision that could result in a ‘Transitional Security Working Group’ of militia and community leaders (as opposed to, or as a step towards the concept of a National Security Council?)

As far as the components of an actual strategy for either integration or civilian reintegration are concerned, it may be that what is usually understood as civilian reintegration could be a slightly misguided concept in the Libyan context: Libya is, latterly if not historically, an arms-bearing culture and many people under arms simply go home in the evenings – members of both state and non-state armed groups take their weapons home at night and are not going to hand them in any time soon. But in any event there is considerable information and comparative analysis available on potential component parts of a strategy for example, pension schemes / pay and grading packages / vocational training and so on. Lessons concerning what has or has not worked well elsewhere may prove to be of value.

**Stages 6 – 8 Generating and Maintaining Momentum**

The above arguments and the questions arising from them cover the first five of the recommended eight stages for leading major change. Stage 6 is to create a number of ‘quick wins’. It is important to note that this implies a need for pro-activity and not simply aspiration. Quick wins need to be planned for and made to happen through programming (and further phasing and sequencing in line with absorptive and operational capacity). Hoping for them is not enough. They may not all prove successful, but those that are will send out a message that ‘something is happening around here as they said it would’. Stage 7 involves broadening and deepening the process through the programming and implementation of a wider range of initiatives. These could perhaps address social and economic woes that can constitute the irritants that, in turn, foster disillusion and political alienation. Stage 8 envisages consolidating gains, perhaps through elections or legislation to enshrine constitutional achievements that underpin the institutions of national (and ideally democratic) unity governance with due attention to considerations of equity and human rights.

**VUCA Challenges to the ‘Comprehensive Approach’**

The UK, US and their allies and friendly nations continue to face a number of VUCA challenges when attempting to formulate policy and strategy to deal with terrorism, insecurity, violent extremism and piracy in the Horn of Africa. The scourge of piracy in the Indian Ocean has now largely diminished as a result of truly effective international co-operation and an integrated strategy that allows merchant ships to have armed protection on the high seas, and justice to be meted out to
captured offenders through application of the principle of Universal Jurisdiction in the courts of Seychelles and other parties to the agreement.

But the fight against terrorism, insecurity and violent extremism continues. The challenges are complex and the strategy to deal with them needs to be comprehensive.

In addition to providing a useful framework for assessing the nature of the threats in the context of this complex and dynamic operating environment, a 2011 issue of STRATAGEM (the journal of the US Asymmetric Warfare Group – volume 6, issue 1) offered an interesting discourse on ‘Dealing with Diplomats’. The very implication of this phrase is revealing in so far as it alludes to the challenge that many in the military feel is central to the necessary civilian oversight of the security forces, and perhaps to the different agendas or perceptions of priorities that inevitably play out on the ground – in Washington and other capitals, in HQs and on the front line of Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Intelligence, and other operations. The author points out that the current model ‘suffers from leadership gaps at many and various seams’. Perhaps this is because it is clear to everyone that what has been termed a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ (CA), or ‘Integration of the 3 Ds’ (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) is evidently necessary, but not yet necessarily evident, or operationally effective (even if the admirable SCID MSc course suggests a synergy!). In short, effective leadership for it is missing.

Experienced practitioners will know that this is evidenced by an absence of dialogue and meetings. Whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mogadishu, or any other conflict or post-conflict environment, where the ‘3 Ds’, or even a properly representative or balanced selection of subject matter experts (SMEs) from the military, the UN Agencies, diplomats, multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors and development practitioners – including community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – operate simultaneously, they would typically never all be present at the same time, and prepared to brainstorm and then agree an integrated approach to strategy.

This is often because their separate strategies are created in isolation from one another and not ‘joined up’; or because the participants often do not understand strategy anyway – frequently confusing it with analysis. This results in no consensus on a clear and achievable ‘end state’ or critical path towards it. UN Agencies or donors are rarely if ever prepared to share and harmonise plans which are frequently pulled off the shelf from some previous engagement and at best tweaked to suit what is known of the need. In fact, the actors tend fundamentally and instinctively to distrust one another, or even to be in competition; and to be wary, if not jealous, of others’ agendas, influence, or resources. This can even pertain across Whitehall Departments, let alone across the international arena.

Examples of institutionalised structures or architecture to improve or facilitate a more comprehensive approach are emerging. The UK Government has established a Stabilisation Unit with pooled funding from the Ministry of Defence (MoD – DOD equivalent), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO – DOS equivalent), and UK AID (DFID – USAID equivalent). The unit is staffed by a mix of officers from all three departments and has a roster (the Civilian Stabilisation Group) of Deployable Civilian Experts (DCEs – both civil servants and free-lance consultants) covering a wide range of subject matter expertise. It has effectively staffed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan (as has a US Government equivalent
mechanism), and sends experts – sometimes at short notice – to work closely with the military and with diplomats in post in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS).

Furthermore, the UK Government has recently aligned much of its increased international development aid budget with its national security priorities; a policy decision not entirely welcomed by many NGOs on the humanitarian ‘left’ of the development aid community. This makes more funding available for programmes in FCAS where, ironically, fiduciary risk is high because governance and financial management probity are frequently weak or missing. This makes budget support for national programmes or nationally executed funding mechanisms difficult. NATO ACT (Allied Command Transformation) is working alongside other command and staff colleges to create both knowledge and learning materials for operationalising the CA with the result that many in the military are much better informed about the benefits of such an approach, and about how their military technical knowledge can complement governance and development, than their civilian colleagues may be about military, peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations.

**A Somalia Case Study**

So why is it so difficult to mobilise such integrated resources in Somalia? Leaving aside the sufficiently complex issue of whether or not Somaliland and Puntland will ever agree to be part of a Federal Republic and subject in important ways to central governance (for example of defence and security), the answer is that Somalia (as opposed to Somaliland) represents a VUCA challenge for a number of reasons:

1. Until the Capital City Mogadishu is stabilised and sufficient rule of law established, it is extremely difficult to plan or mobilise development efforts. The environment is hostile; even security gains are fragile and can be reversed at any time. Urban guerrilla warfare has given way to asymmetric operations with multiple suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), hit-and-run attacks with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), mortar attacks and so on. Donors are delivering development aid in Somaliland and Puntland, and are starting to provide technical support to the Government in Mogadishu, but South Central Somalia remains a huge challenge at this time.

2. The UN Political Office (UNPOS) had the lead for ‘hand-holding’ the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) through its ‘Roadmap’ for the mandated ‘Transition’. More recently its successor, the UN Mission for Somalia (UNSOM) has established a presence in Mogadishu but has suffered several attacks, and holding meetings with Government partners beyond the secure perimeter of the airfield remains challenging and dangerous. Most dialogue used to take place in Nairobi but the centre of gravity has now finally moved to Mogadishu.

3. Other UN Agencies such as UNDP have been planning and creating sophisticated Transitional Results Frameworks for all the development work that they know it is necessary to deliver for Governance, Rule of Law, and so forth – but have until very recently been largely unable to set foot in Mogadishu because the UN’s ‘duty of care’ regime would not allow this. Now they have embarked (in partnership with the World Bank) on an ambitious Capacity Building Programme which the Office of the Prime Minister will manage.

4. The same, or similar, restrictions apply to US Government officials, such as those from DOS.
5. Neither the US nor many other allied governments wish to put boots on the ground in Somalia. The ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident scarred the psyche of the American people to such an extent that even were it not for growing weariness with foreign wars and a concern for having ‘fingers burned’ in yet one more, deploying ground forces could be a difficult sell. Nevertheless, the US is using covert operations and drones to eliminate key Al Shabaab commanders who make the mistake of using a known mobile phone once too often.

6. Donor Agencies like USAID (with the Office for Transition Initiatives - OTI) and UK’s DFID are keen to engage on the ground and have plans and budgets ready. But the sheer difficulty and danger of deploying civilian experts into what is still a kinetic war zone presents an extreme challenge for many reasons:

a. The previous Somali Government banned private military companies (PMCs) from operating in Somalia and thus there has been no authorised and regulated armed close protection (CP) for civilian contractors as we have seen with the growth market for such services in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The EU Military Training Mission and the UN do, however, have armed personnel to protect their specialists.

b. AMISOM (the Africa Union Mission to Somalia) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops are busy enough with war fighting and with protection of humanitarian food aid convoys, and do not have the time or resources to provide CP for civilians other than the exceptional VIP or high-level diplomatic visit.

c. There is a shortage of safe or ‘hardened’ accommodation at present in the relatively ‘safe’ airport perimeter ‘green zone’ and requires booking well in advance. There are one or two hotels and guest houses in town but these are frequently targets of al Shabaab attacks and not considered safe enough to comply with most organisations’ duty of care insurance or policies.

d. There is no safe or armoured transport available, save that which can be ‘begged and borrowed’ as a favour from AMISOM, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) or Bancroft who already have heavy demands on existing resources. Hiring local armed militias with pickup trucks fitted with heavy machine guns or ‘technicals’ (a practice frequently employed by humanitarian aid agencies and NGOs against all advice) is foolhardy and unhelpful to efforts to maintain command and control of the security situation.

e. Insurance is extremely costly.

f. The absorptive capacity of the Somali Government Ministries and other Somali institutions is extremely low. Ministers and senior civil servants are pulled and stretched in all directions. They are frequently away visiting friendly nations to seek support, or hosting incoming diplomatic visits for the same reason. Many are from the diaspora and also travel to visit families at home in the US, Canada, Britain or other places.

To the surprise of some, however, a new phenomenon has raised its head. ‘New best friends’ of Somalia have appeared and the boldest among them do not seem to suffer from the same rules, caveats, bureaucracy, the scars of history, or one might even say the squeamishness with respect to concerns about corruption or transparency, as do the traditional donors and their governments. Every day new aircraft arrive in Mogadishu with delegations from Turkey, the UAE, China and even recently Iran. They bring resources and cash. The Turks (with their thriving economy) are all over Mogadishu clearing roads, building hospitals, schools and generally making their mark as a
new friend and hero to the Islamic world. They have offered to build a military training base on the outskirts of the capital which could make that provided by the EU effectively redundant. Others – notably the UAE - are already committing resources and the trend seems set to continue.

Like Nero, we may not only be ‘fiddling while Rome burns’ but also while others are rebuilding it (perhaps in their ideological image). The UK, US and other allied/friendly nations need to consider whether they will accept these developments, and whether ‘not to have a clear policy’ is a good enough policy to ensure ‘good enough governance’ – and to secure UK and Western interests in either Somalia or Libya.

Conclusions and Lessons

Groucho Marx once said ‘Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it wrongly and applying unsuitable remedies’. Perhaps politics has always been a VUCA operating environment; and perhaps this is why Winston Churchill’s take on this was to quip: ‘Political skill is the ability to foretell what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month and next year. And to have the ability afterwards to explain why it didn’t happen.’

Joking apart, and although it may be something of a cliché, it is probably true to say that international affairs (and by inference international relations) is a more complex and ambiguous arena than ever it has been in the past. Fault lines are developing between the World’s major religions that threaten the perception of security, and even of civilisation, for millions in ways undreamt of since the height of the Cold War. If there is one ‘common enemy’ that emerges from this complexity it is that of violent extremism and the perversion and politicisation of once honourably held belief systems. New technology – and perhaps most specifically the new social media – have been hijacked to proselytise and to influence public opinion through propaganda that is as extremely sophisticated as it is extremely perverse.

Perhaps the most important VUCA challenge in the field of Security, Conflict and International Development studies today is that of determining – and to the extent possible agreeing with like-minded nations – a strategy for countering violent extremism (CVE) by all available means.

1. Bancroft Global Development, a US NGO, provides training and equipment and logistics support for the Somali Army as a conduit (some would say proxy) for the US Departments of State and Defense. They were the first to build accommodation facilities in Mogadishu airport (including those now rented by the EU and other agencies), and operate with an ethos of ‘Enterprise-led Development’, investing in the local economy while providing specialist training and support services and logistics to AMISOM and the SNA.

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rint%20Revised.pdf (accessed on 01 March 2015).


Abstract: This Chapter provides an overview of the history of training within police peacekeeping and the rationale behind the introduction of pre-deployment training for both individual UN police officers and Formed Police Units. The main drivers for the introduction of this training will then be examined, before looking at the two specific routes the UN has taken towards initiating member state involvement in this training. In so doing, the Chapter analyses the concept of police peacekeeping training from the inception of the UN and provides a clear picture of pressures that have been exerted to achieve the current state of play. Finally it looks to further projects which are still to be developed in the police peacekeeping arena.

Early on in the history of the UN, the first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, proposed a small internationally recruited police force that could be placed by the Secretary-General at the disposal of the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, this was firmly rejected by the UN Member States. This led to the dilemma of how the UN selected, prepared and deployed police peacekeepers. Although nearly 60 years later Mr Lie’s vision did finally come to fruition in the guise of the UN Standing Police Capacity (SPC), the issue of pre-deployment training is still evolving.

In the early days of peacekeeping the deployments were mainly military and it was not until the 1960s that police officers started to be deployed as part of a peacekeeping operation.

During this early period, police peacekeepers were deployed in a monitoring and reporting role accompanying local host-state police counterparts in order to verify impartiality to the local population recovering following conflict. This was backed up by a need to report on what was seen. This was peacekeeping well after the conflict was over and ceasefires had been negotiated and implemented with the assistance of a strong Military component. There was little standardised training or commonly agreed guidance as, at the time, it was considered that the UN police officers who carried out these missions did not require any specialised skills, only a good grounding in general domestic policing and report writing ability.
Following the Cold War this all began to change. UN police peacekeepers were required to undertake more roles including mentoring, training and advising their host-state counterparts in order to build up the domestic operational capability of a war-ravaged or fledgling police service. They may have to train former insurgents to integrate them as law enforcement officers following a change of regime. While this was often demonstrated by UN police assuming training roles, it was steadily recognised that there was also a need for the UN Police to become involved in assisting the reforming, restructuring and rebuilding of police organisations after conflict.

However, building institutional police capacity in post-conflict environments requires experts in a range of specialisms and not just larger numbers of general duties police officers being deployed. Allied to this was the fact that policing was evolving around the world, whether in the form of community-based policing or the gendarmerie. Both types of police officer were becoming more specialised in their use of equipment. The old fashioned omnicompetent patrol officer with his notebook and pencil was being replaced by a series of specialists, with specific skills in investigation, training, firearms, information technology, human resources to name but a few, and all driven by information technology.

UN Missions reflected the evolution of the police, requiring these experts to staff the headquarters of the police component with the additional requirement that they are able to practice their specialism in the unfamiliar surroundings of a field-based mission in a foreign country, passing on the relevant aspects of their experience and knowledge to their host-state police colleagues.

In 1999, UN Police were authorised to undertake executive policing missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste where they were responsible for carrying out interim policing and other law enforcement functions until such time that new police services could be trained and equipped to take over. This marked the first time in UN police history that its personnel had actual hands on policing tasks in two post-conflict societies. While this could be considered as the UN police simply undertaking regular policing duties, there is nothing ‘regular’ about post-conflict policing in a foreign country half a world away in an entirely different jurisdiction with colleagues drawn from similar but equally different policing traditions. Thus, police peacekeeping in a UN or other peace support operation differs significantly from the tasks, priorities and challenges of regular domestic policing.

With the instigation of the C34 Special Committee on Peacekeeping there was much discussion around training for peacekeepers (military, police and civilian). Although various resolutions were debated in the General Assembly they all indicated that pre-deployment training should be the responsibility of the Member States (GA resolutions 46/48 (1981), 48/42 (1993) and 49/37 (1995)) although acknowledging that the UN should provide guidance on what the training should comprise.

The Brahimi Report (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations) argued for ‘a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police in United Nations peace operations, to focus primarily on the reform and restructuring of local police forces in addition to traditional advisory, training and mentoring tasks.’ (UN, 2000: 20-21) To enable this to happen, the Report stated ‘Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools in order to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the UN’ (UN, 2000: 21).
Once again the onus was on Member States when it came to training. The UN had already provided a handbook for police officers deployed on peacekeeping missions where the then Police Adviser, Mark Kroeker, stated in its preface ‘The handbook will also act as a ready reference guide to enable national peacekeeping training centres to provide pre-deployment training for their police officers’ (UN, 2005: iii). This handbook covered the concept of Peacekeeping and the structure of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Police Division, the tasks and activities of peacekeeping operations, report writing, radio communications, security measures, first aid, and safe driving. Although brief, this was a useful guide to those being deployed for the first time.

There is anecdotal evidence that some Member States, keen to ensure that their staff could get through the DPKO selection process, restricted pre-deployment training to perfecting the mission language (French or English), driving 4 x 4 vehicles and shooting, as these were the normal tests used by DPKO Selection, Assessment and Assistance Teams (often referred to as SAAT tests for that reason) to ensure that the officers were accepted to deploy.

In 2006 the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) within the UN Secretariat produced a report which showed that 65% of deployed United Nations police personnel received some formal pre-deployment training, although bear in mind the comments in the previous paragraph. However, only 32% received any specialised training on police peacekeeping related issues. Interestingly, two years later a report from the DPKO Integrated Training Services (ITS) on pre-deployment training found that those who have received some form of pre-deployment training had risen by 2% to 67%.

The latter report went on to state:

   The greatest weakness of the training support currently provided to Member States is that the content of the modules is too generic and voluminous, and does not adequately address key operational and mission-specific challenges. (UN, 2008: 7)

It was following this report that the Standardised Generic Training Modules, which covered very general information about the UN and how it functioned, were revised into the curriculum that is used today.

In 2007 work was being carried out within both Police Division and ITS to fill this training gap with advice to Member States. At the time the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS) was reaching crisis point and negotiations were underway to transform it into an AU/UN hybrid mission. There was much interest from a number of Western donor countries that would be unable to deploy staff but were keen to assist the newly formed UNAMID Mission. A baseline study had shown that less than 10% of police officers were receiving any form of preparatory training. Training of police peacekeepers due to deploy was an opportunity for these countries to engage in bilateral arrangements and discussion was held with Police Division as to how to develop this.

The pilot Interim Police Pre-Deployment Training Curriculum for UNAMID was initially developed by UN Police Division in October 2007 and then discussed and ratified by leading police training professionals from the UN Member States as well as representatives from international police peacekeeping training centres at a seminar at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana. The final version was disseminated to all (then) 192 UN Member States in November 2007 and subsequently the first standardised courses began in January 2008.
A Police Donor Working Group was established in New York in November 2007 to co-ordinate the initiative, comprising of the Police Attachés from the Permanent Missions of the UN Member States and supported by the UN Police Division. This group developed processes and databases to analyse the work being done around the globe and acted as a clearing house for bilateral and donor assisted training for UNAMID. In December 2008, almost exactly a year after its inception, the initiative was evaluated and was assessed as having exceeded its strategic target, since over 76% of the deployed police officers in UNAMID had received the new standardised police peacekeeping pre-deployment training. This pilot was judged so successful, that it was further developed so that it could be adopted as the standard generic police pre-deployment training curriculum for all UN police peacekeeping missions.

So, the UN, recognising the inherent differences from the ‘day job’, has developed a standardised UN police pre-deployment training (PDT) package for use by each of its 193 member states in order for them to train their police officers before they deploy as peacekeepers. This package seeks to operationalise the good practice identified during the first half-century of UN police peacekeeping operations and as such ensure these lessons are not only learned but actually applied.

Eight years on this PDT has become the standard for any police peacekeeper and it is being organised through the worldwide network of Peacekeeping Training Centres (PTCs). The curriculum has been reviewed by both the Members States through the C34 committee and the PTCs and reorganised into Core Pre-deployment Training Modules (CPTMs) and Specialised Training Modules (STMs); the former being generic to all peacekeepers, whilst the latter are specific to the police.

Meanwhile, concerns had been raised with regard to the deployment of Formed Police Units (FPUs). These had been originally deployed in the former Yugoslavia to fill the gap between the Military and the individual police officers as there was a need for a cohesive body capable of dealing with crowd control and public order issues. Initially these had been the Multinational Specialised Units (MSUs) deployed by NATO, which were part of the military SFOR. I It was only during the UN deployment in Kosovo (UNMIK) that Special Police Units (SPUs) were deployed under the control of the UN Police Commissioner. These were the fore runners of the FPUs currently deployed. As with any new system there were concerns that there should be a review of the capability of these units, particularly in the light of incidents during major protests, one in particular, that had led to a fatal shooting.

In 2007 a review group met in UN HQ New York to look at the proficiency of UN FPUs deployed around the globe. The result of this was the Proficiency Training and Testing Teams (PT3) project which saw a small group of Member State experts deploy into UN Missions and conduct testing of the FPUs in theatre to ascertain their capability. The results were not good. Whilst the MSUs and SPU s had predominantly been formed from highly professional Gendarmerie or Carabinieri Units that were used to constantly training and working together. Recent FPUs had different origins. Whilst Gendarmerie and Carabinieri units are sworn police officers, some countries were deploying Military Police formations as an FPU. In other instances it may be police or border guards with a military command team.

Unfortunately, over the years, some countries had deployed FPUs with little or no training. Additionally, before deployment some FPUs had been posted domestically as individual officers at
varying locations with no concept of the unit to which they were now a part. Some were undoubtedly encouraged by the large precept that the UN would pay for an FPU as well as the offer of large amounts of equipment and logistical support by donors from developed countries to offset the start-up costs of these units. The author has anecdotal evidence of a senior African police officer commenting that since his country had discovered the ‘benefits’ of deploying FPUs he had been able to drastically improve his domestic policing arrangements from the funding that he had received and was now in the process of raising another FPU so as to cash in on this bonus.

With donor countries offering to equip FPUs, often they would be given equipment they were unfamiliar with as it was not standard issue in their domestic force and they would receive little or no training prior to deployment.

The teams (PT3) were to assess the FPUs deployed on their basic firearms proficiency, crowd control capability, and command and control, as well as operability of their equipment. The teams deployed to all the seven UN Missions with FPUs: Liberia, Haiti, Congo, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, East Timor and Darfur.

In all thirty-eight UN FPUs were assessed on the criteria stated above, and then categorised as either ‘Good to adequate’, ‘Significant operational deficiencies’, ‘Serious operational deficiencies’, and finally ‘Unrecoverable deficiencies’. Of the thirty-eight, only fourteen were categorised as good to adequate (37%). Of the remaining twenty four, fourteen had significant operational deficiencies, nine had serious operational deficiencies, and one was deemed to have unrecoverable deficiencies and was removed from the Mission with immediate effect.

These deficiencies can be summed up as lack of familiarity with their issued firearms, leading to inability to shoot, load and handle the weapons safely. They had a basic lack of skills in relation to crowd control, insufficient protective equipment, and either responded too aggressively or failed to respond at all. They often lacked essential equipment. What they had they were either unfamiliar with or it was inoperable and in some instances they had unauthorised weaponry.

Within the command teams there was evidence of a lack of both operational and police experience and there was little if any specialised knowledge with internal communication being exceptionally poor.

Hansen, in her paper Policing the Peace: The Rise of United Nations Formed Police Units, sums up the situation by saying:

There were serious operational and structural weaknesses with issues ranging from poor sanitary and living conditions, to inadequate and inappropriate equipment, to dysfunctional command arrangements, and to a lack of firearms proficiency and crowd control skills. They reflected one of the fundamental difficulties in taking Member States up on their offer to supply a formed unit, namely the national interpretations for example of what a formed police unit might be, where it may come from, whether it was affiliated with the military or the police in their home country, for how long the unit may have trained together, or, whether it had any area of specialisation. (Hansen, 2011: 3)

The reason for many of these defects was the lack of guidance on pre-deployment training and an assumption that these were specialised units familiar in both crowd control and weapon handling.
This was clearly not the case. Police Division briefed the Member States and immediately went about forming a Doctrine Development Group (DDG) from which Members States were requested to send experts, to both review the results of the PT3 exercise and to start working towards a universal curriculum as well as an updated policy on the use of FPUs in the field.

Whilst the PT3 project had been mostly about assessment, there had been an element of training. It was acknowledged that this may be the way forward to improve the FPUs in theatre by subjecting them to a regular training programme, as it had been identified that few were engaging in any training at all during their deployments.

The deployment of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) was suggested and Members States were once more asked to provide experts to assist. A draft curriculum was developed at a three week workshop in the USA in February 2009. Following this, a pilot team deployed to Liberia. Meanwhile the DDG continued to work on the FPU policy remotely.

The MTT deployed to Liberia found that little had changed. The FPUs were still not being deployed according to either the policy or the Mission mandate, with small unsupervised patrols of FPU members and host state officers who were unable to communicate with each other, and FPUs being deployed to guard the host state prisons and ministry buildings. At the same time there was little improvement in skill levels.

This led to widening the number of MTTs to all UN Missions. Forty trainers were recruited from the Members States for a six month deployment; six weeks training at the Russian Federation Peacekeeping Training Centre outside Moscow followed by the remainder of their tour in Mission. The teams were grouped into both Anglophone and Francophone teams to reflect the two official mission languages. By this stage there were thirty-nine FPUs deployed in six Missions (UNMIK had transformed to an EU Mission).

There were significant improvements across the board, operational capacity was increased to 75% and Police Commissioners in many Missions asked for the MTTs deployment to be extended. However, it was always recognised that this would be a short term fix. What was important was to have an agreed pre-deployment training package that could be sent out to all Police Contributing Countries (PCCs).

Although none of the MTTs were extended, many police commissioners realised the need for having a training regime for their FPUs and restructured their FPU co-ordination units accordingly so that they had a training capacity.

Meanwhile, the work of the DDG continued and both a draft curriculum and a draft policy were agreed in 2010. The revised policy took into account the varying abilities of FPUs from various different Member States and tied their role to the curriculum that had been developed. Therefore the main roles became:

1. Public Order Management
2. Protection of United Nations personnel and facilities within means and capabilities
3. Supporting police operations that require a formed response and may involve a higher risk (above the general capability of individual police officers). (UN, 2010: 4)
The perception that all FPUs were specialist units had in the past made them appear ideal for capacity building within Missions. It was clear that if this continued, the UN would just be allowing poor practice to be passed on to what was, probably, an already failing host state police force. As a result the capacity building role was removed. The policy also introduced a training regime for the units when they were in Mission.

The new policy was signed off in 2010 by the Under Secretary General at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and these changes paved the way for Train the Trainer courses for Member State trainers. These were delivered in 2011 and 2012 in India and Botswana.

So what do the two curricula look like? Needless to say there are some similarities. The CPTMs prepare the officer for a UN deployment by explaining the UN system, how Missions are operationalised, and the role of the Security Council in the formulation of Mandates. There are key inputs on the protection of civilians (with an emphasis on women and children), and working with Mission partners, and finally more personal input on conduct and discipline, HIV and AIDS, safety and security and diversity.

The STMs are more police specific and cover the role of police peacekeepers and their core business. They also look at various legal systems; the human rights aspects of the use of force and arrest and detention; and finally the practical aspects of land navigation, radio communication and road safety. For an individual police officer this is sufficient until they get into their Mission where the field training units will deal with any more specific subjects relevant to their role.

Obviously, the FPU curriculum is more practical, although all of the aspects of the CPTMs should also be covered by those in a command position. This is then complemented by practical elements. The practical side is split into basic police tactics which includes stopping and searching suspects (both on foot and in vehicles), self-defence, first aid, tactical progression with weapons, and stress awareness. Firearms training covers the basics of firearms safety up to and including advanced shooting techniques so that the officer can demonstrate their proficiency. Training in public order techniques includes all the basic foot and vehicle manoeuvres in crowd control situations along with arrest methods, dealing with fire (petrol bombs), barricades and coming under sniper fire and, finally, how to engage and disengage with a hostile crowd and rescue a unit in danger of being overwhelmed. Security of personnel and facilities covers basic security of buildings and individual personnel as well as patrolling, convoys, checkpoints and explosive awareness. Finally, training in high risk operations deals with interventions in prisons, evicting demonstrators, and helicopter operations.

Additionally, for command staff there is the command element, which includes the orders framework, decision-making process, tactical vocabulary, negotiation and mediation, advanced stress awareness, training and maintaining a unit in the field, and the practical elements of dealing with UN equipment inspections.

So, what has been the result of the implementation of these programmes? Well, so far the individual police officer PDT programme has been successful in increasing the number of police officers deploying to Missions having completed PDT. This has been, in part, due to the increased awareness of the training modules both among Member States and also international peacekeeping training centres. The Interim Police Pre-Deployment Training Curriculum was a semi-finalist in the
prestigious International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Webber Seavey Award in recognition for promoting a standard of excellence that exemplifies law enforcement's contribution and dedication to the quality of life in local communities.

This project had raised the percentage of officers receiving pre-deployment training from less than 10% to 76% in less than two years. However, as Cutillo points out in ‘Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for United Nations Peacekeepers’:

…pre-deployment training is foundational. Ideally members of UN peacekeeping operations should be deployed only once they have received comprehensive preparation, so that they can be fully operational and ready to face their assignments from day one. (Cutillo, 2013: 5)

Unfortunately, the UN is rarely in a position where it is able to turn down offers of peacekeepers. Indeed, it is normally the reverse. So, officers with no pre-deployment training will be accepted on the grounds of necessity, as without them the Mission will be left short. It is questionable as to whether the UN will ever arrive at this state as Durch and Ker stated in a report for the International Peace Institute:

Member States can take a more active role in delivering pre-deployment training to their personnel, based on UN guidelines and training opportunities. (Durch and Ker, 2013: 37)

No doubt some Member States will step up to the mark, but others, keen to earn the UN precept with as little cost to their country’s coffers, will take shortcuts. This is particularly apparent in times of financial hardship when training is more often than not the first victim of any nation’s budget cuts. The UN could always refuse to accept peacekeepers who have not undertaken PDT, but this will inevitably lead to shortages within Missions in the short term which is a risk that they are unlikely to want to take.

Naturally, there is more work to be done in the field of international police peacekeeping training, particularly with regard to specialised courses. This is because a UN Police Commissioner has a very different mix of concerns and responsibilities from his/her domestic counterparts. This is also because a UN Police Planner is dealing with a much wider field of activities in much less permissive settings than a police officer planning for a local event such as a major football match or pop concert or even a cross-border operation involving police and other law enforcement agencies from more than one country (Carpenter and Sharwood-Smith, 2012: 189).

Furthermore, the UN Police Division has begun work on the development of an overarching strategic doctrinal framework for international police peacekeeping that will lead to the development of standardised technical guidance in all areas of UN Police peacekeeping. This will allow personnel coming from a domestic police service to be appropriately prepared to deal with the differences they will encounter when working internationally in conflict-related environments. Already they have produced a new policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions. This has identified the need for training and capacity building as part of a police peacekeepers role; making sure that the officers have the necessary knowledge prior to their deployment. (UN, 2014)

Whilst this Chapter has discussed the general pre-deployment training for both individual officers and formed police units, it has not delved into the areas of specific training such as gender-based
violence and protection of civilians, which is also being developed by the UN. This is because, at this stage, this is not strictly required for deployment unless the individual is taking a specific post. So, it is often delivered to Peacekeepers already in a Mission. That said, it would be the goal of the UN that officers would be equipped with these skills prior to deployment, if possible.

It has also not considered the SAAT and SPAT (Special Police Assessment Team) testing regimes used by the UN to assess suitability of individual officers and FPUs respectively for deployment and whether reform or restructure of either or both would assist.

This Chapter has examined the history and rationale behind the introduction of the standardised pre-deployment training modules for both individual officers and FPUs, outlining the deficiencies that were identified in the system and how they have attempted to rectify them. It has then gone on to look at the current work and its expected outcomes. In conclusion, it is clear that the system is not perfect yet and there will be a need to constantly review the processes. However, with an organisation encompassing 193 Member States which is reliant on consensus for the majority of its decisions it is likely to be some time before all police peacekeepers have received their PDT prior to deployment.

References


The use of Biometrics and Population Registration as a control mechanism in the IC’s political, social and welfare development programmes

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Abstract: This Chapter discusses the challenges of working and researching in the field of electoral administration and censal data. The Chapter considers the use of biometrics and population registration as a control mechanism used by the International Community (IC) through its political, social and welfare development programmes. The Chapter endeavours to identify why the EU is investing in Information and Computer Systems (ICS) technology in the areas of population control and management, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa; what their objectives are; and why, for many of their purposes, the current technology being deployed can be described as ‘good enough’. The Chapter also describes the technological advances currently being made in this area, and demonstrates how some of these advances have come about much faster than either the practitioners or the legislators could have imagined – and, hence, why legislation must keep pace or indeed keep ahead of these changing technologies.

Introduction

This Chapter is being written from the point of view of a practitioner who has been, and continues to be, heavily engaged in the area of electoral administration and censal data. As such the Chapter will throughout focus on some of the challenges of working and researching in conflict-affected environments and will address some of the key issues that the author encountered either when implementing programmes or in attempting to research them.

The Chapter will include commentary on those broader issues of population control, such as free movement across boundaries and the more detailed and connected area of population management.
It will also attempt to identify why the EU is investing in Information and Computer Systems (ICS) technology in these areas, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, what their objectives are, and why for many of their purposes the current technology being deployed can be described as ‘good enough’. The Chapter will also describe those technological advances currently being made in this area, and demonstrate how some of these advances have come about much faster than either the practitioners or the legislators could have imagined, and hence why legislation must keep pace or indeed keep ahead of these changing technologies.

The basic premise of the Chapter is that ‘big brother is not here yet’ in global terms but that we should use this window of opportunity to develop the national and international legislative framework for the day when it is an international reality. The Chapter will raise a number of moral and ethical questions and will illuminate areas where a co-ordinated worldwide legislative response to new and emerging technologies in the field of biometrics would be useful. Although the Chapter will indicate ‘directions of travel’ for legislative action, the author is not sanguine that these actions will occur within the timeframe required.

‘Big data’ and it’s various uses has become something of an international phrase for politicians and others to use in a variety of contexts, but much of its value is in its ability to identify people in time and space. There are a wide range of uses for the ability to individuate people and the Information and Computer Systems (ICS) community successfully demonstrated their capabilities to improve electoral technologies in the 1990s, by the use of digital electronic ‘voting cards’ and then with the use of electronic or scannable ballots from the early 1990s. Much of this technology was first deployed in third or second world states, either as part of a post-conflict measure in places such as Bosnia or in a period of radical change such as occurred in South Africa with the collapse of the apartheid regime. Ironically, little progress was made initially in much of the ‘first world’ where for electoral processes, primarily book and paper based systems remained in place in many cases until today. The USA with its punch card ballots and ‘hanging chads’ would be one such example and the UK with its poll cards and postal ballot systems being another.

As one of the practitioners charged with introducing such systems in Bosnia and other states within the Western Balkans we faced two principal accusations. The first ironically was that they were being treated like individuals from the third world as we demanded that their fingers be ‘inked’ with UV ink to prevent multiple voting. This they claimed meant that the International Community (IC) were treating them like ‘Africans’ or other people from the third world where dipping a hand in a bucket of dye is a common way of denoting those who have voted. The other accusation was at the other end of the scale in that the use of scannable ballots meant local people, particularly in local elections, were unable to see their votes being counted in their village polling station. This, combined with other imposed changes in the electoral code, such as the imposition of quotas for women was a ‘difficult sell’ simply because we did not do this in our own countries in Western Europe. As a Briton and as the Director General for Elections it was particularly difficult as not only did we not at the time permit scannable ballot technology, we had also ruled that the creation of electoral quotas for women was illegal. As the Croatian Ambassador in Sarajevo succinctly pointed out to me ‘You don’t do that in your own country’!

Another more important issue is that the UK is one of those countries most heavily criticised by international election observation organisation such as the OSCE-ODIHR and the UN. Not only is
our first past the post system seen as somewhat undemocratic, a number of the processes within the UK electoral system are seen as being open to abuse. One such example is proxy-voting a practice which is not permitted within any other country within Europe or North America. This and various other elements of the UK system are open to fraud and are basically based upon trust, which of course was not a standard which the Western Europeans were willing to tolerate in Bosnia or indeed anywhere else in the Balkans.

Following the move to scannable ballots and allied systems in the mid-1990s the ‘technologists’ then persuaded politicians and other elites to invest US $ Billions in introducing biometric ID cards, digital passports and other state-of-the-art population management technologies. There have been a few well publicised high profile failures, but the reality remains that many if not all of these systems, although technically first rate in hardware and software terms, are more limited in their practical application than they may at first appear.

In terms of technological progress the EU and North America are moving towards the abolition of the traditional visa regime whereby a stamp or paper is inserted into a passport, to a regime where from 01 April 2015 visas are issued but the data is then held by the issuing country and matched upon arrival with a digital passport. As a result, digital passports will become the norm in Europe, and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and those other states with large numbers of visitors to Europe are racing to introduce and issue compliant documentation. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria are all also moving ahead and are in the process of introducing comprehensive biometric ID card programmes but with mixed success. India, for example, has now managed to enrol over half of the target population and has developed a system with 65 ‘customers’ for the data contained within the cards. Nigeria has also enrolled some 56 million people but has, until the recently announced introduction of a national ID card, used a mixture of systems and suppliers due to the decentred nature of the Federal State. Pakistan, on the other hand, has not only introduced some novel features to its ID cards, such as a special card for ‘Heads of Family¹’, but has also aggressively marketed its ID card technology through its biometric management agency, NADRA, and exported it to countries such as Kenya and Somalia.

What, though, does the possession of a ‘digital passport’ or ID card imply? To the man on the Clapham omnibus it probably implies an electronically scannable device of some sort containing a digital image, fingerprints, perhaps an iris scan and possibly some other data. Well, he would be wrong. The only international agreement on biometric passports so far agreed at the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) – the UN organisation which is the arbiter of these matters for the international community – is a digital image and even this may be ‘scanned in’ from a non-digital original. Digital passports therefore may be pretty weak documents. These images are readable worldwide, but other data may be encoded, and it is not incumbent upon the national authorities to share these codes. The UK Borders Agency (UKBA), for example, cannot read the encoded elements on Japanese passports. Other nations have taken and encoded fingerprint data, particularly those with close links to the USA such as the NAFTA countries, but have economised in terms of the storage of this data by using simple bar code features due to the large amounts of data contained within fingerprint and digital image scans². It is the lack of such useable data which has driven some countries to stick with the tried and tested methods of examining people at borders. New Zealand, for example, with fully US and EU post-2015 compliant biometric passports, has not
installed fingerprint readers or iris scanners at its ports of entry and primarily uses physical identification as entry criteria.

**The EU and the Wider European Space**

Within the EU perhaps the most useable electronic document is the HGV drivers digital ‘tachograph smart card’. This contains a digital image, fingerprints, residence data, licence qualifications and the address of the current employer. This is an EU-wide ‘document’ and is centrally issued, but EU legislation prevents its use by the police as a proof of identity.

As the EU expands further into Eastern and Southern Europe, it has been keen to encourage the newer members to introduce digital ID Cards and passports and in many cases has linked their issue to inclusion within the ‘Schengen’ visa-free zone. Albania would be an example of this phenomena and one for which I acted as co-chair of the committee responsible for introducing the cards and passports as part of a project funded by an EU grant. In both the shorter and longer term, the issue of these cards and passports will lock people into an identity. In other words, from the date of issue ‘John Smith’ will have to remain as John Smith, but the issue that most, if not all, technocrats gloss over, is how reliable is your proof that John Smith was who he said he was on the day he came to initially register? In other words, how reliable is the source documentation and how do you verify it, as a biometric identity system is only as good as the weakest document? In countries where crime and corruption are rife, the evidence from the electoral registers is that the delta between accurate and inaccurate information may be as much as 10%.

In Bosnia we demanded proof from at least three separate source documents before an individual was accepted at first registration as who they said they were. There may also be other impediments to accurate data recording such as the logging of residence information in source documentation⁵. Further impediments to accurate data recording come from the need to have a common agreed spelling. Before the introduction of biometric ID Cards in Albania it was common for people to present a range of documents with their names spelt in a variety of ways. This might be for no other reason than that the name had been written in various documents in different cases, that the people themselves or the people completing the forms were not literate, or simply that it did not matter too much, or for other purely practical reasons⁶.

The examples above go to illustrate that one of the principal difficulties for a member of the IC attempting to implement new systems in third countries is to understand the idiosyncrasies of the community with which he is dealing. He or she might ask his staff to tell them what are the particular points which he or she should understand before implementing a particular programme, but the reality is that in many case they will not or cannot do this. I say cannot, not in a negative sense, but simply because they do not realise that something is an issue and that an outsider might find that the way they do things is unusual. In other words, they will not tell you things which are just ‘normal’ or which ‘everyone knows’ and this is particularly so, if they are mostly not well travelled. To take one simple example, it would not occur to most Albanians in Tirana that the idea of not having a street name and a postal address in a city of perhaps a million people would be regarded as ‘odd’ by someone from outside Albania. Nor might it seem unusual that for the first few years we employed a team of drivers to deliver mail around the system because there was no
functioning postal service at the local level. This, though, is critical information if you are arriving somewhere to assist in running an electoral system or to implement a biometric ID card system.

To take another example, the accuracy of identity data in Bosnia became critical in Eastern Republika Srpska (RS) and parts of the Bosnian-Croat areas where various ethnicities were claiming a stake in local government. In Eastern RS and western Bosnia people were being recorded as coming from Dubrovnik or Split, both of which were by 1996 in another country (Croatia), quite simply because that was what their existing ID card booklets stated. What we then discovered was that although the ID cards stated place of residence, this was in most cases their place of birth. As in the region only Dubrovnik and Split had maternity hospitals, their ‘declared’ populations covered a much wider area than the current city boundaries. The implications of these discoveries had a political impact and were therefore unpopular with the politicians of certain ethnic groups. The Bosnian-Croats for example claimed to have minorities in these areas within Eastern RS based upon the birth records in the 1991 census which was a cornerstone for the Dayton agreement and was used as the basis for the 1996 General Election and for the Municipal Elections in 1997. Our practical evidence refuted these claims and proved that the counter evidence which had been presented from the outset by the Bosnian-Serbs was correct.

Experience in the former Yugoslavia also exposed other weaknesses in existing census data. In using the 1991 census as a key document the IC had failed to identify that it had, as had previous Yugoslav censuses, primarily acted as a military mobilisation document and hence the data for the categories of people available for mobilisation was the most accurate. Many Catholic priests and monks were missing, as not liable for military service, as were women. Indeed we identified over 1,500 women in Eastern RS in 1998 from a population of less than 200,000, all of whom were over 70 who had no documentation of any kind and who were not even registered for health care. The IC was stunned to be told by the OSCE elections team that these women had lived through the Royalist regime, first the Italian and then the German occupation, 50 years of post-war Yugoslavia and then a bloody civil war with no legal personality. Critically, the local community, and particularly some of the local politicians, were well aware of these anomalies and yet it had suited them to keep quiet and to let it slip. Another feature, of course, of the Dayton talks was that only one of the sides represented was from Bosnia itself, that of Alija Izetbegovic the Bosniak leader, the Bosnian-Croats being represented by President Tudjman of Croatia and the Bosnian-Serbs by President Milosevic of Serbia.

As time passes, the biometric identity systems will become more effective as the first generation to become enrolled ‘verify’ the next generation. This is the case with Malta, which has one of the most technologically-advanced identity systems. This was introduced forty years ago and new enrolments are verified by the simple device of taking a digital photograph of the new ID card holder with their father and an uncle, both of whom already have ID cards and who verify in person that this is their son/daughter and so on. This would suggest that the effectiveness of most ID card systems will improve over time and I expect this to be the case with both Albania and Bosnia.

If enrolment and the verification of existing data is a problem in the first world it is even more of an issue in the developing world. The election planners for the first round of democratic elections in South Africa discovered that the censal data for the African population had been constructed from aerial surveys and a simple multiplication process based upon sampling, such that in rural areas
each hut was assumed to contain eight occupants. As a result, detailed and accurate population statistics were impossible to come by. Given an average male life expectancy in 2011 of 49, a rapidly growing population and a minimum electoral age of 18, calculations could be made, but they would only ever be a ‘good guess’.

The minimum age at which an ID card is issued is not an issue for an elections official such as myself, but it is a key issue for those engaged in population control such as police forces. In practical terms, cards are usually first issued between the ages of 15 and 17, because any earlier issue would have limited and only short-term value, due to the changing nature of peoples physiology, particularly that of women. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, however, an age limit of 16 would eliminate 40+% of the population and a large number of ‘armed combatants’ in, for example, Liberia or Sierra Leone and, latterly, the Central African Republic from the process.

I have already alluded to the complications which occur in federal states, such as Nigeria, where previously a range of mutually incompatible systems have been introduced. Nigeria is also an example of a state where the more advanced systems have been introduced first into those states which can afford them, rather perhaps than into those areas where they might be of most use. Further complications arise if the data collected is either not fit for purpose or the uses to which it is going to be put have not been properly thought through. Finally, introducing an identity system and a biometric ID card or a biometric passport is, in many ways, the ‘easy part’. Much more complex is the identification of the customer base and how you are going to manage the data once you have collected it. I am now going to briefly examine some examples.

The initial research into the introduction of the biometric ID card system in Kosovo identified 23 individual ‘customers’ within the government structures. This list was subsequently expanded to 52. Very few required all of the data collected, but all required one or more element of it. The people concerned with driving licences, for example, were only concerned with place of residence, perhaps date of birth and gender and the types of licences held. The health authorities needed a different range of data. Some data was ‘fixed’, such as a date of birth, whilst others, such as the type of driving licence held, would need to be modified, perhaps during the life of the ID Card. In later systems a ‘double sided chip’ enabled some data to be locked for the duration of the card or the enrolment, while the other side could be re-written or amended. This was the methodology we used in 2009 in Albania. Then came the issue of who would be allowed to see what data and who would have ‘writing privileges’ on the cards. Finally there is the issue of the legislation to support the collection of this data and which will protect the individual against the ‘state’. This is an issue to which I shall return to later.

Having looked at some of the issues in terms of verification and identification, let’s take a look at the developing technology which will support enrolment programmes now and in the future. It has been possible since 1999 to conduct mobile enrolment including iris scans, fingerprinting and associated data collection on a wide scale, for example the 370 voter registration centres in Kosovo. All of this equipment was portable, including a generator and was carried in the back of a VW Golf estate and was disassembled each night and taken back for secure storage. The data too was taken back to a central location and the Voter ID cards processed and issued at a later stage. By 2009, when the enrolment equipment was deployed in rural areas of Albania, it was truly mobile with a
fully equipped biometric enrolment facility being mounted in the back of 4 x 4 minibuses with on-board generators. These then moved between isolated communities carrying out enrolments.

Also portable and available from 2001\textsuperscript{10} was a small scale biometric passport and ID card issuing facility, which could be mounted on a desktop-sized work surface. This could produce passports with up to 19 discrete security features, considerably more than were present on the contemporary UK passport. The potential, therefore, exists to be able to carry out the complete enrolment and issue process from mobile facilities.

The one area where there had been limited progress up and until recently was in the field of DNA and only slow progress was expected here. As late as 2006, the US DOD was advised that it was unlikely to be able to use DNA data in operational theatres for the foreseeable future given the weight and complexity of the equipment involved and the cost per sample at that time estimated to be US $ 15,000.

Since that time great strides have been made. A single battery-powered hand-held device, such as the US SEEK II, can now enrol someone in less than 2 minutes, including both fingerprints and iris scans and then, when re-united with its docking station, can automatically transmit that data back to a central station. In parallel, LGC forensics had by 2013 developed the ParaDNA scanner which, at 16 kilogrammes, is portable\textsuperscript{11} and which can generate four DNA profiles every 75 minutes. This battery or generator powered device comes with communications ports, which again permit it to transmit back to a central station or to be used locally attached to a laptop device. Not only did the Rand Corporation fail to anticipate these developments they also failed to detect that costs would also fall dramatically with the LGC equipment costing £80,000 and each sample costing a further £50 in consumables. Although currently this would permit only small scale sampling, and not to ‘forensic’ or legal standards, it is clear that the development of such a capability is only a few years away. Furthermore, even at this early stage of development, the UK, with the World’s largest database founded in 1998, has stored 5.2 million DNA records. To give an example of the potential for growth of even a limited ‘sampling operation’ such has been conducted by the UK, there were 4,368,950 DNA profiles stored by 04 July 2011 when a more stringent criteria for storage came into force in the UK\textsuperscript{12}. It is also worth highlighting at this stage that the UK database does not store any useful genetic information due to human rights considerations, a factor that may weigh less heavily on the minds of security officials elsewhere, perhaps outside of Europe.

If DNA enrolment equipment was added into the existing minibus set-up described above, then a complete enrolment and ID card/passport production process could be carried out remotely and almost instantaneously in a wide range of arduous environments.

Mass ID card enrolment using mobile and permanently-based facilities have been carried out in a remarkably short space of time in a number of sub-Saharan African countries; for example, by De La Rue in Senegal where initial enrolment took nine months and in another EU-funded project in Rwanda. Attendance at enrolment centres has often been aided by a degree of compulsion which would not be possible in Europe. For example, the Nigerians have in some areas made the issue of ID cards a conditionality for receiving food aid or educational provision for school age children.

Using the data collected is in many ways more complex than the collection of the original data. The issues of timely data movement are difficult to resolve in third world countries and are often beyond
the financial capabilities of the countries concerned. To transmit a full set of fingerprint scans in
general requires a bandwidth of 2 MB and this is expensive to provide in countries which do not
have the fibre optic based systems found in western Europe and is the reason why bar coding has
been adopted in some countries such as the Dominican Republic. Additionally, the volume of data
collected makes the information difficult to manage at the ‘front line’. How, for example, are the
Nigerians going to access the 56 million enrolments at each of their numerous border crossing
points? In practice, in many countries the best that can be achieved is to maintain ‘watch lists’ of
people they wish to detain. In many cases in the ‘third world’, countries cannot even maintain this
limited system. Additionally, as is the case in Kenya, the biometric ID card, although in and of itself
a high quality document, is for the most part a plastic card with a photo and some writing on it.

A further problem is that the equipment being used to verify data is in many cases either fragile or
very complex, and its continued upkeep and maintenance is often beyond the capabilities of the
countries concerned. Jordan, for example, has a declared iris scanning capability with the
equipment being donated by the US government. However, it has been out of use for over a year at
the principal air point of entry, Queen Alia Airport in Amman. A further concern for smaller
impoverished but often technologically ‘savvy’ states, such as those in the Near East and the
Maghreb, is the fear of the possibility of external manipulation of biometric data, perhaps by the
software providers or entities within them.

Finally, the question for myself as an electoral administrator is whether a full biometric ID,
including DNA and iris scans, can defeat electoral fraud? The answer is yes perhaps on a large
scale\textsuperscript{13} such as was conducted by Serbia in the election of 2000, but not on the scale usually
encountered i.e. at a level which may alter an electoral result. Such mechanisms as ‘carousel fraud’
are still possible on polling day and of course any system which has the ‘voter not present’ such as
the UK postal voting system will remain vulnerable to widespread fraud.

\textbf{The EU Programmes}

Given the limitations of current systems, do the EU identity programmes in various third world
countries offer value for money and more particularly what are their objectives? At this point I am
going to state that I am not going to look at resilience, ‘contingency’ and disaster strategies, which
merit their own separate paper, except in so far as to state that biometric enrolment programmes can
clearly be demonstrated to assist in these areas. The declared purpose of many of the EU
programmes has been to establish population identities, locations, population growth and life
expectancy rates. The EU’s purpose in quantifying and locating this data is to permit EU aid
programmes to be more accurately focussed. For example, population growth rates and the rate of
‘urban drift’ are essential factors in calculating educational and health requirements and in ensuring
that they are located in the appropriate places. Perhaps only an enrolment programme could have
established that some slum areas of Lagos have a population density of 16,400 people per square
kilometre, and in Rwanda\textsuperscript{14} and elsewhere have demonstrated not only the rate of population
growth\textsuperscript{15} but also the relocation of populations following the various crises in the ‘Great Lakes’
region in the early to mid-1990s. In Rwanda such a programme can identify the numbers of female
heads of household and lead to the development of programmes specifically designed to support
this vulnerable group. Similarly, in Uganda population enrolment can be used to calibrate the
impact of the AIDS pandemic and to calculate the number of orphans and single parent families and to provide the appropriate support for them.

Within the confines of the EU requirement these programmes have been effective and relatively low cost, and can be rapidly implemented. Furthermore, they are scale-able and can be effectively ‘contracted out’. They also often employ one of half a dozen or so recognised commercial companies with a worldwide reputation, most of which are based within the EU\(^{16}\) and hence are reinforcing the EU’s commercial and strategic dominance in this arena.

Having instituted biometric ID card programmes, the EU can then relatively easily assist in their maintenance and upkeep and hence not only improve border controls and of course potentially migration to the EU itself, but perhaps more importantly use the data to insist upon an improvement in the democratic processes internally, particularly in the field of elections – an area with which I have been intimately concerned. In parallel, the EU can put in place the legal structures, such as data commissioners, and can begin to implement Western levels of data protection systems into these societies.

**Some Wider Implications for Biometric Programmes and Limitations or Causes of System Failure**

The creation of ‘exemptions’ negates both the investment and ‘value’ of sophisticated biometrically based systems. What do I mean? Let us take the USA as an example. If you wish to travel to the USA from Western Europe you need either a visa, a visa waiver or an ESTA form and will have your fingerprints taken upon arrival, or will you? The 1.4 million people who are members of NATO and potentially another six million or so NATO military reserves do not have to do this, they have an exemption as do ‘diplomats’. All someone from NATO needs to do to enter the USA is to photocopy a form, get it signed off by an non-commissioned officer (NCO) in his unit and add a basic stamp to the document and he is good to travel. All he/she needs upon arrival is to present this piece of paper and their ID card, in some cases a simple card with a photograph and a name on it, and they are waived through immigration. No photograph, no fingerprints and no further checks. It is also worth remembering in this post 9/11 world that NATO includes countries which are members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)\(^{17}\). However, it is the NATO accords which guarantee free movement between countries and this legislation is unlikely to change in the near future. Even beyond NATO, Kenya with its biometric ID card system and passports permits entry and exit solely on the basis of the production of a UK military ID card. It is also worth noting that diplomats, often a broadly described group\(^{18}\) are also permitted entry to most countries without the production of biometric identity documents\(^{19}\).

As we have already said, data is often protected and encoded and subject to national data protection legislation, but in the case of passports the whole intent is to provide freedom of movement. Let us take the example of a civilian evacuation from a country either entering conflict or subject to a natural disaster, such as has recently occurred in the Philippines after typhoon Haysan. These occur fairly regularly and as a diplomat I had direct involvement in three such Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). In these cases, ‘lead nations’, often including the UK, are responsible for the evacuation not only of their own citizens but also those of ‘friendly states’\(^{24}\).
Let us look now at a theoretical example, say an outbreak of a potentially lethal viral infection such as Ebola in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland (an autonomous state within the boundaries of Somalia) and see how the introduction of biometric passports and identity cards may or may not be an asset in this scenario. Such an event may well trigger a NEO and, in addition to the members of the IC, diplomats and so on who would be evacuated, the EU states would also be responsible for the evacuation of any of its citizens who happened to be on holiday in Somaliland or visiting relatives, for example. The number of Somalilanders with residence in the EU and the EEA is currently about 100,000, so those requiring evacuation could number several thousand. In addition to a large number of Somalilanders in the UK, the former colonial power, there are further significant communities in Norway and Denmark with some 15,000 in the latter country. Once a NEO has been declared it is likely that, at the airport, the likely point of embarkation, the UK authorities would be surrounded by thousands of Somalilanders desperate to flee. How would they ascertain those who were entitled to ‘protection’ and those who were not? Crudely, who would and who should not board any evacuation aircraft? The UK would be able to validate its own passport holders, but would struggle with any Danish passport holder, in particular those who arrived without his/her passport but who may arrive with a Danish ID card or who perhaps having lost his passport would attempt to validate his UK, Danish or Norwegian nationality using one of the 2.7 million biometric ID cards issued by the Somaliland authorities. How would the UK authorities access the Somaliland database or cope with the fact that it is against the Danish data protection rules to pass personal ID data to the authorities of another state? That, however, is clearly what is required in this case if the UK is to provide surety that those being moved have a right to travel at the point of embarkation.

What the examples above suggest is that in order to be effective as a means of providing travel documentation, biometric information has to be shared. At present this can only be done by the state issuing a visa or similar document and by them demanding the information as a condition of travel\(^{21}\). The current population management control mechanisms are subject to rigorous national and international legislative control, but in order to work effectively in a mobile world they will require international agreements on the format in which data is to be stored and presented and, critically, on how the data can be shared. Nowhere is this more so than in Europe where it is possible for a citizen to move by car between five or six different states in one day. These agreements are not in place and are not likely to be so in the near future.

Decisions will also need to be made on the use of DNA for identity purposes. Whilst in the ‘West’ the uses to which DNA may be put may be limited by human rights concerns, this is likely to weigh less heavily elsewhere, for example China with its fractious minorities. Once DNA enrolment technology becomes widely and cheaply available, there will come an inevitable pressure to use it, particularly as it is significantly less ‘heavy’ to manipulate and to transmit in data terms.

**The Legislative Void**

There is a complete legislative void as to how biometric data is used internationally, other than for specific criminal purposes. The technology, as in so much of the biometric identity spectrum, already exists but the legislative mechanism for its employment or, more sensibly, to regulate its employment is absent.
In the international arena, how do we control and restrict the use of forensic data? The UK and the EU have a brief window to introduce appropriate legislation to manage this still nascent technology and to take a leadership role in bringing forward international legislation which will both empower the technology and control it in a manner which is human rights compliant. Put simply, how best do the legislators employ the capabilities with which the technologists have presented them?

This may appear a simple proposition, but if the legislators are unable to agree upon the use of fingerprint data internationally (or even in the case of the USA, nationally), with its 300+ separate databases, we are right to be concerned that, without a concerted effort on the part of UK and EU legislators at the highest level, the technology will continue to evolve without adequate control mechanisms being in place. It is not impossible to imagine in an extreme case, let us say for example North Korea, the sub-cutaneous micro-chipping of humans. This is a process which is well underway in almost every town in the UK for other mammal species. If we do not wish to sleepwalk into a potential ‘1984’ scenario, then urgent legislative action is required.

Notes

1. The Head of Family card gives the linkages to subordinate family members also.

2. Bar code scans of digital images are often used for large conferences in the UK where people are asked to send a photograph in advance with their application to attend and then receive a scannable pass with a bar code. The previously sent photograph is scanned and then held on a database. This, for example, is the technology currently in use at political party conferences.

3. There were thirty-one approved document types in total.

4. For example, proper names can be and are conjugated in Albanian. To use a town name as an example the second city in Albania is ‘Durres’ in the nominative, but ‘Dursi’ in the accusative. The transitive vowel is a common feature of Albanian proper names, but a feature which is ill suited to the modern computer age.

5. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), more generally known as the Dayton Agreement, mandated that the 1991 census document was to be used as the basis of the electoral roll in 1996.

6. The IC assumption had in most cases been that as a socialist dictatorship under Tito the issues of identity would have been firmly under control if only so as to ‘lock people in place’. Prior to the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav state had been declared by the UN on the basis of statistics supplied by the government to be amongst the most literate states in Europe. In practice, the electoral team identified significant levels of functional illiteracy, perhaps as much as 20% amongst adults in rural areas. This was amongst all three major ethnic communities and the author remembers assisting voters in the Bosnian-Croat areas of Livno with the written instructions in polling stations while carrying out electoral observation in the late 1990s.

7. It is not surprising that banks and other institutions in the UK insist upon utility bills as proof of residence as the official data is often so weak. In some social housing areas such as Addington in Surrey (part of the London Borough of Croydon), the electoral roll contains only 52% of the eligible population. There were 31 approved document types in total.
8. Such as in Borno state in the North East and other areas now heavily affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.

9. This technology was not available at the time of the first voter ID card project in Kosovo.

10. This was produced and demonstrated to me by the De La Rue company.

11. The equivalent US system deployed in Afghanistan from 2009 weighs 88 Kgs.

12. The new restrictions focussed enrolment on those convicted of crimes. Previously, enrolments could be carried out to eliminate people as suspects at a crime scene. In some instances this had led to several thousand people being enrolled.

13. If only because the data can be verified and people can 'prove' that they have been enrolled, particularly to the International community (IC) This would have prevented the mass tampering of the electoral roll as undertaken by Milosevic in Kosovo.

14. The Rwandan biometric enrolment programme is very comprehensive including iris scans.

15. The rate of population ‘change’ is also significant. Male life expectancy in South Africa and over much of sub-Saharan Africa is currently 49 years.

16. In addition to the UK-based De La Rue company, the German Bundesdruckerei and SAGEM, a French based company, are all active worldwide in this market.

17. These include Turkey and Albania, but many other states within NATO also support large Muslim populations.

18. An extreme example is the accreditation of well known ‘pop stars’ as diplomats and with diplomatic passports to ease travel. An example would be the Latin American group ‘Los Paraguayos’ who all held diplomatic passports. More prosaically and within Europe, all Irish Army officers hold diplomatic passports.

19. Technically, under the Vienna of Convention of 1945 diplomats are only entitled to diplomatic status in the countries to which they are accredited. In practice most diplomats demand and receive diplomatic status wherever and whenever they travel.

20. In the case of Cyprus, in 1974 this included the citizens of the USSR who were evacuated through the air base at RAF Akrotiri.

21. In the case of the UK, those coming from certain countries have to provide iris scans and fingerprints in their home countries prior to their visas being issued. This data is then held for up to three years.
We Were Rebels
Katharina von Schroeder

Abstract: This Chapter describes the challenges faced by a documentary filmmaker in researching, preparing for and filming We Were Rebels. The film is a feature-length documentary filmed over two years, which follows the trajectory of a young nation, South Sudan, in overwhelming euphoria from their recent independence until the outbreak of war in December 2013. The central character is Agel, a former child soldier turned basketball captain, who returns to his home country to help rebuild it after decades of war.

Introduction

The feature film We Were Rebels, is a 93 min documentary, which was shot over a period of more than 2 years. It traces the trajectory of a young nation – South Sudan – in overwhelming euphoria from their recent independence until the outbreak of war in December 2013. The central character is Agel, a former child soldier turned basketball captain, who returns to his home country to help rebuild it after decades of war.

The independently produced film has been screened in numerous film festivals (see below) and was sold to German TV. In early 2015 it won the prestigious German TV award ‘Grimme Preis’. It has also been screened by the German army, die Bundeswehr.

Background

For a documentary filmmaker, especially working on a character driven film such as We Were Rebels, it is essential to gain the trust of the protagonists. People who have lived through fighting and other traumatic experiences are often very suspicious of what the intention of a filmmaker is. In the case of South Sudan the propaganda during war times suggested that everyone with a camera is a spy working for the enemy.

The feature film We Were Rebels originated in a short documentary we realised as part of the collaborative online documentary project The Two Sudans (see below). For this project we worked
closely together with South Sudanese colleagues from SSTV (South Sudan Television). This teamwork continued also when we realised the feature film. It was especially helpful to overcome bureaucratic issues, such as getting film licenses and to interact with the police and intelligence personnel who are present in most public spaces.

The majority of the South Sudanese population has little or no exposure to television, especially to the kind of narrative documentary we were trying to shoot. In a country with no proper electricity network, accessing a television set is a luxury, mostly only available for citizens living in the capital Juba or other major towns. During the decades of war and even until today, state television only publishes strictly censored news and a few music shows.

To gain the trust of Agel, the central character of the film, we took a lot of time to prepare and film the documentary, discussing with him our ideas. Between 2011 and 2013 we travelled three times to South Sudan and spent more than four months with him. In some way he became a co-director, making suggestions what could be essential for the storyline. Nevertheless, when we started filming it was not easy for him to speak about his traumatic experiences in depth. In his first interviews he only referred briefly to the time when he was a child soldier. However, directing a documentary the strongest moments often happen unplanned. For example, we were waiting for lunch in a friend’s place when Agel discovered a weapon under the pillow. He started to explain how a Kalashnikov works and how he actually used it himself. For me it is a very telling scene, when we begin to understand much more about his past experiences, despite the fact that he is in a cheerful mood. Another time we walked three hours through the bush and he started to make a funny but also very relevant speech about the history of South Sudan.

Apart from transporting a message, it was also important for us that Agel benefitted from the film in different ways. We made a small fundraising clip for his NGO free of charge and managed to invite him for the German premiere of the film, where he could meet different actors in the field of international development.

Nevertheless, conflicts appeared between us, the film crew, and Agel during the shoot. When we were filming near the northern border with Sudan, he was very worried about the security situation. At the same time it was important for us as filmmakers to tell his story in depth. We wanted to spend more time on some scenes, especially in the Abyei area, which is very symbolic for the conflict between the North and South of Sudan. On the surface everything seemed calm but, being a soldier himself, Agel knew that things can change quickly. Furthermore, it was during rainy season and there was a danger of being cut off due to heavy rains. In this case we would have needed to wait for one or two days until the roads would dry to be passable again. Of course, we trusted him with his judgement of the situation but, after a long journey to reach Abyei, it was difficult for us to accept that we would only be able to spend a few hours in the area.

In the end, filming was only the smaller part of the production and we spent nearly six months in the editing room in order to shape and structure the story. For me the greatest challenge was to do justice to a very complex political and social situation while creating a film which can work for an audience who has little or no knowledge about South Sudan.

Acknowledging that the film would be shown on German TV, the contextual information needed to be clear and very concise without becoming superficial. In some way, protagonist-centred films
could be considered to be the opposite of an analytical text. They are subjective, emotional and very personnel, so there was never the idea to tell ‘the whole story’, but to show the developments of a country reflected through the story of one man. There is a phrase used in Germany; that the whole world can be seen in a single village.

Despite the tragic end of the film, it was a great moment to watch the film with Agel for the first time and to see that he appreciates it very much.

Finally, there is the question of the role a documentary film can play in terms of peacebuilding efforts and reconciliation. Can a film raise awareness and start a discussion? Can it change the mind-set of people involved in a war?

A positive example would be the impressive documentary The Act of Killing (2012) by Joshua Oppenheimer and its sequel The Look of Silence (2014). Both films have resonated nationally as well as internationally. The atrocities of the past had, until then, been described by the acting Indonesian government as patriotic and heroic acts. Since the films have been screened publicly, a political debate evolved on how to deal with the victims and perpetrators and how to reconcile them.

Another very recent example is the film Tell spring not to come this year (2015) by Saeed Taji Farouky and Michael McEvoy, a former soldier himself, working as a liaison officer between the International and Afghan forces. The film, which just premiered at the Berlinale 2015, documents the merciless situation of the Afghan forces on the ground and their interaction with the local population. The filmmakers also put themselves in very dangerous situations by filming during various battles. The aim of the documentary is to shed light on the daily life of the young Afghan men fighting in extremely difficult circumstances. The filmmakers were concerned that the image of the Afghan forces in the international media is very negative, portraying the soldiers as opium smoking lazy men. They wanted to show how they try to serve their troubled nation while putting their own lives in danger.

For a film to have an impact, it is obviously important to reach a relevant audience in terms of numbers and people who are actively involved in politics and state building. While we were already able to invite Agel, the main character of We Were Rebels, to the German premier, it is important for us to also bring back the film to South Sudan. As cinemas are virtually non-existent, we are currently planning a mobile cinema tour to screen it in different South Sudanese cities. The presentations would be accompanied by a debate with the local population.

The following texts and stills have been taken from the press kit

**Film Synopsis**

The civil war between the predominantly Arab Muslim North and the South of Sudan, where the population mostly follows traditional and/or Christian beliefs, raged for decades. It was only in 2005 that a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was finally signed that allowed Southern Sudan to vote on its independence. With a majority of 99%, the Republic of South Sudan was declared an independent state in July 2011. The atmosphere was euphoric, and the country’s people were full of hope for a better, self-determined future.
The documentary film *We Were Rebels* tells the story of Agel, a former child soldier who returns home to help build South Sudan – the youngest country in the world. Agel becomes captain of South Sudan’s first national basketball team, hoping that sporting success will help his people regain the sense of self-dignity that they lost during the years of war. Over 2.5 million people died in the conflict, and a large part of the population fled the country. Agel himself lost almost all his male relatives, including his father and two of his brothers. He and his mother fled to Ethiopia where he trained in a military camp. At just twelve years old he went off to war, armed with an AK-47. Later he managed to flee via Kenya to Australia, where he was able to complete school and continue his education.

Agel sees himself as one of the lucky ones for having had this opportunity, and wants to use his knowledge to help develop his homeland. But this is no easy task: South Sudan is still flooded with armaments and the country’s infrastructure was never really developed – there are barely any proper roads, schools or hospitals. In addition, the top-ranking politicians are all former generals and still militaristic in their outlook. Even in the country’s first international basketball game against Uganda, conflicts soon emerge over (game) tactics and hierarchies. But Agel remains optimistic, motivating the team to work harder. ‘These problems don’t just arise in sport – they are evident across the whole country,’ he says. ‘We must have the strength to keep on fighting until something changes.’
Following an injury, Agel’s sporting career comes to an abrupt end. He starts managing an NGO that drills drinking water wells in some of the country’s most remote areas that are still affected by war. With unwavering faith and a great deal of humour, Agel faces the obstacles of everyday life – from unhygienic food to broken roads that even all-terrain vehicles cannot navigate. When his two-year-old daughter falls ill with malaria, he firmly believes that she can overcome the illness.

But the country’s economic recovery is not advancing as hoped. South Sudan is dependent on oil revenues, which account for 97% of the national budget. However, the pipelines for the oil’s export run through the north of the country, where this position is exploited to exert political pressure. Disagreements over the course of the border bring oil production to a standstill, and many development projects grind to a halt.

Even worse, however, is the increased internal political tension. Just two years after the founding of the state, a power struggle escalates between the president and former vice-president that plunges the country into chaos. The conflict spreads among the country’s tribes, turning into what Agel describes as a ‘pointless war’. After getting his family to safety, he sees no other option than to fight as a soldier once again.
Director's Statement

We began working on the online documentary THE TWO SUDANS (www.thetwosudans.com) in collaboration with local filmmakers back in 2011.

At the time, it seemed likely that Sudan – then the largest country in Africa – would be divided. A brutal war between the regime in the north and rebels in the south, spanning several decades and costing millions of lives, came to an end in 2005 with the signing of a peace agreement that allowed the people of southern Sudan to vote in a referendum on independence. An overwhelming majority voted for the formation of an independent nation.

On 9 July 2011, we were able to capture this historical event on camera. Full of hope for a better future, the people celebrated the birth of South Sudan, the newest nation on Earth. It was a time of euphoria, and we were in the midst of it. The people of South Sudan were hopeful for a new nation that would bring them prosperity, improved healthcare and education, and a more secure future. But the cracks had already started to show: funds went missing, and some individuals got rich while others could hardly afford to eat.

So would the people’s high expectations be fulfilled in any way?

Amidst independence celebrations, we began filming with Agel Ring Machar, the captain of the national basketball team, and we realised that his life story seemed to mirror the country’s history. Before the war, he had fled the country as a young boy, only to return later as a child soldier. He had lost many friends and relations in the war, and had suffered physical and mental traumas. Over
20 years on, he was now fighting for the development of his homeland. He was very proud, yet thoroughly critical, and always spoke with a hint of irony.

Inspired by his personal experiences, we decided to document the nation’s progress. We filmed with Agel in South Sudan over a period of more than two years. The country was struggling with various economic problems, particularly since crude oil production – its main source of revenue – was continually disrupted due to disputes with the north. Indeed, in late 2013, all initial hope and expectations were shattered. A political power struggle triggered a war that spread across the entire nation and cost thousands of lives. While hundreds of thousands of people fled, Agel became a soldier yet again.

That means the end of the film is not the one we were hoping for, since progress has been significantly worse than even the pessimists could have predicted. But, just like Agel, we refuse to give up hope that the people can coexist peacefully once the power struggles subside.

Quotes from the film

Even though our generation got traumatised, we must find a way to be good citizens and make sure this country is prosperous, united and democratic.

You have seen a lot of death as a child. It's not easy, being trained to be a killer, to be a soldier. At that age. It distorts a lot of things in your head. I was 7, 8.

If you find somebody that has been shot by AK-47 you will think this person has been hit by a truck. This guy [Mikhail Kalashnikov] designed this good, for poor people like us. It’s not sophisticated, doesn't have night vision or silencers or anything. But it just kills.

I have my own country now. It's my own. This is the only country you can build. You feel you are part of building it, you are part of history.

The current crop of leaders are former generals. And they are militaristic in mind. If they fight it out in a democratic way, good. If they sink to their tribal groupings and pick up arms, then I don't think we will have a country.

If we give up, our country's not moving anywhere. We need the resilience, bounce back, come back. Until something changes.

How do you expect us to act like America? Obama is taking benefit of 200 years of experience. We only have two years! We were just rebels, the other day. We are doing very good, at least we are not shooting each other.

The current situation across South Sudan is appalling. People always say, it is hard to build something but easy to break it down. I just experienced it for the first time properly.
Screenings

2014/05 International Documentary Film Festival Munich (Germany)
2014/06 Official Premiere Berlin (Germany)
2014/07 Rwanda Film Festival, Kigali (Rwanda)
2014/07 ZDF Public German Broadcaster
2014/07 Ecrans Noirs, Yaoundé (Cameroon)
2014/08 iRep Monthly Documentary Film Screenings Lagos (Nigeria)
2014/09 Montreal World Film Festival FFM (Canada)
2014/09 Dok Leipzig market screenings (Germany)
2014/10 Humanitarian Congress Berlin (Germany)
2014/11 IDFA International Documentary Film Festival Amsterdam (Netherlands)
2014/12 Escales Documentaires de Libreville (Gabon)
2014/12 LSE London School of Economics (UK)
2015/01 DocPoint Helsinki (Finland)
2015/01 Nomination for GRIMME AWARD (Germany)
2015/04 Input 2015 (Japan)
Online

Production company: http://www.perfectshotfilms.com
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Wewererebels

Film reviews

English:
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2015/01/12/film-review-we-were-rebels/

German:
http://taz.de/TV-Dokumentation-ueber-Suedsudan/!142241/
http://daskleinefernsehspiel.zdf.de/ZDF/zdfportal/programdata/da3c052c-c5f8-3724-8474-3bb78e48f1f4/20323956?generateCanonicalUrl=true

Crew

Director Katharina von Schroeder, Florian Schewe
Camera Florian Schewe, Katharina von Schroeder
Camera – Destruction Bore Town Simon Lokwang
Camera – Interview Agel Soldier Martin Clement
Camera – Cattle camp night shots Christoph Lumpe
Editing André Nier
Sound Recording Katharina von Schroeder
Executive Producer Inka Dewitz
Music Kaan Bulak, Jan Cziharz, André Nier
Sound Mixing Niklas Kammertöns
Sound Design Thomas Wallmann
Audio Postproduction Neuton Berlin
Postproduction Edelbytes Postproduction
Color Correction Jakob Wehrmann
Graphics Caroline Röckelein
Camera Equipment Camelot Broadcast Services, Berlin
Translation Cholhok Dut, Sara Hanafi, Mahgoub Mohamed Eltayeb
Production Assistance South Sudan Simon Lockwang, Leila Osman, Alphonse O Yoasa
Editorial Department Burkhard Althoff, ZDF / Das kleine Fernsehspiel
Author Katharina von Schroeder, Christoph Lumpe
Associate Producer Katharina von Schroeder, Christoph Lumpe, Florian Schewe
Producer Inka Dewitz, Michael Bogár
Collaborative Online Film project *The Two Sudans* - [www.thetwosudans.com](http://www.thetwosudans.com)

On July 9th 2011, Africa’s largest nation was split in two to become Sudan and South Sudan. In the run-up to that date, we, a group of young filmmakers from Sudan and Germany, felt the need to capture the impact of this unique and historic moment on camera. When we met for the first time in December 2010, Sudan was still a united country, but it was foreseeable that this would soon no longer be the case.

In this time of political turmoil, our team was driven by the common interest to understand how these events are affecting the lives of the people in the North and the South of the country. The Sudanese directors started to follow their protagonists – sometimes friends or family members – and to ask questions about their lives, hopes and dreams. What will change in your future life? What does home mean to you? How can you achieve your personal goals? How do you define your identity?

THE TWO SUDANS is an ongoing web documentary, which embarks on a visually and emotionally gripping journey into Sudan and South Sudan.

Watch the Trailer: [http://thetwosudans.com/msudan/](http://thetwosudans.com/msudan/)
Conclusion: Shared Skills, Challenges and Lessons – Bridging the Gap between the Worlds of Academia and Practice

Dr Eleanor Gordon

The theme of researching and working in conflict-affected environments was chosen for the second SCID Symposium because the SCID Course draws from the work of both academics and practitioners, aims to equip its students with the skills and tools required to pursue a career in the field or further their academic studies, and hopes to contribute towards bridging the gaps that often exists between the worlds of academia and practice. The Chapters in this Reader, and the other papers presented at the Symposium (available on the SCID Blog – www.uolscid.wordpress.com), highlight the similarities in the skills that both the researcher and practitioner require when working in the field, as well as the challenges often faced. It is hoped that the Reader also highlights the lessons learned that can be shared beyond specific areas of practice or research, which could contribute to a better understanding and, thus, response to the challenges of conflict and peacebuilding.

Skills

Most SCID students have extensive practical experience in conflict-affected environments and are encouraged to draw on the skills and knowledge that they have developed in the field in their studies and research. An awareness of how things work in practice rather than in theory, that the practitioner often has, can be especially invaluable when critically engaging with resources, gathering and analysing data, and drawing conclusions. Likewise, academic skills and knowledge developed through the SCID Course, and in academic research more broadly, can enhance the work of the practitioner. Research and analytical skills, in particular, are valuable in many professions and none less so than in the field of peacebuilding or international development: to be informed and to have read widely and critically before deployment to a mission is invaluable. Moreover, a comprehensive conflict analysis – determining conflict actors and dynamics, and being informed of the context, history and culture of a place – is essential to any effective engagement. Advanced research and analytical skills can also help the practitioner identify when and where to access apposite information, how best to retrieve it, and how to analyse it and draw out key aspects. The ability to collate information from various sources, develop reasoned and balanced arguments supported with evidence, and produce well-written and well-structured documents are also
skills that can be developed through academic study and research, which are invaluable in the field. Critically engaging with dominant discourses, as academic learning and research encourages, can also aid the practitioner in identifying marginalised or oppressed voices, alternative or non-formal approaches to peacebuilding and development, and hidden agendas of political rhetoric.

Conversely, an awareness of context and the ways in which conflict is informed by and informs geo-politics, social structures and psychologies is an awareness that can rarely be learnt through reading alone. An ability to identify opportunities and threats to peace, to be aware of the complexity of voices and demands – actors and activities – in the field, and to operate in circumstances not intimately familiar, can help equip the researcher with the skills and knowledge to be able to undertake original, credible and powerful research. Research often undertaken by SCID students tends to be informed by the complexities and challenges of working in conflict-affected environments and the difficulties of effectively and positively contributing to the development of sustainable peace. Such research also tends to be characterised by a passion to understand more deeply and contribute more broadly to the ways in which security, justice and peace can be built.

**Challenges**

As highlighted throughout the Reader, there are significant challenges presented by working in conflict-affected environments that will impact both the practitioner and researcher, although to varying degrees, which often depends upon the support network that exists. The nature of conflict-affected environments means that a high level of flexibility is required and so planned activities may need to be regularly revised. Such environments are also often highly politicised and there tend to be a multiplicity of actors engaged, particularly in the aftermath of conflicts. An ability to analyse often rapidly changing conflict dynamics, identify relevant conflict actors, navigate the field and get on with others are all skills required in researching and working in conflict-affected environments. Language, logistical and security issues can also pose challenges to the researcher and practitioner: interpreters may be needed; living accommodation may be basic and access to water, electricity, a telephone network and the internet may be sporadic or poor; and the security situation may prevent access to certain people or places at certain times and compounds the ethical issues that need to be considered (not least concerning the security of self and others engaged). Dealing with trauma and traumatised people is also difficult: the researcher and the practitioner need to reflect continuously upon whether their work causes harm. Continual self-reflection is also necessary, not least in order to guard against the emotional effects of witnessing or listening to traumatic events causing harm to themselves and, thus, the project they’re working on and the people with whom they are engaged.

**Lessons Learned**

The Chapters contained in this Reader and presented at the Symposium highlight a number of skills and lessons learned that would benefit both the researcher and practitioner. These lessons learned can be summarised as the need to:
• Be responsive to ever-changing dynamics in post-conflict environments and be flexible with plans;
• Avoid underestimating the amount of planning and preparation required;
• Conduct a conflict analysis prior to and throughout engagement, and to consider potential problems and ways in which they can be overcome;
• Identify priorities and dependencies in the actions to be undertaken;
• Be familiar with the specific context within which work will be undertaken;
• Draw on applicable lessons from elsewhere;
• Consider the impact of work on others and endeavour to ensure no harm is caused;
• Be aware of security risks (to self and others) and take necessary action to minimise those risks;
• Take care when recruiting people (whether as a practitioner or as part of a research project);
• Exercise humility and have respect for others, treating people as people and not simply as research subjects or conflict actors;
• Recognise the power relationships between academic or practitioner and those in the field, and attend to power imbalances by engaging local actors in the design of projects (whether research projects or projects designed and implemented by practitioners) and giving something back to those who have contributed to the project;
• Accept that the success of projects is dependent upon the support and engagement of local actors, and recognise and utilise their knowledge and advice;
• Acknowledge that there is no such thing as objectivity, recognise that action or inaction has an impact on the field, and make decisions accordingly (for example, about whether to share control of projects or take action to prevent suffering when situations present themselves);
• Develop inter-personal skills, including an eagerness to learn from and listen to others;
• Take time in the field (to build trust and rapport);
• Develop self-awareness and recognise when stress or other intense emotions risk harming the project and those who are associated with it.

A number of Chapters draw attention to the specific skills required by certain professionals engaged in conflict-affected environments, which are equally applicable to others engaged in these environments; both practitioners and researchers. Alex Batesmith’s Chapter and the presentation given by Anna Shevchenko (Managing Multi-Cultural Teams in Conflict Environments [Experience from Ukraine]), in particular, highlight the need for practitioners (and researchers) to be attentive to cultural dynamics; to recognise and respond to different cultural attitudes and needs; and to be culturally effective by developing and practicing good listening skills, and having humility and respect for others. Chapters by Chris Sharwood-Smith and Douglas Brand OBE highlight the importance of being well-prepared and trained in advance of deployment, and of identifying the right people to be deployed to the right places at the right time.
Chapters by Douglas Brand, Chris Sharwood-Smith, Alex Batesmith and others also demonstrate the role that employers have in contributing to effective peacebuilding by selecting, training and supporting people and in evaluating their performance. These lessons can be applied to those engaged in conflict-affected environments beyond the police peacekeeper, lawyer and those working in aid and development – the focus of the Chapters by Chris Sharwood-Smith, Alex Batesmith and Douglas Brand, respectively. These and other presentations also highlighted the importance of focussing on competencies beyond technical ability and knowledge when determining who should be recruited or engaged in a particular project. Oftentimes, compassion, empathy, motivation and commitment to making a positive contribution are overlooked during the recruitment and selection processes in favour of ascertaining the technical skills and prior experience someone may have, as highlighted in Douglas Brand’s Chapter. Likewise, Emmicki Roos’ Chapter underscores the importance of introspection and internalising – within ourselves and the organisations in which we work – the values that we outwardly project in the work we do. As Alex Batesmith’s Chapter suggests, it is skills such as the ability to listen, show humility and respect towards others, know oneself and the environment in which one works, and cultivate and demonstrate commitment to contributing to the host country that will determine project success. Related to this, Anna Schevchenko’s presentation also clearly highlighted the need to recognise and respond to the different skills and styles of different members of a team when allocating tasks, to avoid conflict and facilitate programme success. Again, these skills are, of course, as relevant to the researcher as they are to the practitioner.

Similarly, there are lessons that could be usefully shared with practitioners by those engaged in the field of research in conflict-affected environments, which are highlighted in the Chapters by Dr Tony Welch OBE, Dr Alex Finnen MBE FRGS and Dr Eleanor Gordon as well as the presentation by Professor Alice Hills (Personal Reflections on Police Research in Conflict-Affected Environments) in which she reflects upon the challenges of her research in Kano, Nigeria (Hills, 2011). These lessons include the importance of determining what analytical tools to utilise and what information/literature to draw upon (and the importance of being aware of and reflecting upon one’s choices and how it will impact the research); reflecting upon the impact of the research process and output on the research participants and research environment; being aware of and addressing the power dynamics between researcher and research participant; and being familiar with the impact on research of the choice in gatekeepers, locations chosen for research, use of language, issues addressed/questions asked, and so on. Alex Finnen’s Chapter on research design (Chapter 2) refers to the skills and knowledge that someone who is both an academic researcher and a practitioner might have. This Chapter also reflects upon the role of a scholar-practitioner, crucially proposing that the concept of participant observation as a research method be revisited to encompass those participants who are decision makers within the field under investigation.

Aside from common guiding principles and lessons that can be usefully shared between practitioners and researchers working in conflict-affected environments, lessons can be learned from others beyond the parameters of those directly engaged in or studying/researching building security and justice after conflict. Katharina von Schroeder’s
Chapter and film *We Were Rebels* highlight the need to spend a significant amount of time to build trust and rapport. Her presentation also resonated with the practical challenges of conducting research, particularly without any institutional support, that were highlighted by Alice Hills as often constituting the most instrumental challenges to a research project: where to live while in a conflict-affected environment; how to get around; where to find an interpreter; and what to do in the event of a security incident or unforeseen development, for example. *We Were Rebels* demonstrates how complex phenomena, such as conflict or peace processes, can be shown through an in-depth study of a single person or place and, crucially, it captured the complexity and emotional content that can sometimes be missing in research or project outputs. Similarly, concepts, theories and approaches developed in other disciplines may also add value to those engaged in conflict resolution or peacebuilding. For example, the way in which theories and strategies developed by the military can be applied in management, and *vice versa*, and further applied to others working in volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) environments, such as conflict-affected environments, was detailed by Peter Reed in his Chapter.

Presentations by Maureen Poole (*Working in Conflict-Affected Environments: Lessons from Ukraine*), Richard Byrne (*Food Security and Conflict: Stabilisation Forces and Agricultural Awareness*) and Matthew Waterfield (*Challenges of Monitoring and Evaluation of Programmes in Conflict Affected Countries*) also highlighted the lessons learned that can be shared among others engaged in conflict-affected environments. The latter two in particular indicated the benefit that closer working relationships between academics and practitioners can have on peacebuilding efforts, not least in terms of the importance of gathering and analysing data in order to inform practice and, thus, improve performance and results.

**Bridging the Gap**

Notwithstanding the role of scholar-practitioners that many people associated with the SCID programme occupy, there is often a gap between the worlds of academia and practice. Indeed, even those engaged with both academic research and practice often suffer the effects of preconceptions (not academic enough / too academic; not objective / not engaged) aside from being drawn by often competing priorities, forms of engagement and output, and work styles and cultures (Wessells, 2013). However, as Wessells (2013: 102) argues, ‘the interconnection between practice and research is crucial since practice without research and reflection tends to leave one ensnared by one’s dogmas and preconceptions, just as research without practice tends to leave one disengaged and trapped in the ivory tower.’ As has been outlined above, in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding there are skills that benefit both the academic researcher and practitioner, similar challenges faced, and lessons learned to be usefully shared. Most importantly, there are skills and knowledge possessed by the practitioner that are of enormous benefit to the academic researcher, and *vice versa*. For example, as Longman (2013: 269) details:

> Since my first position with [Human Rights Watch (HRW)] in 1995–6, I have traveled to Africa many additional times, sometimes for formal academic research, sometimes for HRW and other organizations working in the field. Far from finding
these two types of research to be contradictory, I find them to be complementary. I find that my social science research skills are highly useful for investigating human rights abuses or for helping the U.S. government analyze the principal challenges for democratic consolidation in a country. My social scientific training pushes me to conduct more systematic research, to go beyond key informant interviews and talk to the sorts of people – the poor and uneducated – who are often overlooked in brief assessments, and to push outside the capital cities into the countryside as much as possible. My knowledge of local languages and cultures helps me ask better questions and allows me to assess the veracity of answers.

On the other hand, working for governmental and nongovernmental groups has forced me to revise both my research and my writing. I have been forced to consider the potential impact that my research might have. I have been challenged to think about priorities for research projects based (at least in part) upon perceived needs for the societies that I am studying rather than simply choosing a topic that I might find personally most intriguing. In writing, I have been pushed to avoid jargon and to write in a fashion that will be accessible to people outside a narrow academic field.

A better understanding of the mutually beneficial roles of the academic and practitioner is required. While academics and practitioners may be bound by different organisational and disciplinary constraints, utilise different languages, speak to different audiences, operate according to different time-frames, and focus on different outputs, at a very basic level the overarching aims of engagement in conflict-affected environments are, at least ostensibly, harmonious. Closer working relationships between academics and practitioners can aid the work of the researcher by opening (and closing) some gates, further exposing the researcher to the detail of how practice is lived, and enabling the researcher to have a greater reach and a greater impact in his or her work. The academic’s role to inquire, inspect, analyse, critique, understand and to contribute to the body of knowledge is, of course, invaluable to the role of the practitioner if endeavouring to affect change and ostensibly build peace – although understandings of the specific character of that peace may not be shared by everyone. As Bush (2011) has outlined, research can contribute to peacebuilding by analysing the complexities of peace and conflict; questioning the take-for-granted, accepted ‘truths’; impacting policies and programmes as well as solving problems, especially if the research is action-oriented. Crucially, research can also help provide and protect a space for ‘contentious ideas to be presented, examined, developed … [which] cannot be over-estimated especially in settings where space for dialogue, independent thought, and political engagement has been reduced, or is under attack outside of the walls of the university’ (Bush, 2011: 5). Of course, the extent to which research can positively impact peacebuilding, and broader practice, depends upon the nature of the research – such as the choice of research questions and methods, the engagement of research participants, and the involvement or support of research staff from conflict-affected environments.

Church’s (2005) analysis of the extent to which research on conflict issues influenced policy development showed that it rarely informed decisions that would not have otherwise been taken. However, it was often seen to influence ‘the context within which policy is developed
by illuminating new trends, offering different paradigms, improving the understanding of a problem or coining new and improved terms’ (Church, 2005: 6). A closer working relationship between the academic and the practitioner can ultimately help research reach policy-makers (directly and indirectly – through collaborative research endeavours and through informally disseminating output or influencing the field). As Luc (2006) has described, there is certainly a need for better information exchange between practitioners in the field, decision makers and researchers, not least in order to better respond to the challenges of conflict and be more effective in peacebuilding.

Of course, critical engagement with peacebuilding endeavours or even the concept of peace itself can hinder efforts to establish better relationships between academics and practitioners, and research in the field can increase tensions and impact conflict dynamics. Nonetheless, the advantages of closer working relationships far outweigh the potential risks that might present themselves; indeed closer working relationships can minimise the extent to which these concerns or risks may manifest themselves.

However, the politics of peace and peacebuilding aside, often the relationship between academics and practitioners is hampered due to preconceptions among academics that close allegiance with practitioners may undermine objectivity and impartiality; on the part of the practitioner, a closer relationship is often avoided due to misconceptions about academics as relevant actors in the field and as people who can influence change and even understand ‘the reality’ as opposed to ‘the theory’. For academics, practitioners are seen as research participants and a certain distance must be maintained; for practitioners, academics are disassociated and not wholly relevant to the conflict resolution, peace-keeping or peacebuilding process (or aspect thereof). These preconceptions of impartiality and disassociation need to be addressed if there are to be better relationships between academics and practitioners. However, the world of academia and the world of practice (in the case of peacebuilding; the international community) are similar in that they often, ironically, insular and they utilise and defend a set of established practices and discourses which operate to self-legitimise, exclude others and deter scrutiny. An openness to change, as highlighted in Emmicki Roos’ Chapter, is required if new allegiances are to be formed, new bridges built, new approaches identified and progress made. An openness to change, however, carries risks and may not be attractive to those who don’t wish to critique their world views and, similarly, don’t wish their – often privileged – place in the world to be critiqued.

Without better relationships between the academic researchers and practitioners there are missed opportunities to utilise the experience and knowledge of each other and with it, of course, missed opportunities to better understand and respond to the challenges of conflict. Of course, establishing a stronger relationship shouldn’t be at the expense of further excluding those who are the most directly affected by conflict, and further reinforcing concepts of expertise and legitimacy in terms of knowledge and engagement in efforts to resolve and prevent conflict. Aside from critically reflecting upon our roles as well as upon peacebuilding efforts more broadly, we also need to ask what the aim of our work or our research is and who, ultimately, we are writing or working for – and whether it is ultimately, in whatever way, for those who most suffer the effects of conflict.
It is hoped that the SCID Course and particularly the establishment of the SCID Panel of Experts contribute towards bridging the gap between academia and practice. Specifically, it is hoped that this Reader will help underscore synergies between the two, draw attention to the common skills and challenges faced, and help show that bridging the gap between academic researchers and practitioners can lead to a better understanding of and, thus, better response to the challenges of conflict and peacebuilding.

References


